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Despite an ever widening base of literature in the field of conflict management, the 
seemingly simple question of what is meant by 'success’in the context of mediation 
outcomes remains unsatisfactorily addressed. 
As such, a framework intended to begin to rectify this has been developed out of two 
basic theories. The first suggests that success is not, as it is often depicted, a singular 
phenomena, but rather that it exists on a continuum of possible mediation outcomes. 
To this end, a continuum is created indicating the extremes of success and failure and 
suggesting a transitory zone within which success at its most modest and failure at its 
most marginal meet. It is suggested that it is by identifying what distinguishes success 
at this point that it can best be understood. 
The second theory, suggesting that mediation outcomes are ongoing social processes, 
rather than discrete, singular events is then utilised to inform the selection of a 
number of determinant factors it is suggested may feature in separating success from 
failure. These are: the nature of the agreement, re『 entry,impact and durability. 
In order to advance these theories, the framework is tested by way of two detailed 
qualitative case studies; Camp David and the Oslo process. As a result of this testing, 
it is suggested that while one study alone cannot hope to comprehensively address 
such a broad concept as that of success, a number of conclusions can be made that 
reinforce the merits of placing success on a continuum. The practical method of 
tracing the developmental process of a mediation outcome also delivers some 
interesting insights into the manner in which post agreement features of a mediated 
agreement, such as re-entry and durability may actually serve as more useful 
indicators of success than a simple impact assessment. 
The thesis finishes with some practical suggestions for both conflict management 
research and policy making. 
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What Is Success And Whv Does It Matter? 
＊キ＊＊ヰミ＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊
“Trumpets For A Day Of Glory”i blared the New York Times headline of 
September 14, 1993, as back channel negotiations between the Israeli Government 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization bore fruit with the announcement of the 
Oslo Accords. Contained within the accords were an array of agreements regarding 
the future of both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples that hinted at the once 
inconceivable; peace in the holy land. Of course, the accords were only ever intended 
as a stepping stone, the first building blocks of a better future, rather than a guarantee 
of peace themselves. However, the magnitude of there being any sort of agreement 
between the two former enemies, combined with the rich symbolism of Yitzhak Rabin 
and Y asser Arafat’s signing of the Declaration Of Principals on the White House 
lawn, gave the Oslo Accords the appearance of being “an historic turning point in the 
Middle East”f and a diplomatic triumph of the highest order. Rabin and Arafat, along 
with Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres, were jointly named Nobel Peace laureates 
and the world had witnessed the highest profile example of successful conflict 
management in the post-Cold War era. 
Less than a decade after Rabin and Arafat’s famous hand-shake, however, the 
‘success’of the Oslo process seems less certain. Voices of dissent from the time have 
been ampli日edby an al too familiar cycle of assassination, military incursion and 
terrorism, and the headlines of today contrast starkly with those of 1993 while 
ignoring gains that were made subsequent to the Accords' ratification. The Oslo 
Accords' 'Trumpets of Glory' have been drowned out by “The Battle Of 
Bethlehem."" 
中＊＊本＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊
1 New York Times, September 14, 1993. 
2 New York Times, Sept巴mber1, 1993. 
3 Christchurch Pres, April 3, 2002. 
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How does one evaluate and define an event like the Oslo peace process? Does 
its ground-breaking nature constitute a success, or does the region’s tragic return to 
violence in recent years imply failure alone? Indeed, what is success in such a 
situation? It is a simple question, but one that the field of conflict management has yet 
to address in a comprehensive manner. 
Given the considerable amount of work focused on discerning conditions for 
successful conflict management episodes,4 it is the height of irony that so litle work 
has been focused on developing a clear understanding of what success itself entails. 
Too often, it seems success is either lazily assumed to be a universally understood 
concept or, alternatively, is defined on a case by case basis in an arbitrary and poorly 
reasoned manner. Equally often, it seems, much focus is placed on assessing 
mediation agreements alone, ignoring the ongoing nature of any conflict management. 
In an eagerness to establish 'end points’for framing evaluation, results are provided 
that may not be in sync with the developing realities of a given situation. Furthermore, 
the array of possible success indicators utilized by those attempting a definition of 
success is so diverse that most ultimately only address one or two aspects of what 
might be inco中oratedin a truly thorough understanding of success. Put simply, there 
is a noticeable gap in the literature of conflict management for some more 
comprehensive discussion of what success entails. 
4 For exampl巴， se巴Zubeck,Jos巴phine.Pruit, D巴an.Peirce, Robert. McGillicuddy, N巴il.Syna, Rel巴na.
“Disputant And Mediator Behaviour Affecting Short Term Success In Mediation" in IQ旦盟主LQf
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, 1992 or Kleibo巴r,Marieke.“UndぽstandingSuccess And Failure Of 
International Mediation”in Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, June 1996. p. 370 
This thesis contests, therefore, that success in mediation may best be 
understood by way of a continuum of possible mediation outcomes. Existing on this 
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continuum, it is suggested, is a transitory zone within which the ‘modest extremes’of 
success and failure are housed and that it is by considering a range of determinant 
factors that one can establish the success or failure of a given event. From this, further 
conclusions can then be drawn about the nature of success. Of course, such a creation 
will serve more as a rudimentary framework for the development of an improved 
understanding of mediation outcomes, than as a comprehensive tool for defining 
success. However, it is contended that this is ultimately of more value than making 
any attempt at creating an‘absolute’definition of success, a task it is suggested, is not 
practically possible. 
Of course, to the layperson, any attempt to fil this perceived gap in the 
literature and create a well defined framework for understanding success in conflict 
management may seem somewhat pedantic. Surely al that matters is that those 
involved in a conflict management episode, be they disputants or third parties, have 
an innate understanding of what they deem success in the circumstances at hand? Any 
further consideration is of no practical necessity. Furthermore, the potential 
complexity of trying to further the understanding of such an ultimately abstract term 
in such an inexact science, only to potentially face the same criticisms as those that 
went before it, may seem like a difficult and potentially fruitless task. However, in 
reality, this undertaking should not be viewed as pedantic nor futile. There are a 
number of reasons for this. 
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A clear understanding of what success is and what it entails is vital to the 
development of conflict management theory. If successful episodes can be fully 
analyzed there is some hope of replicating that success in future endeavors, the 
benefits of which are obvious. However, without a clear and defensible explanation of 
how success is to be understood, this undertaking can be called into question. Should 
the events surrounding the Oslo process be held up as a shining example of how to 
forge towards a successful conflict management episode, or should research address 
the flaws in the process that lead to its failure? What will be learnt from the 
experience is largely dictated by how its outcome is defined and, hence, it is important 
that definition is borne out in the most comprehensive, transparent manner possible. 
Likewise, studies attempting to discern common trends or dominant factors in 
successful mediation episodes will return results influenced at least in part by what 
conception of success was utilized in selecting case studies. Hence, without a clear 
understanding of what success may be considered to entail, a study’s results have no 
true context. 
On a more immediately practical front, the creation of a framework for 
understanding success may provide a useful tool for mediators and disputants alike. 
Ascertaining what features of a conflict outcome may be instrumental in suggesting it 
to be either a success or a failure and in suggesting means for their investigation, for 
example, could suggest much for the assessment of mediatfon outcomes, and hence 
what can be learnt from them. 
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Much of this thesis will focus upon the understanding of various concepts and 
terminologies. For the most part, they will be defined as they are required. However, 
two basic concepts require explanation from the outset. 
Conflict management is essentially a generic term for any and al approaches 
for dealing with conflict situations. In a broad sense, one could assume this to involve 
the use of military force and other conflictual behavior. Conflict management does 
not necessarily imply conflict abrogation. However, in general, and for the purposes 
of this thesis, conflict management should be understood as a blanket term for the 
broad range of methods utilized in the hope of halting or harnessing conflictual 
behavior and (peacefully) settling points of contention. These include, among other 
things, negotiation, arbitration adjudication, and mediation itself. 
Mediation is a means of conflict management in which conflicting parties 
gather to seek solutions to their problems, accompanied by a mediator who serves to 
facilitate discussion and the flow of information, aiding in the processes of reaching 
agreement. An informal process (notwithstanding the protocol associated with higher 
level mediation episodes in the political arena) mediation follows no set process or 
structure. Furthermore, its functionality is derived from its facilitative nature, it does 
not have any direct legal basis or institutionalized authority. For this reason perhaps, it 
tends to be the conflict management technique most widely utilized in the 
international environment, where there is seldom an adjudicatory power capable of 
dealing with issues of conflict. In keeping with their informal nature, the assumption 
is also made that mediation episodes are informal undertakings. Certainly, there are 
pressures involved in the decision to enter into mediation, particularly in the 
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international environment, but the final decision to participate must be that of the 
participant, not a matter of duress. Otherwise, the very nature of mediation is called 
into question. The relevance of this factor will become apparent in the following 
chapters. 
Although the information presented in this thesis will be derived from across a 
broad range of mediation, conflict management and social science sources, its focus 
as regards practical application, is the mediation of international and m吋orinternal 
armed conflicts. As well as being the author’s area of interest, these sorts of conflicts 
are particularly suited to the informal, non-judicial approach of mediation. 
Furthermore, the complex nature of such conflicts also means they are particularly 
well suited to highlighting both the difficulties of, and the need to, create a framework 
for better understanding success. 
In order to complete this task, the thesis shall unfold as follows; 
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two will introduce the reader to the array 
of difficulties inherent in the evaluation of any phenomena in the social sciences. 
When boldly stating that a particular task has been left undone too long, it is 
important to understand why. In this case, much of the answer may lie in 
understanding the complexity of social science evaluation. Defining a given event as a 
success or failure is often the ultimate goal of an evaluatory process. As such, failure 
to provide a framework for making such definitions may be a result of problems with 
the evaluatory process. An array of potentially salient problems associated with the 
evaluation of social science phenomena are thus discussed in this chapter. The 
pur下osebehind this is both to highlight why success may not have been as thoroughly 
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addressed as might be ideal, and also to suggest issues that must be taken into account 
if one has any intention of rectifying that situation. 
Having considered the potential hindrances to defining success that are 
presented by the nature of social science evaluation, it is then important to consider 
the manner in which the task of understanding success has been addressed in the 
conflict management field. Chapter three focuses on this, with a consideration of a 
range of approaches utilized that suggest a variety of possible means for addressing 
the question of success. In many cases the ideas discussed are not specifically 
addressing the question of defining success. As suggested, it is an under-researched 
question. However, they regularly imply understandings of what success must entail 
in their discussions of other topics from which ideas about the nature and 
interpretations of success can be‘reverse engineered' after a fashion. Many of these 
approaches present competing possibilities and, superficially there is litle 
compatibility between them. However, understanding the range of possibilities 
already present in conflict management literature is important in creating a new 
approach. 
Having done this, chapter four will focus on the creation of a framework for 
success. The intent is that it will be at once comprehensive, simple and practical. In 
utilizing and refining many of the possibilities for framing success discussed in 
chapter three, and addressing the difficulties of evaluation highlighted in chapter two, 
it is believed that a comprehensive approach to the issue can be provided. The first 
half of the chapter sees to this with the creation of the framework and its explanation. 
It is also hoped that in distilling the issues of the first two chapters in a comprehensive 
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fashion, a degree of parsimony will be provided. The second half of the chapter, 
meanwhile, sets about providing a practical aspect for the framework, by suggesting 
the practical means for its operationalization. While generally frameworks are created 
as tools for framing real world outcomes, in this instance it is the case studies that 
shall be utilized equally as much to elaborate on the nature of the framework itself. 
This is seen in chapter five. The practical guidelines discussed in the previous 
chapter are utilized in the undertaking of two case studies; the Camp David Accords 
of 1978 and the Oslo Accords of 1993. As suggested, the intention of these studies is 
to assess the functionality and practical merit of the theoretical aspects of the 
framework. Each case shall be explained according to a series of indicators provided 
by the previous chapter, the outcomes to be discussed as regards their implications for 
the theory itself. 
Having completed this process, the paper will be concluded in chapter six. The 
process of the framework’s development shall be reviewed and issues raised by the 
case studies will be discussed. Any required refinements of the associated theories 
will also be undertaken. The implications of these developments will also be 
addressed, and suggestions for the focus of future discussion shall also be made. 
Rounding out the chapter and the thesis will be a series of final observations and 
suggestions of their potential practical impact. 
Of course, no process can ever hope to completely define a term such as 
'success’. However, it is hoped that this undertaking will facilitate a more thorough 
discussion of the issue and provide a better understanding of how it may be best 
addressed in the mediatory context. 
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(2) 
THE DIFFICULTIES OF EVALUATION 
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
10 
When approaching the task of framing success in mediation, it is important to 
consider those factors that have played a part in making it such a problematic 
undertaking. Specifically, one must consider how the inherent difficulties of 
evaluating an event such as a mediation episode may impact on our ability to establish 
what constitutes success in such a situation. As Weiss suggests, it is evaluation that 
“establishes clear and specific criteria for success"5 and, as such, any difficulties in 
establishing terms for success must, at least partially, be traced back to the process of 
evaluation itself. 
Across the social sciences, evaluators face an array of difficulties that can be 
seen as impacting on their ability to clearly and comprehensively define ‘success’． 
The abstract nature of success as a concept, and the subjectivity inherent in attempting 
to define such an abstraction, walk hand in hand with an array of potential 
measurement difficulties. The result is an evaluatory process in which it is apparent 
that framing success is a complex task indeed. These concerns are not unique to the 
study of mediation. As such, although their application to mediation is the present 
focus, it is important to appreciate that the issues discussed are evidence of the 
broader difficulty of attempting to establish exacting criteria in the inexact realm of 
social science of which the study of conflict management is a part. 
5 Weiss, Carol. Evaluation Res巴arch:M巴thodsOf Ass巴singPro gram Efi巴ctivenes,
Prentice-Hall: Englewood Clifs, N巴wJ巴rs巴y.1972. p. l 
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2.a: ESTABLISHING CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS 
As suggested, the realities of social science evaluation are seldom as simple as 
Weiss’statement might imply. In the physical sciences, such clarity and specificity 
may be able to be applied to a single, empirically measurable action in its attempt to 
achieve a defined goal. However, in the social sciences, the multiplicity goals and 
array of issues associated with the measurement of actions means such criteria are 
seldom self evident. 
This is problematic, because ‘success’as a term is ultimately an abstraction. 
That is to say, one cannot describe ‘success’per se, but rather, as is the case with such 
6 abstractions, it can only be understood in terms of other concepts. In situations where 
success can be measured by a single clear indicator, the abstraction becomes easily 
understood. However, the more complex the situation, the greater the number of sub 
concepts that must be taken into account to describe success, the harder it is to suggest 
any practical conception of success has been ascertained. 
To utilize an example from the field of economics, a policy to stal inflation is 
relatively easily understood. If inflation is stalled, the policy is a success. Success 
itself is no longer an undefined abstraction, but rather a practical term, clear, specific 
and understandable in the context of the evaluatory process. If one attempts an 
evaluation of a broader policy of general economic advancement, however, the task 
becomes exponentially more complex. One must consider not only issues of inflation, 
but issues of inflation with regard to interest rates, lending rates with regard to 
6 Lewins, Frank. Social Science M巴thodolm!v:A Brief But Critical Introduction, Macmillan Education 
Australia: Melbourn巴.1992. p. 37 
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investment rates, unemployment figures, balance of payment figures and so forth. The 
array of complex, often competing, indicators does litle to clarify what success for 
the policy will entail. Instead they create an over determined phenomena, in which 
success’abstraction is maintained by the complexity of attempting to decode such a 
range of indicators. The human values at the heart of many possible indicators (be it 
conceptions of‘justice＇，‘progress’or‘happiness’） also introduce a fundamentally 
subjective element into any evaluatory process. Finally, such complexity can impact 
on the ability of the individual to clearly articulate what is conceived as being 
indicative of success. Hence, while some understanding of what success might entail 
may be assumed in a general sense, its complexity, vulnerability to reinterpretation 
and the difficulties of articulating it mean it is difficult to ascertain whether others are 
labouring under the same assumptions. This highlights the need for a more general, 
systematic understanding of success. 
At first glance, the world of economic policy analysis may seem far removed 
from that of mediation evaluation. However, the plethora of possible indicators of 
success, and competing means of measurement present in any evaluation of a 
mediation episode clearly suggest the problems discussed to be pertinent to the field. 
Indeed, the manner in which concepts such as success are too often just assumed as 
being understood is a focus of some concern in the literature. At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, Kleiboer critiques the manner in which success can end up being so 
over determined as to become impractical and unobtainable.7 
7 Kleiboer, Mari巴ke.The Multiole Realities Of International Mediation, 
Lynne Ri巴nn巴r:Boulder, Colorado, 1998. p. 19 
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Obviously, what is required to abrogate the concerns of abstraction and 
assumption present in social science evaluation is the establishment of a clearly 
articulated range of criteria for success that focus proceedings on an understanding 
that attempts to avoid abstraction, assumption and over determination. Unfortunately, 
any attempt at such a task presents its own set of problems. As already suggested, 
criteria for success in social science settings are seldom self-evident. That is to say, 
seldom do actions imply obvious desired outcomes with complete certainty. Hence, 
any criteria constructed are reliant on the input of the evaluator and their personal, 
unavoidably subjective and/or arbitrary inte叩retationof the information available to 
them to some greater or lesser extent. 
2.b: UNDERSTANDING PARTICIPANT GOALS 
Actions are born out of intentions and no task is undertaken without some sort 
of goal or ambition motivating it. As such, when attempting to evaluate a given event, 
it is generally supposed that one must take into account the goals of those involved in 
assessing its success or failure. To this end, Weiss suggests that the purpose of 
evaluation research should be“to measure the effects of a program against the goals it 
sets out to accomplish."8 Therefore, participant (be they disputants or third parties, in 
the case of mediation) goals have an impact on how outcomes should be understood. 
d’Estree, discussing defining success in conflict resolution, takes this line of thought 
further, suggesting that if evaluation is based on process goals，“then the concept of 
8 Weiss. p. 4 
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success will be one that is easier to define and a less fearful or contested claim for 
practitioners to make."9 
The idea that an understanding of goals will lead the way to an understanding 
of success is echoed by Thompson, who suggests that people do not derive 
satisfaction from results and rewards (objective indicators), but rather from how those 
rewards relate to their personal (subjective) desires or terms of comparison.10 To whit, 
“people’s salaries are not strongly predictive of pay satisfaction”， but rather，“people 
use personal standards of comparison [comparison to a colleagues salary, relation to 
financial needs, and so forth] with pay satisfaction determined by the discrepancy 
between actual salary and such standards.”1 Thus, it is suggested that different 
individuals will derive differing degrees of satisfaction from the same salary, on the 
12 
basis of their varying desires. The implication is that objective，‘actual’results are 
not sufficient to indicate the success or failure of a given action, but must be 
considered in the context of what are ultimately subjective ambitions. In turn this 
suggests success to be a highly individualized phenomena, adapted to fit mindsets and 
circumstances. 
Despite d’Estree and Thompson’s assertions regarding the merits of a goal 
based focus for evaluation, this focus on participant ambitions does present two m吋or
problems for the would-be evaluator. Firstly, the goals of participants in an event, and 
hence the manner in which they are likely to view success in a given setting, are not 
9d’Estre, Tamra P巴arson.Fast, Larisa. Weiss, Joshua. Jakobsen, Monica.“Changing The D巴bate
About ‘Succ巴s'In Conflict R巴solutionEforts" in N巴gotiationJournal, Vol. 17, April 2001. p. 103 
10 Thompson, Leigh.“The Impact Of Minimum Goals And Aspirations On Judgem巴ntsOf Success In 
Negotiations" in Group Decision And Negotiation, Vol. 4, 1995. p. 513 
11 
12 
Ibid. p. 513 
Ibid. p. 514 
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necessarily going to correspond with whatever established wisdom the evaluator may 
be working with. The evaluator may simply perceive the goals of the participant to be 
misguided, their attainment therefore not being indicative of success as the evaluator 
understands it. For example, a policy maker may claim success in an economic policy 
because a certain inflationary goal has been reached. However, an evaluator with firm 
beliefs (be they correct or not) th瓜 interestrates or employment are superior 
indicators of economic well-being may not code the event as such. Hence, one event 
could see conflicting interpretations based on different conceptions of appropriate 
goals. This discrepancy between evaluator and participant is indicative of the degree 
to which personal input can impact on evaluation and, ultimately, the attribution of 
success or failure to a given action. 
The second concern revolves around the ability of the evaluator to effectively 
interpret the goals of the participants in order to apply them to the actual outcomes. If 
one accepts the contention that one must understand the goals of participants in order 
to understand outcomes under evaluation, it is important to understand the limitations 
that訂 eplaced upon the social science evaluator attempting such an undertaking. 
Unlike the physical sciences, where much evaluation can take part in a controlled, 
experimental setting, where the evaluator sets the goals of, and often performs, the 
action being assessed, much of the evaluation in the social sciences (and this is 
particularly true in the case of mediation) is what might best be referred to as 
‘observational evaluation'. That is to say that, the evaluator is observing the event in 
question, but has no real involvement in it. This difference between observational and 
experimental evaluation will be highlighted in a number of contexts, but as regards 
the issue of goals, it simply means that the evaluator plays no part in the setting of 
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goals prior to evaluation. As such, it fals to them to instead attempt to interpret the 
goals of those involved in the event under investigation, in order to accurately gauge 
what may be deemed a success for evaluatory purposes. This is no simple task. 
Much as is the case with the term ‘success’itself, party goals are often left 
implicit, 13 are assumed and left unarticulated, 14 or are discussed in only the broadest 
of manners. As a result, a considerable degree of ambiguity, or what Weiss would call 
“fuzzinessぺ15creeps into the evaluation process. While in some situations, actions 
may suggest goals16, more regularly it can be expected that the evaluator will be left 
to interpret whatever information they have access to in order to establish some 
workable conception of party goals for the purposes of evaluation. Unavoidably, this 
means that the criteria against which outcomes are judged will owe as much to the 
evaluator’s conception of party goals as it does to actual party goals. Thus, any 
determination of success or failure is likely to owe something to the process 
undertaken it its judgement. 
In politicised fields of evaluation, such as the mediation of international 
conflict, the issue of goal interpretation is further complicated by the fact that parties 
will often articulate their goals in a pu叩osefullyvague or misleading manner. Seldom 
will parties enter a mediation episode expressing exacting, specific goals that cannot 
be left open to interpretation and rearticulation. For the participant, this enables a 
greater ability to claim post mediation success (politically, if not actually). For the 
13 d’Es tr巴巴 etal. p. 103 
14 Sheppard, Blair.“Third Party Conflict Intervention: A Procedural Framework: in ]k盟笠三h且
Onranizational B巴haviour,Vol. 6, 1984. p. 145 
15 w巴is.p. 27 
16 The enacting of trading tarifs, for巴xampl巴， wouldsugg巴sta d巴sireto protect domestic industry. 
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purposes of observational evaluation, however, it only serves to further hinder an 
evaluator’s attempts to establish goals against which to measure events and determine 
success by requiring further su句ectiveinterpretation of competi時 claimsas well as 
enabling participants to subvert interpretation for their own benefits. 
Even when goals are honestly and openly articulated, however, the evaluator’s 
task is barely simplified. The uncontrolled nature of observational evaluation and the 
complexity of participant goals means that seldom is the evaluator presented with a 
single over-riding goal on which to base an event’s assessment. Instead, the evaluator 
must take into account the varying goals of al participants in evaluating a given 
outcome. In the case of mediation, this may include mediator(s), disputants and other 
interested third parties. One may consider the goals of the mediator most salient in 
such a situation, as they may be perceived as having a greater interest in overarching 
outcome of the mediation than the more self interested participants.17 However, the 
mediator is in turn responsible for helping disputants reach an agreement 
commensurate with their goals, thus intrinsically tying the two together. Hence, the 
evaluator is left to consider a range of divergent (and commonly conflictual) goals, al 
of which may impact on the understanding of a given outcome. 
Complicating this is the multiplicity of goals maintained by any one 
participant in a given situation. A party to an event may have any number of hopes for 
proceedings, the salience attached to which may be both fluid and unclear. Thompson 
identifies a dichotomy between minimum goals (that which a party must receive in 
17 Of course, the posibility that mediators have their own, potentialy selfish interests should not b巴
avoided either. Se, Kleiboer, 1996. p. 370 
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order to settle an agreement) and maximum aspirations (that which a party most hopes 
to gain from an agreement), for example, which raises questions about what sort of 
desires most closely tie to participant satisfaction and sense of ‘success’. Meanwhile, 
short and long term goals must be considered as regards a given event. Resultantly, it 
is left to the evaluator to determine not only the degree to which a given outcome has 
fulfilled these goals, but also to establish which of the goals carry the most weight 
when attempting to discern success or failure in the given situation. In many cases, the 
evaluator must consider also potentially contradictory goals, 18 of which the attainment 
of one implies a failure to reach another. Furthermore, when evaluating any real world 
activity, one must take into account a certain fluidity of goals. While the debate over 
goals discusses the way in which pre-episode ambitions impact on post-episode 
outcomes, the reality is that goals change as the situations of those involved in setting 
them do. How then does one address this in an evaluatory sense? Achievement of 
goals as held immediately prior to a settlement may suggest success at some level, but 
this in turn may suggest a failure to achieve initial goals. Given the already difficult 
nature of interpreting party goals, issues such as these only serve to make it harder. 
Ultimately, it is clear that while an understanding of participant goals is 
important in order to grant meaning to gathered results, the difficulties inherent in 
discerning such goals are also a key factor in making the understanding of success so 
problematic. 
18 D’Estree et al, p. 104 
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2.c: MEASUREMENT DIFFICULTIES 
Of course, establishing the goals of the participants and processes under 
assessment is only half of any evaluatory equation. The utility of understanding such 
goals comes from the manner in which they grant context to the actual objective 
results of a given event. However, outcomes in the social science arena do not always 
lend themselves to objective measurement. How does one measure the results of a 
social policy or a mediation episode? While Weiss somewhat blithely suggests that 
evaluators translate evidence into quantitative formula for measurement against a 
given criteria or set of goals,19 the reality is seldom so simple. Concepts such as 
‘participant satisfaction' or‘peace’are not created in the interests of simple empirical 
analysis, but rather to simplify complex ideas and goals. However, the need for 
displayable data may lead to the evaluator utilising what measurable indicators are 
available in order to create some demonstrable evidence of an outcome, be it success 
or failure. 'Peace’， for example, can and has been defined and measured in terms of a 
certain period of time without actual physical conflict. x time without conflict is not 
peace, but it is a chosen, measurable indicator suggestive of peace. While 
unavoidable, this again highlights the subjective, personalised nature of any analysis. 
While one evaluator may code a successful settlement as a thirty day cessation of 
violence, another may suggest a certain percentage decrease in casualties or other 
measurable conflict symptoms. Both are discussing the same phenomena but in their 
attempts to place it in a measurable format both have come up with completely 
different gradations of it. Regardless of reasoning, it is stil somewhat arbitrary. Nor is 
it particularly easy to measure perceptions in attitudes in any truly scientific manner. 
Furthermore, degrees of success do not necessarily follow a linear path. While one 
19w巴is,p. 4 
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indicator of success may entail a decline in violence, an indicator of a ‘better’ 
outcome may entail not simply a greater decline in violence, but instead the opening 
of lines of communications between disputants, making empirical comparison of 
results al the more difficult. Defining the margins within which to measure is also a 
potential problem. Process effects are ongoing, the conflicts they impact on, 
evolutionary. As such, identifying a discrete end point at which to focus assessment 
can impact greatly on eventual results. Finally, evaluators also run the risk of leaning 
towards the measurement of those indicators most easily quantified, rather than those 
best suited to providing information about a given event’s success or failure. 
Much as is the case with the understanding of participant goals, much outcome 
measurement often boils down to subjective interpretation. It is here that the 
difficulties of abstractions, such as‘satisfaction’， begin to manifest themselves. Any 
empirical method for attempting to measure such conceptions of success is based 
upon the subjective, arbitrary assignations of a given evaluator, and tel us litle about 
the how best to approach success in a comprehensive manner. 
2.d: COUNTER幽FACTUALANALYSIS 
Beyond concerns surrounding how to measure events in the social sciences, 
evaluators are also presented with the problem of attempting to compare these 
measurements with those of other events in order to grant comparative context to the 
results gathered. When this proves impossible, they are then faced with the dilemma 
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of whether or not they should take part in counter-factual analysis20 in order to 
achieve the same ends. The need for such seemingly ‘shaky’analysis in the social 
sciences is derived both from the observational nature of much social science 
evaluation and the uniqueness of many of the phenomena under investigation. In the 
realms of experimental evaluation, one can compare gathered results both with the 
results of previous attempts at the same task and with those of other possible 
approaches, al of which can be performed and measured in a comparatively 
controlled environment. Thus, one can establish both if the process under evaluation 
was performed to its potential, and if it was a wise choice for the undertaking at hand. 
Both of these are potentially salient factors in the determination of success or failure. 
However, the unique nature of so many social science situations means that often not 
only can one not compare outcomes with relevant past episodes, but the event itself 
may also have precluded the consideration of other possible approaches.21 As such, 
the questions of whether the undertaking under evaluation reached its potential, or 
was the best approach for the situation, cannot be determined in an absolute, factual, 
manner. As such, it is left to the evaluator to decide if, and how, to attempt to discern 
these things without any direct information. Hence, the use of counter-factual 
analysis, interpretation and estimation in an attempt to grant context to events that 
may not otherwise have any. 
When confronting a situation in which such counterfactual analysis may be 
required, the evaluator is presented with a‘Catch 22’of sorts. If one fals into what 
2° Count巴r開factualanalysis is perhaps b巴std巴finedas analysis that is undertaken to ases factors for 
which no direct factual backdrop can b巴provided.
21 In what may b巴seenas an extrapolation of th巴oldsaying“If you don’t住y,you’1never knowぺthe
very act of‘not trying’precludes any possible insight into oth巴routcome posibiliti巴s.
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Kleiboer considers a‘Negative Alternative Bias’2 and fails to consider a given 
outcome against that which another approach may have delivered, then the gathered 
results can lose much of their context. As Thompson implies with regard to goals, 
some form of comparison is necessary.23 No matter how positive one result may 
seem, does it really warrant being termed a‘success’if other available approaches 
could have performed the same task to a better end or with greater efficiency? And, 
with no form of comparison, how can results be understood with regard to success or 
failure. For example, a runner can state they have run the hundred metres in 10.2 
seconds. This is a solid, quantifiable and undeniable piece of information, but it 
means litle without some form of comparison. Hence one must establish either the 
times of the runner’s competitors or the runner’s own previous times. Only once this 
information is gathered can one truly evaluate the runner’s performance. In an 
Olympic final, with world class runners, for instance, that time would mean failure, in 
a high school track meet, it would likely mean gre瓜 success.For the Olympic athlete, 
10.2 might be a poor personal time, for a high school athlete it may indicate the 
successful achievement of a personal best. However, without information suggesting 
context and means of comparison, the result can only be interpreted on the basis of an 
evaluator’s understanding of the subject at hand, which may suggest the result to be a 
success or failure on the basis of an evaluator’s personal standards and/or 
understanding of the matter in question. Like an understanding of participant goals, 
comparison of ‘performance against alternative' or‘performance against potential’ 
can add context to quantifiable outcomes. However, it also places goals in context by 
establishing their merit against other possibilities that could have been utilised. If 
someone achieves a clearly articulated goal but it can be proved that goal could have 
22 Kleibo巴r,1998. p. 17 
23 Thompson. p. 513 
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been su叩assedby another approach, to what extent has the event really proved to be a 
success and of what value were the goals really? 
However, in attempting to avoid the problems of neglected alternative bias and 
grant context to a measured outcome, one must take great care. While comparing the 
performances of a sprinter is a relatively easy task, useful for explaining the merits of 
comparative analysis, in social science settings information on such alternatives is 
often hindered by the uniqueness of the situation at hand. To utilise a broad example, 
when presented with an immediate crisis, be it military, social or economic, policy 
makers will select an approach to attempt to alleviate it. However, crisis situations 
tend to be unique in nature. Hence, while they may share features with previous 
events, there is no real way to judge if the actions taken were performed as well as 
possible in the given situation as there will be no record of such a chain of events 
against which to make a comparison. Likewise, in choosing a response, one action is 
favoured over others. There is no way, then, to say how another approach may have 
performed in the same situation as competing approaches can seldom be attempted 
simultaneously and the environment requiring them is unlikely to be replicable. 
Of course, the evaluator may stil attempt to carry out some degree of 
comparative analysis. While events may be unique, seldom does an event or 
phenomenon occur that does not share features with another. The events of September 
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11, for example, were without precedent, but the ensuing economic crisis shared 
many features with other sudden stock slides. Hence, it may be possible to survey 
responses to similar events in order to establish precedents and standards of 
24 The 2001 terorist atacks on N巴wYork’s World Trade Centre. 
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comparison for response. However, there are also aspects to any event that will be 
unique, and hence cannot be translated for the sake of comparison. As such, the 
evaluator is left to interpret how these variables may have impacted on other, unused 
approaches, a process for which no hard data can be provided. It is at this point that 
the counter“factual nature of analysis rears its head. In attempting to avoid the pitfalls 
of presenting results without any framework for comparison, the evaluator is left to 
interpret possibilities, leaving a framework that owes much to an evaluator’s beliefs 
on how other eventualities may have developed. 
These concerns are particularly evident in the field of mediation. Although 
there are many elements common to al mediation episodes, the nature of human 
involvement and the complexity of most conflict situations means that any given 
episode is ultimately unique. As such, the performance of a given mediator, or 
mediation style, cannot directly be compared to performances in other mediation 
settings. While one approach’s differing results in differing situations may inform us 
as to its strengths and weaknesses, it does not enable us to discern clearly whether it 
has been performed to its potential in a given situation. 
Furthermore, the decision to pursue mediation, and decisions regarding the 
nature of that mediation, preclude the taking of any other action at that point in the 
context. Hence, while it may be possible to judge a mediation attempt in light of how 
other approaches fared at different points, the fact remains that the given action was 
the only thing tried at that specific point in that particular environment. Therefore, 
while conclusions can be made regarding what may have been a better approach, 
given the circumstances, this is ultimately a counter-factual analysis and any 
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comparative analysis must take into account these differences and no absolute 
judgment as to the merits of mediation versus other approaches at that juncture can be 
made. 
None of this is to suggest, of course, that solitary results cannot necessarily 
indicate success. Nor is it meant to imply that counter factual deduction cannot prove 
to be a useful (and often unavoidable) tool. Rather, it is to emphasize the difficulties 
of evaluating unique events accurately and comprehensively in an uncontrolled 
environment and to suggest the twin concerns of ignoring and addressing the issue of 
negative alternative bias. 
2.e: ESTABLISHING CAUSALITY 
Much as is the case with the issue of counter-factual analysis, the nature of 
observational evaluation also poses problems with regard to the linking of evaluated 
actions and measured results. By investigating whether or not a certain action has 
been a success, one may consider measured outcomes against goals, alternatives and 
potential. However, in order to suggest whether the achievement of these goals (or, 
indeed, the failure to attain them) implies anything about the process being evaluated, 
one must also establish a direct causal link between action and outcome. Proof, in 
other words, that such a result came about because of the action in question. il the 
realm of experimental evaluation, such links can be established by an array of control 
experiments that rule out other variables as contributing factors. However, in the 
uncontrolled realms of observational evaluation in the social science, the 
establishment of such links is more tenuous due to the unavoidable lack of scientific 
isolation. 
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For example, a recent power crisis in New Zealand lead to experts suggesting 
a 10% cutback in daily power use would be required in order to stave off power cuts. 
As such, the government undertook a campaign to promote power savings. Shortly 
thereafter, the approach was lauded as a success in the Canterbury region, where 
savings peaked at 20%. On one level, this clearly did constitute a success (for the day 
at least), as a 20% saving clearly exceeds the desired (and scientifically justified) goal 
of 10%. However, for anyone evaluating the governmental policy of encouraging 
savings, instead of just whether or not savings occurred, there is a simple question th瓜
must be asked. Was this saving the result of the government品powerconservation 
campaign? As it turns out, it may not have been, with unseasonably temperate 
conditions being given much of the credit for the dip in power consumption. Thus, the 
evaluator is presented with two possible causes for the given outcome, making it 
impossible to state with absolute authority that it was in fact governmental policy 
which was responsible for the apparent success of consumer power savings. 
In the mediation setting, causality can be particularly difficult to prove. The 
international environment is such a complex, interlocking system of action/reaction 
relationships that nothing about it can develop in a vacuum. Given the upheaval 
associated with most conflict and mediation situations, this means that no mediation 
outcome is likely to occur in a static environment. Hence, changes brought about by 
mediation are likely to coincide with other systemic developments, often leaving the 
link between mediation and outcome less than clear. 
Indeed, there are many instances where a given action may not be the only 
possible cause of a measured result. In the context of mediation, one such example 
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25 revolves around Zartman’s conception of conflict ripeness. It is suggested that 
mediation is most likely to be undertaken, and most likely to be successful when 
conflicts are‘ripe’for some form of settlement. The potential causes of such ripeness 
are many and diverse. Conflicts may have reached a plateau, a mutually hurting 
stalemate in which neither party can perceive a possibility for unilateral gain nor 
accept the continuance of the current situation, or a precipice point at which 
continuation of the conflict suggests the potential for considerable harm to 
participant(s).26 Environmental changes impacting upon the importance of the 
conflict’s issue base and internal changes amongst participants as regards the salience 
of conflict issue, al of these are factors that could prompt a move away from conflict 
behaviour. Haas’observation that conflicts can slide into obsolescence of their own 
accord, due to systemic changes and the evolution of new issues of concern, 27 echoes 
this, raising the question of whether some mediatory episodes may have no more 
impact than to ritualise the end of a conflict. In the case of conflicts exhibiting these 
signs of ripeness, or obsolescence therefore, it could be argued that there is litle to 
prove that it is not these factors, rather than the process of mediation that has lead to 
any sort of settlement. As such, the causal link between mediation and outcome 
becomes potentially weakened. 
Of course, a contrary argument, when presented with the same suggestion, 
could state that one of the features of successful mediation is the identification of 
moments of ripeness upon which to capitalise. The difficulty of discerning what 
25 Zartman, I. William. Rine For Resolution: Conflict And Interv巴ntionIn 
主血旦， N巴wYork: Oxford University Pr自民 1985.p. 232 
L.U Ibid. p. 232 
幻 Haas,Michael.“International Conflict R巴solution”inHaas, Michael （巴d.),
International Svstems: A Behavioural Anoroach, New York: Chandler Publishing, 1974. p. 328 
factors should be granted salience (and how so) in the assessment of success is thus 
clearly illustrated by this early example. 
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The issue of ripeness also raises another issue as regards the problematic 
nature of causality analysis. In many cases, the sort of processes of change one may 
wish to evaluate in a social science setting are exactly that, processes. Events, such as 
mediation episodes, are often assessed in isolation. However, mediation, like so many 
other social science phenomena, is generally part of a bigger picture. In this case, it 
may be a long term conflict management effort that has consisted of a number of 
previous attempts at mediation. As such, while it can be argued that such prior events 
only highlight failures in comparison to the eventually assessed ‘successful’episode, 
it can equally be suggested that as part of an ongoing social process, every prior effort 
plays a part in the one currently under assessment. By this thinking, one must consider 
if a mediation deemed successful is so because of the mediation itself or because of 
the cumulative benefits of the ongoing process that has preceded it. Regardless of 
one’s opinion on this issue, it is indisputable that social science phenomena are 
regularly interconnected and ongoing, rather than discrete events, and evident that 
such factors further serve to hinder the ease with which one can undertake their 
evaluation. 
Ultimately, it is clear that positive outcomes do not always indicate process 
success. Of course, for those involved the point may be moot, but for those studying 
the impact of mediation attempts, it is an important factor to consider. 
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2.f: SUMMARY 
Weiss’comments regarding evaluation’s role in defining criteria for success 
clearly highlights the obvious link between processes of evaluation and the 
establishment of a clearer understanding of success. However, much like the 
definition of success itself, evaluation is a more problematic task than one might first 
think. As such, this chapter has addressed the difficulties inherent in evaluating 
phenomena in the social sciences in general, and mediation in particular. 
The purpose of this is twofold. Firstly, by highlighting the link between 
evaluation and success, and the difficulties of evaluation, one can begin to see why 
the creation of appropriate frameworks for under anding success has proved so 
problematic as regards mediation. Discerning success or failure is often both the goal 
and the final step of evaluation. Hence, understanding success may make evaluation, 
in this context at least, a litle less frustrating. Correspondingly, a more carefully 
thought out means of evaluation may make it easier to form a clear understanding of 
success. Secondly, it enables the identification of issues that must be addressed in 
order to attempt the creation of any such framework. The avoidance of abstraction in 
the establishment of appropriate criteria for success, the problems of understanding 
participant goals, the challenge of measuring often unquantifiable results, the taking 
into consideration of alternative possibilities to those investigated and the proving of 
links between actions and outcome, will al be areas of focus in the ensuing 
discussion. 
As well as identifying these fundamental difficulties, however, problems 
arising from attempts to deal with them are also made apparent. Most notably it is 
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clear that the unwary evaluator’s best attempts to address such concerns may result in 
a degree of arbitrary, inte中retativeevaluation, at odds with the observational nature 
of such evaluation. Thus, the evaluator can come to impact the outcome as much as 
the events under evaluation, calling the whole process into question. Of course, 
subjectivity and arbitrariness are unavoidable in human endeavours, but an awareness 
of their threat should hopefully enable the minimisation of their impact where 
possible. 
Of course, understanding the difficulties of evaluation in the social sciences is 
only one step on the path to creating a workable framework for understanding success 
in mediation. Beyond the generic evaluation difficulties of the social science setting 
there are many problems associated with approaches to the definition of success in the 
more specific field of conflict management. Hence, one must go beyond addressing 
simply the difficulties of evaluation by also acknowledging, and eventually 
addressing those attempts that have been made at defining success in conflict 
management. 
(3) 
APPROACHES TO FRAMING SUCCESS 
IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
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While it can certainly be argued that there is litle in the literature of conflict 
management suggesting a truly comprehensive understanding of success, this does not 
mean that the term success is not regularly utilized. Indeed, one could instead argue 
that much of the problem lies in the term’s regular, careless use. Nevertheless, there 
remains much in the literature of conflict management that is worth consideration in 
the attempt to create a framework for success. There are an array of approaches to the 
evaluation of conflict management episodes that give considerable insight into a range 
of methods for interpreting success. From the use of illustrative sub-concepts, issues 
of settlement and resolution and the utilization of goals in assessment, to the debate 
over output and outcome analysis, there is considerable material for anyone wishing 
to develop the means for a better understanding conflict management results. 
Of course, in many cases, the approaches to framing success discussed in this 
chapter were not solely, or even primarily, developed for that pu叩ose.Their specific 
intents are varied. However, al of these divergent fields suggest specific 
interpretations of success and the means for its evaluation, which color their 
development and provide useful fodder for this discussion. 
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3.a: MEDIATION: COMMUNICATION OR CHANGE'? 
At its most basic, the question of how best to address the issue of success 
boils down to a debate over what is required from mediation itself. As a process of 
communication, it has been suggested that the very act of partaking in the (ultimately 
voluntary) process of mediation should qualify it as success. By willingly choosing to 
open up a dialogue focussed on addressing concerns related to an ongoing conflict, it 
is suggested that a great step has been taken. Furthermore, any action within 
mediation is perceived as part of a cumulative progress towards any eventual 
settlement or resolution. The simple act of focussed communication is thus seen as a 
success in the realm of conflict management. 
Of course, the very focus of this thesis implies the dismissal of this idea. Were 
the act of mediation alone accepted as indicating success, then of what need is this 
debate? However, it should perhaps not be so totally dismissed. As suggested in the 
previous chapter’s discussion of ripeness, even mediation episodes that don’t result in 
explicit indications of success can be part of a cumulative effect, building (either 
through the benefits of communication or the concerns of ongoing failure) the 
conditions of conflict ripeness for settlement and/or resolution. By this line of 
thought, any mediation effort can certainly be seen, if not as a success, then at least as 
a potential part of success. 
In most cases, however, the requirements for success are somewhat more 
stringent. Narrower approaches to explaining success suggest, or at least imply, that a 
mediatory episode must fulfil certain requirements in order to be deemed a success. 
Thus, instead of being successful simply by way of occurrence, mediation must secure 
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settlement or resolution, achieve certain goals, provide satisfaction or any one or 
combination of these and other possibilities. Thus, success is determined by the 
achievement of a certain standard in the mediatory episode. Discerning the best 
measure to identify this standard may therefore be what is required in order to garner 
a better understanding of what success entails. 
3.b: MEDIATION AGREEMENTS: Discrete Events Or 
Ongoing Process? 
One’s understanding of the conflict life cycle can result in very different 
approaches to understanding conflict management outcomes and assessing their 
success. In many settings, conflict management is understood as a singular event, the 
end point of a conflict relationship. This is suggestive of an interpretation of success 
as an immediate product of conflict settlement, born out of mediatory agreements. It 
is therefore a clearly recognizable development that can be assessed in the short term. 
However, Honeyman postulates that this approach is flawed. Conflict, he 
suggests is an ongoing process of which settlement is just a stage. He illustrates this 
by way of two diagrams: 
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Diagram 1: The Cymbals Clash and Conflict Ends28 





Diagram 2: The Cymbals Clash .. But Then, Something Else Happens29 






The first of these diagrams illustrates the aforementioned approach, with 
conflict peaking, a settlement being reached and conflict subsiding away to nothing. 
The second suggests his interpretation that, in reality, mediation settlements are only 
the first stage in a ongoing, staggered development away from the peak of conflict. In 
this staggered decline, illustrated by secondary peaks on the sine wave, many factors 
may impact on one’s eventual interpretation of a conflict outcome. 
28 Hon巴yman,Christopher.“The Wrong M巴ntalImag巴OfS巴ttlement”in
N巴gotiationJournal, Vol. 17, January 2001. p. 8 
29 Ibid. p.8 
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The implications for our understanding of success are considerable. If conflict 
settlement is perceived as Honeyman suggests it should be, then success is a 
phenomena likely to be identified as developing over a number of stages. If one 
accepts the ‘Cymbals Clash and Conflict Ends' approach, however, success is likely 
to be understood as a product of immediate mediation outcome. In other words, it is a 
discrete, identifiable event. 
3.c: FAIRNESS, SATISFACTION, EFFECTIVENESS, 
EFFICIENCY, STABILITY 
One regularly used means of framing success is that involving the utilization 
of illustrative sub-concepts. A conflict management/mediatory episode can be referred 
to as a success due to its‘fairness’， its ‘effectiveness’， or any one or combination of a 
plethora of applicable concepts. Indeed, the concept of success itself is often 
articulated solely in terms of such concepts. Of course, the illustration of an abstract 
concept such as success by way of other abstract concepts is not without problems. 
One may blithely suggest a mediation to have been a success because it was fair. 
However, while this may tie the concept of success to that of fairness, it is 
meaningless without a clearly outlined understanding of ‘fairness’or the plethora of 
other terms that may have been utilized. 
However, the utilization of such sub-concepts is not without merit. While stil 
abstractions requiring framing, illustrative concepts often suggest means of measuring 
the success they represent and imply an'-interpretation of the nature of conflict 
management and mediation that may further illuminate what is best understood by the 
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term‘success'. Furthermore, the consideration of such an array of possible criteria for 
defining success presents a range of interesting insights into other areas of debate. 
Although a multitude of possibilities present themselves, this discussion will 
be limited to five possible concepts; fairness, satisfaction, effectiveness, efficiency 
and stability. The first four of these are most clearly laid out in Sheppard’s discussion 
of procedural effectiveness criteria (see table 1). They are also utilized by Jameson, 
who cites Sheppard extensively in a discussion of the desired outcomes of conflict 
management (see table 2).30 Susskind and Cruikshank, meanwhile, utilize the terms 
fairness and efficiency alongside those of wisdom and stability, and make passing 
reference to satisfaction in their discussion of‘good’outcomes for negotiated 
settlements. 31 
30 Jameson, J巴sicaKatz.“Toward A Compreh巴nsiv巴ModelFor Th巴AssessmentOf 
Intraorganizational Conflict: Developing Th巴Framework"in The International Journal Of Conflict 
Mana2:ement, Vol. 10, July 1999. 
31 Susskind, Lawern巴C巴andCruikshank, J巴frey.Breakin2: Th巴Imoasse:Consensual Annroaβhes To 
Resolvin2: Public Disnutes, Basic Books: New York. 1987. 
Table 1: Procedural Effectiveness Criteria32 
QUALITIES OF PROCEDURES THEMSELVES 
I Fairness 
1. perceived fairness* 
2. level of intervener process neutrality, e.g., a non-n巴utralthird party may permit one party to 
speak but not the oth巴r*
3. 1巴velof disputant control* 
4. protection of individual rights* 
I Participant Satisfaction 
5. lev巴lof privacy* 
6. 1巴velof participant involvement and s巴riousn巴ss*
7. level of injury incurred by any party* 
II Effectiv巴n巴SS
8. implementability ofproc巴dur巴＊
9. quantity and quality of facts, ideas or arguments巴licit巴d*
10. degr巴巴 towhich dispute surfaces or gets into th巴op巴n*
IV Efficiency 
11. cost* 
12. tim巴linessand sp巴巴dof resolution* 
13. disruptiven巴sof other ev巴ntsand everyday affairs* 
QUALi刀ESOF OUTCOME RELATED TO PROCEDURE 
I Fairness 
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14. as defined by: equitability, consistency ofresults with similar conflicts, n巴巴d,consist巴ncywith 
accepted rule or norm and p巴rceivedfairness 
I Partici~ant Satisfaction 
15. disputant commitment to solution 
16. b巴nefitof outcom巴participants
17. level of disputant animosity* 
II Effectiveness 
18. level ofresolution achiev巴d*
19. perman巴nceof solution* 
20. likelihood of future similar outcome* 
21. impact on directly involv巴dparties* 
IV Effici巴ncy
* Criteria repeatedly identifi巴din our res巴arch.
32 Sheppard. p. 169 
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Table 2: Desired Outcomes Of Conflict Managernent33 
THIRD PARTIES DISPUTANTS 
FAIRNESS Institut巴b巴terrules and Set a prec巴dent
proc巴dur巴S (Sand巴rαnd Goldberg, 1994) 
(Pr巴in,1987) Obtain a n巴utralopinion 
(Sander and Goldberg, 1994) 
SATISFACTION Fully ace巴ptabl巴solution(Pr巴in, Ke巴pdisput巴privat巴
1987) (Sand巴randGoldb巴rg,1994) 
Maintain desired amount of Make disput巴public
privacy (Sheppard, 1984) (Sander and Goldb巴rg,1994) 
G巴tvindication 
(Sand巴rand Goldberg, 1994) 
EFFECTIVENESS Improv巴r巴lationship(Prein, Improv巴relationship
1987) (Sander and Goldb巴rg,1994) 
Prevent repetition (Pr巴in,1987) 
T巴achparties to manage futur巴
conflicts (Pr巴in,1987) 
Create more clarity (Prein, 1987) 
L巴amfrom th巴conflictwithout 
resolving it (Pr巴in,1987) 
Create a workable solution 
(Pr巴in,1987) 
Find a pragmatic solution (Prein, 
1987) 
Alt巴rwork structure (Pr巴in,
1987; Putnam, 1994) 
Decision quality (Thomas, 1982) 
EFFICIENCY Settle conflict in a timely Settle conflict in a timely manner 
mann巴r (Sand巴randGoldb巴rg,1994) 
(Prein, 1987; Sander and 
Goldb巴rg,1994) 
Minimize costs and us巴of
resourc巴S
(Prein, 1987; Sand巴rand 
Goldberg, 1994; Thomas, 1982) 
Of course, in none of these cases are methods for framing success directly 
addressed in the manner this thesis is intends. As suggested, this is a task that has 
seldom been approached. However, considerations of areas such as these can be 
clearly related to success. This is indicative of the sort of interpretative research and 
33 Jameson. p. 280 
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‘reverse-engineering’that must be undertaken in order to provide insights into how 
success is/can be conceived by those in the field. 
In investigating these areas each concept will be addressed in turn. As terms 
utilized for academic endeavors are so often granted either a specificity or generality 
not present in their common usage, each term will be considered by common 
definition and as discussed by each author. Observations will be gathered both about 
how each term can be utilized in framing success and how each term also provides 
insights into other aspects of our understanding of success in the mediatory context. 
The first of Sheppard’s procedural effectiveness criteria, fairness, is certainly 
vulnerable to criticism that it is an intangible abstraction. One cannot define fairness 
so stringently that it will not stil be interpreted differently by different people, much 
like success itself. However, in layman’S terms at least, it suggests an even-
handedness of procedure and equitability of outcome that is clearly indicative of some 
conception of‘success’. Sheppard in particular also presents a number of measurable 
indicators of fairness that serve to assuage concerns regarding the threat of 
abstraction. 34 Levels of process neutrality, disputant control, equitability, consistency 
of results and consistency with accepted noロnsare al relatively easily measured and 
defined indicators that help ‘operationalize’the abstract. Both Jameson and Susskind 
and Cmikshank, meanwhile, present similar procedural indicators of fairness 
(improvement of procedure and institution of precedent,35 access to information and 
36 opportunity for expression ) which provide reasonably structured conceptions of 
fairness. However, while there are certain measurable indices of fairness, both 
34 Sheppard. p. 169-170 
35 table 2, Jameson. p. 280 
36 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 21 
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Sheppard37 and Susskind and Cruikshank38 also identify the importance of perceived 
fairness in proceedings. Measurable indicators of fairness mean litle if parties to a 
mediation episode do not themselves feel it to be fair. This perception of unfairness, 
justified or not, can in turn shade opinions on actual outcomes. Hence, while such 
indicators may highlight a well balanced procedure, or even an equitable solution, if 
parties to it don’t perceive that fairness, it is unlikely to have a direct link to success. 
This is typical of the assessment concerns one faces when dealing with issues of 
perception and interpretation, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Also problematic is the contradictory definition of fairness itself. Defined as 
just, equitable and in accordance with rules, 39 the term is potentially oxymoronic in 
the mediatory context. Equitability and justice do not necessarily walk hand in hand, 
and established rules may not necessarily help to provide either in cases of 
unexpected circumstance. Susskind and Cruikshank identify this indirectly by way of 
their observation that in problem solving situations, perceived fairness “depends more 
on willingness of the parties to accommodate each other’s special needs, than on the 
rules not changing."4° Fairness, therefore becomes an amo叩housconcept that can’t 
easily be framed within any one setting. Equally problematic are suppositions such as 
that surrounding the use of ‘neutral’， or more accurately, impartial, mediators. 
Traditionally a clear indicator of fairness, there is much to suggest impartial mediators 
37 Ibid. p. 170 
38 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 21-25 
39 Oxford Pocket English (81h edition), Oxford: Clarendon, 1992. 
40 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 22 
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may be less effective in securing mediation agreements than obviously partial ones,41 
thus calling into question the merit of some traditional conceptions of fairness. 
The utilization of fairness as a sub-concept to suggest success has some merit. 
It implies a number of qualities (even-handedness of process, equity of outcome) that 
may serve as indicators of a successful mediation episode. However, the perceptual 
nature of any interpretation of such an abstract concept as‘fairness’， incorporated 
with the very fluid nature of what fairness may entail in a given situation, means that 
it arguably asks as many, if not more, questions than it answers. 
In some respects, participant satisfaction seems like a better indicator of 
success. If a party is satisfied with process or outcome, they are more likely to 
perceive it to be a success and, as Sheppard indicates, are more likely to be committed 
to it.42 This in turn makes success by other indicators, such as stability, more likely. 
Shepherd identifies a number of measurable indicators, both as regards process 
(privacy, level of involvement), and outcome (benefit, commitment）戸
However, as with fairness, the criteria of satisfaction also has a largely 
perceptual and individualized element. Satisfaction is often deemed an almost 
emotional response to the achievement of a goal or attainment of some requirement. 
Clearly, the sorts of goals taken into an event by those involved are very individual 
and informed both as regards their setting and their achievement, by perceptions of 
events. Of course, this is not unexpected, nor should it serve as a reason to 
41 Carnevale, P巴terand Arad, Sharon.“Bias And Impartiality In International Mediation" in 
Bercovitch, J. (ed) R巴solvingInt巴rnationalConflicts: The Th巴orvAnd Practice ofMediatio11, Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynn巴Ri巴nn巴rPublishers, 1996. 
42 Sheppa吋.p. 170 
日 table1, Ibid. p. 170 
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completely dismiss the utilization of satisfaction in attempts to frame ‘success’． 
Conflict itself is largely born out of perceptual differences between individuals and it 
is to be expected that such differences will also impact on its evaluation. 
Nevertheless, the fact that satisfaction is born not simply out of measurable indicators, 
but out of parties' perceptions of them does serve to qualify its use in such a context. 
Perhaps the most obviously linked to a layperson’s conception of success, and 
44. 
arguably the most heavily researched of Shepherd’s criteria 1s that of effectiveness. 
Conflict management is a process of change. Hence, for a mediation episode to be 
deemed successful, it must have some (positive) impact, or々万台cton the conflict. In 
keeping with this, Sheppard highlights an array of possible indicators of 
effectiveness,45 many of which will appear in future aspects of this discussion. They 
suggest a more concrete, less ‘perceptually vulnerable' array of indicators that 
arguably present the most easily measurable means of assessing success in mediation 
episodes. 
However, as Jameson indicates，“The diversity of goals within the category of 
effectiveness [see table 2] indicates one’s definition of ‘effectiveness’depends 
heavily on individual values and preferences.”46 The obviously contradictory nature 
of such indicators as those suggesting goals of making a conflict public or keeping it 
private47 is obvious. The question of which indicators one chooses to acknowledge 
and what salience is granted to them also leaves much room for inte叩retation.If, for 


































































































conflict issues themselves, is it deemed a success or a failure? How does one discern 
which indicator should take primacy? Clearly, a mediation episode must be effective 
to be successful, but what sort of effects constitute success is the real question that 
must be addressed. 
The fourth criteria, efficiency, is primarily focused on in a procedural sense by 
Sheppard, addressing as it does, the cost, timeliness and disruptiveness of the 
undertaking. In some respects, this may seem extraneous. If a mediation episode is 
effective in other ways, what matter efficiency? Once again, it must be stressed that 
conflict and its management does not tend to occur in a vacuum. Costs racked up in 
order to accrue benefits may be such that those benefits lose their sheen. Jameson also 
acknowledges this, addressing both time frame and resource consumption, but it is 
Susskind and Cruikshank that grant efficiency the most weight. They suggest that 
“Fairness is not enough. A fair agreement is not acceptable if it takes an inordinately 
long time to achieve or if it costs several times what it should have.”48 As well, they 
address the false economy of‘fast but poor’outcomes,49 ensuring that efficiency is 
stil linked to quality of outcome, not just management of costs. Along these lines is 
Susskind and Cruikshank’s questioning of whether quickly reached agreements that 
overlook the possibility of other so『 calledelegant trades, should really be considered 
in a positive light.50 This also serves to highlight the possibilities for counterfactual, 
'what if？’ analysis in the assessment of such situations. 
Clearly, the concept of efficiency, like that of fairness, is of greatest value as a 
means for facilitating consideration of issues beyond the direct outcome of the 
48 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 26 
49 Ibid. p. 27 
_,u Ibid. p. 2 
44 
procedure. Hence, while one could argue that efficiency is a necessary consideration 
in attempting a thorough definition of success, it cannot be seen as sufficient in 
itself.51 Rather it serves as an interesting addendum to other potential means of 
evaluation. 
Far more practical is their utilization of‘stability'. That which is stable is 
“firmly fixed or established, not easily, changed, moved or destroyed.”52 It is 
“resolute, constant."53 In the context of Susskind and Cruikshank's discussion, this 
translates to the constancy of conflict management agreements, the degree to which 
they remain fixed, established and operational after institution：“An agreement that is 
perceived as fair, is reached efficiently, and seems technically wise is nevertheless 
unsatisfactory if it does not endure.”54 This is in keeping with some aspects associated 
with effectiveness (Jameson’s suggestion of the prevention of repetition, for 
5 example ) but is presented more thoroughly as an indicator of conflict management 
outcomes as ongoing. Hence there is a focus on feasibility, practicality and realism, 
the development of relationships and flexibility for renegotiation in order to address 
developments as they occur. 
Ultimately, the focus on stability is an important one. Of course, a stable 
outcome is only likely to be coded a success if it is also possessed of other merits, but 
the matters raised in consideration of stability nonetheless foreshadow a number of 
other issues that shall come to be of considerable importance in attempting to frame 
success in the mediatory context. 
51 Ibid. p. 27 
52 Oxford Pocket English 
53 Ibid. 
54 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 31 
5 Jameson. p. 280 
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Obviously, none of these concepts can be used independently as total 
indicators of success. While al suggest certain positive outcomes that can be assessed 
in the evaluation of a mediation episode, none stand alone in providing a clear picture 
of how best to define success. Efficiency and effectiveness mean litle if parties are 
not satisfied. Satisfaction and fairness mean litle if an episode has proven to be 
ineffective in a practical sense. Stability, meanwhile is an obvious requirement of a 
successful outcome in many respects, but it is ultimately only as beneficial as its 
SU句ect.
In conjunction however, one can begin to get some insight into how success is 
understood and may be framed. The very‘human-ness’of the endeavor is captured by 
the acknowledgement of fairness and satisfaction, while effectiveness addresses the 
actuality of conflict outcomes. Meanwhile, efficiency draws attention to the fact that 
any conception of success must incorporate the cost benefit practicality of real world 
endeavors, while stability addresses the fact that the sorts of events being assessed in 
the mediation setting are ongoing in nature, providing an array of further assessment 
possibilities and difficulties. 
3.d: SETTLEMENT vs. RESOLUTION 
More practical, in many respects, is an approach to evaluation of mediation 
based on simple analysis of agreement and outcome types and their impact on the 
conflict in question. While doing litle to deal with the more esoteric aspects of the 
'what is success’question, such an approach does provide an insight into what sort of 
practical results for a mediation episode may be coded as successful. 
46 
Often, mediation attempts will result in no agreement being reached and no 
alteration in the situation that precipitated them. Notwithstanding those who argue 
that any mediation episode has an effect, regardless of outcome, 56 they prove to be 
in々酔ctive.On other occasions, however, agreements will occur that do demonstrably 
alter the conflict relationship. In such cases, the question then becomes, what sort of 
mediation outcomes should be considered success? In order to address this issue, one 
must first understand the different potential outcomes. d’Estree etαl identify four 
heavily debated terms utilized for describing potential conflict management impacts: 
settlement, management, resolution and transformation.57 Each of these imply specific 
understandings of mediation success. 
Unfortunately, however, these approaches are seldom clearly defined in 
conflict management literature. Settlement and resolution are often used 
58 interchangeably, leading to uncertainty as to their meaning in a given situation, 
while terms like transformation and management are often synonymous with 
resolution and/or settlement. For the pu叩osesof this discussion therefore, mediation 
agreements shall be broken into their two most commonly used categories: settlement 
59 and resolution. 
The distinction between the two is simple in its explanation but far reaching in 
its implications. Essentially, the dichotomy relates to the differences between dealing 
with a conflict’s symptoms and addressing its causes. The settlement of a conflict 
56 Refen-ing to th巴id巴asof mediation as succ巴sin its巴Ifand/or as a proc巴sof cumulative ben巴fit.
57 d’Es tr巴巴 etal. p. 101 
58 Burton, John and Dukes, Frank. Conflict: Practices In Managem巴nt.Settlem巴ntAndR巴solution,
St Martin’s Pres: New York. 1990. p. 1 
59 Leving巴r,George and Rubin, J巴fr巴y.
Conflict" in Negotiation Journal, Vol. 10, July 1994. p. 204-205 
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occurs when conflictual behavior (most notably of the damaging or destructive kind) 
is neutralized, or dampened. For example, upon witnessing a fight between siblings, a 
parent may choose to pull the two children apart and send them to their rooms, thus 
halting the physical manifestation of their conflict, without addressing its origins. 
Resolution, on the other hand, occurs when the root causes of a conflict are addressed, 
thus negating the threat of further conflictual behavior. It does not rely on 
enforcement, but rather the establishment of common ground, 60 upon which to build a 
relationship free of the need to revisit the conflict. In the case of the parent with 
feuding children, this would involve discerning the motivations behind the conflict 
and addressing it in such a manner as to negate the need for further conflict. In such a 
situation, this may involve the division of resources or the settling of a point of 
contention. Burton suggests settlement to be a useful tool for dealing with interest 
based disputes, while resolution is more suited for interpersonal conflicts where issues 
ぽemore easily addressed than in, for example the international environment.61 Had 
the children’s conflict been due to no more than childish exuberance, for example, or 
if there is no underlying problem that cannot be addressed by a simple behavioral 
alteration, then settlement may be al that is required for a satisfactory, successful 
outcome. 
Within conflict management literature, resolution is often presented in such a 
manner as to suggest it as being inherently superior to settlement. Complete as 
opposed to piece-meal, it is seen as dealing with the root causes of the conflict and 
negating the need for future conflict or management. By comparison, settlement, often 
involving a simple cessation of conflict behavior (such as a cease-fire) can be seen as 
60 Burton and Duk巴s.p. 121 
61 Ibid. p. 83, 121 
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a potentially damaging half measure, leaving conflict to smolder beneath the surface, 
before erupting again. Such a stance implies an understanding that conflict 
management should be a comprehensive undertaking and that the results of actions 
such as mediation should hence be equally comprehensive in order to be deemed truly 
successful. One can see this in many places. Burton, for example, discusses 
transformation in such a manner as to clearly imply some form of resolution (as 
opposed to settlement, which he views as a cause of protraction).62 The criteria 
utilized by Sheppard and Jameson imply resolution at various points also.63 Following 
a‘resolutionary’understanding, therefore, conflict is seen as a relationship to be 
altered, rather than an event to be dealt with. This has clear implications for our 
understanding of conflict management and mediation success, by implying the 
requirement for a transformational outcome and long term alteration to conflict 
behavior in order to claim success. 
Furthermore, while there are few who would argue against the merits of 
resolution that have been discussed thus far, not al consider it the only goal of 
conflict management. In discussing third party interventions, for example, Regan 
suggests that such events are regularly borne out of a (often selfish) desire to deal 
with the violence and other negative activities associated with conflict.64 In other 
words, their goal is often to counter the symptoms of the conflict rather than to invest 
any effort in gaining an understanding of disputant relationships and issue dynamics. 
Nor may ful resolution necessarily be in the parties’interests. Prein’s suggestion that 
62 Burton, John. R巴solvingDeen-Root巴dConflict: A HandBook, Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press Of Am巴rica,1987. p.18 
""Sheppard’s utilization of the t巴rmresolution and Jameson’s focus on alt巴ringrelationships and work 
structures, for example. Se巴tables1 and 2 
64 Regan, Patrick.“Conditions Of Succ巴sfulThird”Party Interv巴ntionIn Intrastate Conflicts" in 
Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, June 1996. p. 341 
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participants may wish to use conflict management for information gathering, learning 
from the process, without seeking to resolve the conflict, illustrates this well.65 To 
hark back to Susskind and Cruikshank’s consideration of stability of outcome, 
resolution is not always even deemed a realistic goal. Where settlement or cease-fire 
may be possible, the depths of feeling may be too great to achieve anything more 
ambitious, making a more modest settlement the best possible option. Its achievement 
in the circumstances may thus be considered a success. 
Whether settlement or resolution should be utilised as an indicator of success 
also depends somewhat on one’s conceptions of conflict and its management. If an 
understanding of the international environment is informed by a neo-realist view, 
wherein conflict is a natural part of a system defined by power politic behaviour, then 
resolution of conflict in any truly comprehensive manner may not be seen as realistic. 
Thus, conflict management’s focus is likely to be on the cessation of violence. In 
other words, it is suggested that conflict itself is natural, unavoidable and unlikely to 
be resolved and hence success is best judged as the ability to avert, or end the 
damaging aspects of conflict. In such an understanding of conflict and its 
management, therefore, settlement would, if achieved properly, clearly suffice as 
regards the denotation of success. 
By comparison, those who hold what might be described as a more idealistic66 
view of proceedings in the international environment may have more exacting 
requirements. If conflict is perceived as an aberration of sorts, born out of structural 
discrepancies, rather than being a part of the natural order of things, one is more likely 
65 Prein, Hugo.“Strategies For Third Party Intervention" in Human Relations, Vol. 40, 1987. p. 704 
66 The use of this term should, of cours巴， notb巴takento imply any of the negativ巴connotationswith 
which it is som巴timesasociated. 
to consider comprehensive resolution possible, and, hence, the prime indicator of 
mediation success. In such a view, settlement would be seen as a lesser result, 
ineffective in dealing with what the conflict is really about. 
Another approach, similar to that of the neo・同realists,is that of the 
behaviourally oriented. At its simplest, a behavioural approach would suggest that 
values and ideals cannot truly be addressed and that one must focus on only the 
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observable. Under this approach, conflict is seen as“a phenomenon manifest in active 
behaviour.”67 As such, its management must focus on the alteration of behaviour. 
Although not tied to the same theoretical background as neo-realism, it nevertheless 
shares in its utilisation of practical，‘real’data in assessing outcomes and, hence, 
understanding success. 
The choice between settlement and resolution can also be informed by one’s 
focus of concern as well. If one is primarily concerned with the destructive aspects of 
conflict behavior, an immediate settlement may be required to ensure safety and 
security before al else. This is particularly common in the case of major conflict 
where the potential loss of life is such an emotive motivating factor as to supercede al 
other considerations in both an emotional and a political sense. However, when one is 
primarily concerned with the relationship between two parties, a resolution may be 
the only way to feel one has truly contributed. 
The level at which a conflict management procedure occurs may also impact 
on the means and goals of the process at hand. Mediation at leadership levels, for 
67 Haas, Michael. International Conflict, Indianappolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1974. p. 6. 
51 
example, is more likely to focus on behavioral aspects of conflict, such as securing a 
cease-fire, while conflict management at the grass roots level may be more intent on 
building understanding, addressing structural problems at their roots and seeking 
68 
resolution. This may be in part due to the regular political requirement for a quick 
fix, but it also highlights the potential inability of high level conflict management to 
go beyond the control of conflict’s behavioral aspects. 
Ultimately, the idealized notion of ful conflict resolution is hard to fault as an 
example of what mediation success should be in a practical sense. However, it is 
considerably less clear as to whether a line should be drawn at resolution or whether 
more modest, settlement style outcomes may also be considered success in any 
developed framework of that phenomena. Again, we see how goals and perceptions of 
conflict can impact on trying to work out what success is. 
3.e: GOAL BASED FOCUS 
What is evident, upon consideration of both the criteria of success and the 
issue of settlement and resolution is that the goals of those involved (and those 
evaluating) play a m吋orpart in either method of evaluation. Indeed, regardless of the 
many evaluatory concerns presented by attempting to discern party goals, it is clear 
that goal based issues are never far from the forefront as a possible means of 
ascertaining ‘success'. 
Most obviously goal oriented is Jameson’s focus on desired outcomes. 
Explicitly stating a desire for a given outcome clear唱 suggestsone's goal is t 0
68 L巴derach,John Paul. Buildine: Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation In Divided Soci巴ti巴s,Washington, 
DC: Unit巴dStates Institute Of Peac巴Pres,1997. p. 39 
52 
achieve said outcome. Therefore, if setting a precedent is, as Jameson suggests, 
required to ensure a‘fair’outcome,69 and it is fairness that the participant desires, then 
the setting of such a precedent will serve as their immediate goal, against which the 
process’success or failure will be judged. Hence, in its most basic sense, even broad 
concepts such as those of Jameson, can be broken down to the achievement of simple 
goals. The same can be said about the Jameson criteria. Perceptions of success are 
likely to rely on the achievement of certain practical goals which in turn suggest the 
broader illustrative sub『 concept.Those seeking an efficient agreement, for example, 
may set goals surrounding the time frame of such an agreement, the achievement of 
which would suggest the desired efficiency was achieved and the process was, in that 
sense at least, a success. Similar examples could be made from the other criteria. 
Sheppard’s approach is admittedly not so suggestive of a goals based focus, 
but his very utilization of the term satisfaction is. Satisfaction necessarily implies the 
achievement of some goal or provision of some need. Hence, any utilization of 
satisfaction vis-a-vis success can be seen as suggesting success to be directly related 
to the achievement of goals. Success, therefore would be a phenomena best 
understood by way of the measurement of accomplishments against goals. 
Likewise, one’s interpretation of an outcome is potentially reliant on one’s 
goals. A simple settlement (i.e., a cease-fire) of a conflict may be deemed a failure by 
one whose goal was a comprehensive resolution, while being heralded a success by 
one with more modest hopes. Hence, we can see a clear example of how, as suggested 
in the previous chapter, post mediation outcomes can be colored by pre-mediation 
69 Jameson. p. 278-279. 
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goals. This also clearly echoes Weiss’suggestion“to measure the effects of a pro gram 
against the goals it sets out to accomplish.”70 Equally, of course, the criticisms raised 
regarding the difficulty of accurately evaluating goals stil stand. Howeverヲitis 
important to consider this as it is evident goals inform much that may relate to 
understanding success. 
Nevertheless, while this is indeed prohibitively difficult, work has been done 
on assessing the salience of differing types of goals that bears consideration. 
Thompson provides an interesting and comprehensive view of one way of 
approaching this issue in her “exploration of the mapping between objective outcomes 
and people’s subjective evaluation of those outcomes’川 regardinggoals, aspirations 
and their impact on resultant perceptions of success. Although focused on non-
conflict negotiation, and negotiation of a particularly measurable nature, Thompson’s 
study stil raises a number of interesting issues regarding how the pre“conflict 
management mind set may impact on the coding of post-management outcomes. 
Thompson’s basic thesis suggests that people do not derive satisfaction from 
results or rewards, but rather from how those results relate to their desires or that 
which they see those around them attaining. To whit，“people’s salaries are not 
strongly predictive of pay satisfaction" but rather “people use personal standards of 
comparison [perception of worth, comparison to colleagues salary and so forth], with 
pay satisfaction determined by the discrepancy between actual salary and such 
standards.”72 Thus, it is suggested that people will react differently to the same 
70 Weiss. p. 4 
71 Thompson. p. 513 
72 Ibid. p. 513 
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outcome as a result of differing standards of comparison.73 To return to Jameson’s 
consideration of desired outcomes of conflict management, it would not be 
improvement of a relationship that would suggest an effective outcome, but rather the 
degree to which that improvement approached the improvement desired by the party 
involved. This has clear implications for both the assessment of participant 
satisfaction and the interpretation of settlement and resolution style outcomes as 
success or failure. Hence, we can see that even if basic outcomes are easily quantified, 
they will only be clearly understood as regards a perception of success when scaled 
against a participant, or evaluator’s, goals and desires. 
According to Thompson, such desires are separated into two poles. The first is 
that of minimum goals, the lowest acceptable outcome a party will willingly accept as 
a result (remembering that under our understanding of mediation, undue duress should 
not be a factor). The second is that of peak aspirations, the optimum outcome 
conceived. In economic settings, it is suggested that minimum goals are the measuring 
stick of outcomes, with bargaining surpluses (the amount by which a final agreement 
surpasses one’s minimum goal) being utilized to indicate the degree of success.74 In 
the context of direct negotiation, however, Thompson suggests a different possibility. 
Although reinforcing the theory of bargaining 問中lus,it is also suggested an 
outcome’s proximity to a party’s maximum aspirations may serve as an equally 
insightful indicator of party satisfaction and perceptions of success.75 
Indeed, Thompson’s subsequent investigation suggests that aspirations and an 

















































than a bargaining su叩lus,by way of a sales related experimental procedure戸Itis 
suggested that the reason behind this may be that as achievement of minimum goals is 
basically ピgiven’inany agreement derived from a voluntary procedure, one is 
instead more likely to focus on securing an agreement capable of approaching their 
highest hopes. Thus, it is the proximity they gain to aspirations, rather than the degree 
to which they pass their lower threshold, that is the determining factor in outcome 
assessment. 
The implications of such observations are important to consider. While 
minimum goals are likely to be based on some actual basic requirement (in 
Thompson’s example this might be the securing of a high enough price to cover 
costs), aspirations are potentially limitless, their levels set by personality and 
countless other variables. If success is therefore based around the degree to which 
such aspirations are reached, it is clear that it will be at once more ambitious and more 
difficult to measure than would a conception of success based around minimum goals. 
Of course, Thompson’s approach is not the only way of addressing this issue 
and nor should its applicability to conflict management and mediation be overstated. 
Seldom are the goals and outcomes of a mediation episode, particularly one in a 
political setting, likely to lend themselves to measurement as easily as Thompson’s 
sales based experiments. As suggested in the previous chapter, outcomes are more 
likely to have a broader range of measurable indicators and goals are less likely to 
follow a linear development than in such a simple, empirical measurable setting. 
76 Ibid. p. 520-1 
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Furthermore, although Thompson’s results regarding negotiation appear 
conclusive, in the context of conflict management, requirements may differ. Burton, 
in particular presents a contrasting view point in suggesting an approach, the aim of 
which is to provide for an outcome “in which both sides can claim attainment of their 
,7 
immediate minimum objectives. In this, we see a potential contrast between the 
mindsets of conflict management and sales based negotiation. While conflict 
management is voluntary in the case of mediation, episodes will often occur as a 
result of a failure to achieve maximum aspirations by more direct means. As such, the 
desire for some form of agreement to satisfy political needs may impact on the 
relative salience of minimum goals vis-a-vis maximum aspirations. As such, the 
question is raised as to whether goals are more modest, given the realities of the 
mediatory context. 
3.f: ASSESSMENT ISSUES 
In considering the issues already discussed, one can begin to get some idea of 
the issues that must be addressed in any attempt to frame success in the mediatory 
context. However, it is also important to consider how the manner in which an event 
is assessed may impact upon its coding as a success or failure. As suggested in 
chapter two, whether one wishes to address settlement duration, impact on conflict 
intensity or some other practical indicator will impact upon how a given result is 
interpreted. Even if competing approaches both suggest success in an assessment, 
they may do so for entirely different reasons,78 thus providing litle real insight into 
the nature of the success in question. Most interesting, however, is the issue of 
whether one should even focus on outcomes at al. 
77 Burton, John.“Resolution Of Conflict" in International Studi巴SOuart巴rlv,Vol. 16, 1972. p. 20 
78 Kleibo巴r,1998. p. 18 
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In the context of conflict management, the question is raised; can outcomes 
(regardless of their means of measurement) that have been impacted on by 
environmental variables beyond the control of those involved in the process, 
reasonably be used in measuring that episode’s success or failure? Some would 
suggest not, that instead measurement of process is the only fair way to assess an 
episode. We can see this in Fischer’s definition of the third party’s rol as being 
diagnostic and facilitative, and not focused on re-entry79 as well as in Ingestedt’s 
suggestion that the mediation only addresses conflict up until the point of 
agreement. 8° Furthermore, how can one assess outcomes when causality can be so 
difficult to discern and ‘ripeness’rather than any mediation effort, may be at the heart 
of its outcome? 
Certainly, there is super日cialmerit to the suggestion of output analysis. One 
traditional example used is that of the ‘lone gunman’. Peace agreements so often seem 
to be derailed by small groups of malcontents acting beyond the power or predication 
of those involved in the conflict management process. To judge success and failure on 
the unpredictable (and often unavoidable), seems harsh in some respects. Critics 
would suggest, however, that one cannot simply focus on the skills of participants and 
the quality of the process in defining mediation episodes. Doing so creates a view of 
mediation results based on indicators not directly tied to the underlying purposes of 
conflict management (the alteration of conflict behavior/relationships), resulting in the 
79 Fischer, Ronald.“Third Party Consultation As A M巴thodOf Int巴rgroupConflict Resolution" in 
Journal Of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, June, 1983. p. 323 
80 Ingest巴dt,Marianne. Mediation In Civil Wars: Tracin! The Causes Of Succ巴sOr Failure, 
Unpublished, Uppsala University. 1999. p. 54 
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distinct possibility that one will end up performing admirably at tasks that are not 
required. 81 
The implications of these two competing views as regards the definition of 
success are both obvious and significant. Each approach suggests a radically different 
range of indicators for framing success. An output based approach would suggest a 
conception of success measured by quality of process and participant involvement 
while an outcome based one would suggest measures focused on an episode’s actual 
impact on the conflict in question. Any assessment of what success may best be seen 
to entail will therefore be heavily influenced by one’s standing on this question. 
3.g: SUCCESS AS A CONTINUU乱1?
The preceding debates regarding goals, resolution/settlement, and so forth, 
also raise another issue regarding the nature of success in conflict management; that 
of whether success is a zero-sum, either/or phenomena or an issue best considered in 
matters of degree. 
Can an events evaluation occur along a continuum, from total failure to total 
success, with many graduations along the way, or is it, as is often portrayed in the 
media, a simple success or failure equation? The implic瓜ionsof this for our 
understanding of success are clearly great. If one assumes success is such a zero sum 
phenomena, then one must define a tipping point at which failure ends and success 
日lState Servic巴sCommission. Occasional Paner No. 7: Loaning The Loon: Evaluating Outcom巴SAnd 
0th巴rRiskv Feats, Wellington: State Servic巴sCommission, 1999. p. 11 
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begins. If, on the other hand, it is seen as a gradual development, then some sort of 
continuum illustrating this development must be formulated. 
Within the literature, examples of zero sum thinking can be seen in 
consideration of the settlement, resolution debate. Those who suggest comprehensive 
resolution to be the only truly acceptable outcome of conflict management have 
essentially drawn a line in the sand, with success on one side, failure on the other. 
Indeed, any expression of a singular outcome desire does this. There is also much 
evidence of zero『 sumthinking that might suggest the existence of some undefined (or 
at least inadequately defined) tipping point at which failure is divided from success. 
This can be seen both in the settlement, resolution debate as well as in comments by 
the likes of Fischer and Kleiboer indicating circumstances likely to be perceived as 
win/lose that, in turn, inform an understanding of what success will entail in the 
management of those conflicts. 
By comparison, Bercovitch et al’s behavioral approach discusses the concept 
of full and partial settlements, 82 suggesting (or at least implying) some sort of 
continuum upon which outcomes may be graded, rather than simply judged in one 
way or the other. The settlement, resolution debate also implies the possibility of 
varying degrees of success, from the modest, through to the ideal. Likewise, 
Thompson’s‘aspiration zone’also implies a measurable range of outcome83 while 
s2 B巴rcovitich,Jacob. Anagnoson, Th巴adore.Wille, Don己te.“SomeConceptual Isu巴sAnd Empirical 
Trends In The Study Of Successful Mediation In International Relations" in Journal Of Peace 
E盟主笠辿， Vol.28, 1991. p. 10 
83 Thompson. p. 519 
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Prein operates in terms of how successful and more or less successful, 84 also 
suggesting a range of possible outcomes beyond simple success and failure. 
Clearly, establishing an understanding of how success should be viewed is of 
fundamental importance in creating a framework to comprehensively define it. As 
such, the decision as to whether or not it is best conceived as a one dimensional 
phenomena or a range of possibilities would seem to be an issue of potentially great 
salience. 
3.h: SUMMARY 
Much of this chapter may seem overly critical. No means of defining success 
or evaluating conflict management episodes will ever be beyond critique. However, 
the close consideration of these widely divergent approaches and their respective 
merits and failings raises a number of important questions. Is success a practical 
matter measurable by settlement or resolution? Is it fair to evaluate such procedures in 
an outcome based manner given the unpredictable, uncontrollable nature of the 
conflict environment? Should participant goals be taken into account? If so, how? To 
what extent can illustrative concepts be used to counter the abstract nature of the term 
‘success’？ Although the creation of one framework could never hope to provide a 
final answer to al these questions, by addressing them, in conjunction with the 
already covered difficulties of social science evaluation, one can begin to form an idea 


























Upon consideration of the discussion thus far, one might come to believe that 
the evaluation of mediation episodes and the establishment of even a rudimentary 
framework for success to be a task so difficult as to be prohibitive. Certainly there is 
litle in the last two chapters that provides obvious hope for such an undertaking. 
However, the very array of problems that might be expected to hinder the process 
may instead help facilitate it. The plethora of difficulties facing anyone attempting to 
evaluate social science phenomena provide a guideline of issues that must be 
satisfactorily addressed in order to do so. Likewise, the range of potential definitions 
for success present in conflict management literature may be less than ideal in any 
number of respects, but they do provide the ingredients from which a framework can 
be created, while also suggesting a number of issues that must be addressed if one is 
to approach success in a comprehensive manner. However, drawing these possibilities 
out is a potentially difficult process. 
The intent of this undertaking, therefore, is to create a framework that 
illustrates the determinant factors of success in an understandable, but not simplistic, 
manner. As such, the explanation shall be broken into two halves. The first explains 
the theoretical framework itself. Aspects of the already discussed approaches to 
success are incorporated, while others are refined or discarded. In doing so, a number 
of the problems associated with attempting to define success are addressed regarding 
the new framework. In responding to the issues raised in the literature of the field, it is 
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hoped the theoretical underpinnings of the framework will be both comprehensive and 
easily understood. 
However, as already discussed, mediation is a practical undertaking, and any 
discussion of it must acknowledge this. Hence, any theory needs to be practically 
applicable. As such, the second half of this chapter endeavours to operationalize this 
framework in order to enable its testing against real world mediation episodes. In 
doing so, those aspects of the initial theory left undefined will be fleshed out with 
suggestions of specific requirements for the coding of a given outcome as success. 
The result should hopefully be a framework which addresses the m吋ortheoretical 
concerns surrounding our understanding of success, and yet stil provides practical 
indicators as to its perceived nature. 
4.a: CREATING THE FRAMEWORK 
At the heart of this framework is the idea that success must be viewed on a 
continuum of some sort. While a simple success/failure, win/lose dichotomy carries 
with it the allure of simplicity, it does litle to really address the often complex nature 
of mediation outcomes and seems vulnerable to oversimplification. As suggested, 
success is often discussed as a singular phenomena.百owever,in the case of this 
framework, it is contested that success should not be identified as one simple 
eventuality against which al else is considered failure. There are two major reasons 
for this. 
Firstly, it implies success to be a one dimensional concept, which, quite 
simply, it is not. Success can be modest, just barely acceptable. One common usage of 
satisfaction, for example, is that which suggests one is satisfied simply when some 
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basic level of requirement has been obtained. Success can be glorious, the attainment 
of a dream or a goal, an achievement so complete it negates the need for further 
endeavour. Success can (and regularly does) also fal somewhere between the two. 
The salience granted to the achievement of varying degrees of success within such a 
range is open for debate, but it is evident that any consideration of success must 
acknowledge its multitude of forms. 
Secondly, a simplistic, dichotomous, conception of success suggests a clear 
line between success and failure. This is not the case. While in many situations it is 
certainly possible to show the difference between success and failure clearly, this will 
not always be so. While 'total success’and ‘abject failure' do indeed present 
themselves as polar opposites, the reality of most mediation outcomes is more 
equatorial. Therefore, in order to illuminate a phenomena such as success, spread as it 
is across part of a continuum of possible mediation outcomes, one must identify it at 
its most modest origins. That is to say, one must identify a range of possible minimum 
requirements for success. In doing so, one can suggest a point beyond which al 
superior results simply constitute greater degrees of success, thus illustrating the 
concept in its entirety. By comparison, were one simply to identify the qualities of 
success at its most ideal, one would be provided with litle information as to what 
constitutes success in a broader context. 
Of course, such a task is difficult. Identifying an absolute point of divide, 
where failure becomes success, is, as enticing as it might sound, not practically 
possible. To attempt to do so would serve only to promulgate the utilisation of 
arbitrary, and/or subjective, personalised designations of success and failure largely 
dismissed in the preceding discussion. Instead, one must identify the keys of clear 
success and failure and then attempt to address the nature of the borderline between 
them, where success has its origins. To help illustrate this, a simple semi-circular 
diagram can be utilised. 
DIAGRAM 3: The Success Arc-Continuum 
Abject Failure 
Transitory Zon巴




The arc indicates the continuum of possible mediation outcomes, from total 
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failure to complete success. Of course, such absolutes only exist in theory, but they do 
serve to illustrate the potential extremes of the continuum. The transitory zone, with 
its borders illustrated by dotted lines to indicate that they are not absolute margins, 
represents the realm between the two, within which failure at its most marginal and 
success at its most modest are intertwined. This is the realm within which 
investigation must ultimately be taken to discern more clearly, the nature of success. 
The arc is, or at least was initialy, designed in order to indicate a tipping point, past 
which a mediation outcome can be defined increasingly as success or failure. Of 
course, it is not believed that any such tipping point, while it may exist in a theoretical 
sense, can be satisfactorily identified to be used to address the overriding question of 
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‘what is success？’ Instead, it is by discussing the nature of possible determinant 
factors housed within the transitory zone that progress can be made in this endeavour. 
On their own, however, the arc and its implications regarding the origins of 
success within the transitory zone are meaningless. Some means of application is 
required in order to explain how success and failure are to be interpreted and where 
the grey area of success’origin resides in a practical sense. The indicators chosen for 
this pu叩oseare those of settlement and resolution as discussed in chapter three. The 
simple break down of outcomes provided by these alternate outcome possibilities 
lends itself well to the success arc and the avoidance of over-determination. 
Both settlement and resolution have many features that lend themselves to 
providing a definition of success. As alr 
almost the ideal of a successful mediation outcome in most contexts. Hence, those 
mediation results that clearly fulfil al aspects of an idealised resolution could be seen 
as falling to the right hand end of the arc, as close to‘total’success as is possible. 
Less perfect resolutions fal ever further left on the continuum. 
However, it is the contents of the transitory zone that provides insights to the 
‘beginning’of success and, hence, success itself for the pu叩osesof this discussion. 
As such, one must look to the idea of settlement. More modest in its intent than 
resolution, settlement suggests simple behavioural alterations in a conflict, rather than 
overarching relational shifts. As such, settlements may potentially result in either 
success or failure. While a ceasefire, or other behavioural changes, may do litle to 
radically transform relationships in a conflict or address its deep seated issues, there is 
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much to suggest it should be coded a success. On the contrary, a settlement resulting 
in a cease fire that barely gets off the ground may serve to promulgate mistrust, 
resulting in a conflict situation ultimately worse for the mediation attempt. A clear 
failure, in other words. Thus, resolution is identified as success, failure to reach any 
agreement is coded as failure and settlement is seen as inhabiting the grey area. 
Settlement, therefore, is the range of results within which success can be identified at 
its origin. 









The utilisation of settlement as the base level of success should not be seen as 
suggesting a fully neo-realist or behavioural approach to the understanding of conflict 
and its management. On the contrary, the acknowledgement of the merits of 
resolution and its placement on the continuum should be seen as indicative of the 
author’s belief that conflict is a relationship that can be altered, rather than simply a 
pattern of behaviour to be restrained. However, it must be acknowledged that much 
conflict management derives its impetus from concerns surrounding the negative 
impact of conflict’s behavioural manifestations, rather than concerns about the nature 
of the structural roots of the conflict and its associated relationship problems. Hence, 
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the utilisation of settlement to identify success at its most basic, although simply 
addressing conflicts' behavioural aspects, is not intended to deny the possibility of 
resolution, which is itself part of the same continuum. Furthermore, it is suggested, 
that the divide between the behavioural and relational aspects of conflict is over-
stated. Like success and failure, both sit on the same continuum. Any agreement to 
shift behavioural patterns is indicative of some small relationship change, while such 
shifts in behaviour can also promote, or at least enable, deeper relational changes and 
may serve as symptoms of those changes also. 
The exact nature of what aspects of a given settlement must be considered in 
order to address its possible success or failure will be discussed in the second half of 
this chapter when the framework itself is operationalized. 
In choosing to utilise success at its most modest, this framework is clearly 
stepping away from a utilisation of maximum aspirations as a measure of success. As 
discussed in chapter three, such aspirations may be neither practical, possible, or 
politically desirable. Even if achieved, they, much like ful resolution, suggest a more 
ideal success than is required for this discussion. However, nor does this framework 
focus on minimum goals, despite its modesty. As discussed, minimum goals may 
consist of sub-settlement benefits. While these have positive aspects, the task at hand 
is the framing of‘success’of a mediation, not its value. Likewise, suggestions that 
any mediation should be framed a success either because of its symbolic nature or, as 
with above, its potential cumulative effect, should be dismissed. Certainly, it is a 
triumph when two formerly intransigent opponents come together to discuss the 
possibility of a new future. However, it is a triumph for pre-mediation diplomacy and 
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back room politicking, not the mediation episode itself. Furthermore, while a failed 
mediation may lay the groundwork for future successes, it is those future episodes that 
should be coded as successful, the one at hand may simply be a failure with some 
redeeming qualities (and thus somewhat closer to the centre on the arc). 
Utilising settlement and resolution in order to frame success also addresses 
another evaluation debate by clearly suggesting an outcome, rather than output, based 
focus. This bears some discussion. Output evaluation is not without its merits. As 
already suggested, the international environment is fraught with vagaries, many of 
which prove impossible to predict in a mediation environment. In judging the success 
or failure of a given mediation episode, it would seem unfair to suggest failure as a 
result of events completely beyond the control of those involved. The emphasis added 
is to stress a point. Output analysis is a perfectly reasonable means for assessing the 
performance of those involved in a mediation. It would certainly be unfair to suggest 
a skilled mediator was a failure after a carefully facilitated agreement of sublime 
wisdom was destroyed by political developments completely beyond anyone’s ability 
to control or predict. Furthermore, without some acknowledgement of the limited 
power those involved ultimately have in the long term results of a mediation, it would 
be difficult to fairly asses冶theirskills and abilities, thus making it difficult to ensure 
the best people for the job were regularly provided. 
However, when evaluating the mediation episode itself, one should be less 
concerned about such an understanding approach. Mediation is a real world process, 
often undertaken in times of most dire need. If it does not provide a positive outcome, 
some sort of practical improvement, how can it be deemed a success? This is a study 
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of success in mediation, not the quality of participant input. Well performed officials 
and completely unpredictable hindrances do not change the fact that a mediation 
episode that ultimately results in litle or no improvement of the situation at hand is of 
limited value. To hark back to Sheppard and company, conflict management must be 
effective to be successful. 
As a result, the success arc is focussed on assessing outcomes as regards the 
success of mediation episodes. This means that sometimes superb mediation episodes 
will ultimately be coded failures. This is not to pass judgement on those involved, but 
simply to ensure focus remains firmly on the impact of the mediation episode. 
However, the flip『 sideof this is that, given the aforementioned difficulty in 
establishing causal links with absolute certainty, some lesser processes may be 
deemed successes due to their fortuitous timing or otherwise good luck. This is not an 
exact science, nor should it ever claim to be, but as long as one remembers that the 
focus is success of episodes vis-a-vis their conflicts, rather than quality of procedures, 
these potential vagaries should not be a cause for concern. 
This said, the question of causality cannot be ignored. In order to suggest a 
given mediation episode has been a success, it is vital that a link is made between that 
mediation and the outcome(s) being measured. In an environment as complex as the 
international arena, there are always concurrent events that will make proving sole 
cause difficult. Nevertheless, in order to lay claim to an indicator of success, a 
mediation episode must be shown to be the primary factor in precipitating that 
change. A mediation episode that happens to coincide with diplomatic manoeuvring 
from other quarters, for example, must be shown to have had a greater impact than 
that other factor. 
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Furthermore, even upon establishing a mediation attempt as the primary factor 
of impact on a given conflict at its time of undertaking, one must also be certain that 
the conflict’s alteration is not more clearly the product of pre-mediation events. Both 
extremely 'ripe’conflicts and those heading for obsolescence may simply fizzle out of 
their own accord. Thus, it is important to establish whether a given mediation is 
actually responsible for a measured outcome, or has simply served as a tool for 
framing it. Admittedly, this does require a certain amount of counterfactual analysis 
(once a mediation has been undertaken, one cannot be certain how the conflict would 
have developed without it), but it is important to at least consider the relevance of a 
mediation episode to any measured change in a conflict before adjudging th瓜 change
to be indicative of successful or failed mediation. 
Despite the possibility of utilising some counterfactual analysis in assessing 
causality however, such analysis does not play a m司orpart in the framework. There 
are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is quite simply an incredibly difficult task to 
undertake. In the complex environment of international mediation the range of 
possibilities for a given outcome is often as broad as one’s imagination. In al but the 
most ideal of mediation episodes it seems fair to suggest that there will have been 
better options that went unpursued. However, determining which of these options may 
have had a real likelihood of getting off the ground and out-performing a given 
approach relies so much on personal interpretation of facts that can never be proven as 
to remove it from contention as a tool for clearly framing success. 
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Secondly, counterfactual analysis of outcomes arguably goes a step beyond 
what is required for framing success. As with output evaluation, counterfactual 
analysis can serve as an interesting tool for evaluating the performance of those 
involved in a mediation episode, but it does not provide the sort of information 
required to assess whether or not a given mediation should be deemed a success or a 
failure. While evidence of a superior option having been overlooked or ignored 
(assuming of course one could comprehensively prove such a claim) may serve to 
further damn a failure, or take some of the gloss off of a success, it does not alter the 
simple fact of whether or not a given outcome reached the tipping point past which 
success is indicated. In many ways, this stands as a mirror image output analysis. 
Where measuring outputs can serve to suggest a successful process but should not be 
utilised in final evaluation of the mediation’s result, counterfactual analysis may 
suggest failures on the part of those involved in a mediation that do not ultimately 
impact on the success or failure. 
As regards the idea that counterfactual analysis may provide much needed 
context to unique outcomes that could otherwise have none, this is certainly true. 
However, it also is not completely relevant. Conflict management develops along a 
continuum much like mediation outcomes, stretching across a range of conflict 
possibilities and on through to settlement and resolution. Settlement as success, 
therefore, provides a context in itself as (successful) mediation is a process of change 
and change has been identified, from conflict to settlement. In essence, conflict 
management is a journey, rather than the race discussed in chapter two. Its goals are 
born of progression, not competition. Knowing how others (or other approaches) may 
have performed is interesting, but ultimately peripheral to the real questions 
associated with outcome evaluation. 
None of this is intended to dissuade counterfactual analysis. In 
striving to do as well as is possible, and in attempting to learn from one's 
experience, some form of counterfactual analysis must be undertaken, regardless 
of the difficulties involved. Certainly, a mediator’s performance must be 
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considered carefully. If, for example, they miss an opportunity for the sort of elegant 
85 
trades suggested in Susskind and Cruikshank's discussion of efficiency this must be 
acknowledged and assessed. However, in the context of the current assessment 
consideration, it remains a potentially interesting addendum, but a largely peripheral 
concern. 
Another area of consideration that has not found its way directly into the 
framework under creation is that regarding the use of illustrative sub-concepts such as 
fairness, satisfaction, effectiveness, efficiency and stability as primary tools for 
framing success. 
Such terms are ultimately abstractions, albeit finer ones than‘success’. As 
such, they are limited in their value as far as creating a workable, easily 
understandable framework for defining mediation success on their own. One cannot 
explain an abstraction with an abstraction without a vast degree of explanation. 
Simply saying, for example, that success is best defined as a blend of efficiency and 
effectiveness is of litle more value than explaining to a blind person that pu叩leis a 
85 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 26-28. 
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mixture of red and blue. With further explanation of course, one can begin to develop 
an idea of what success may be seen as entailing, but the process of providing in-
depth explanations of such a range of concepts very quickly leads one a way from the 
sort of workable definition likely to lend itself to a workable framework. 
Furthermore, while any one or combination of these concepts (or a perception 
thereof) may play a part in an agreement to setle, or even the quality of the settlement 
itself, it is ultimately that settlement, resolution or the failure to attain either which 
indicates the quality of the outcome. To some extent this argument is born out of an 
understanding of the nature of mediation. 
Mediation episodes are concluded either with no agreement, resulting in 
failure, or in an agreement, be it formal or informal, written or verbal, which may 
possibly lead to success. Due to the voluntary nature of involvement in the process, it 
seems reasonable to expect that any agreement reached will be one that satisfies 
participants, to some minimal level at least. Therefore, it can be assumed that some 
minimum degree of these various requirements has been mco叩oratedinto any 
agreement. Thus, they are ingredients of the agreement that may result in a settlement 
deemed worthy of being coded a success. They are not however, tools for defining 
success themselves. 
This is not to say, however, that those concepts discussed by Sheppard, 
Jameson and Susskind and Cruikshank will not play a part in discussion of the 
framework under creation. To the contrary they, or some of them, are vital to its 
utilization. Fairness and satisfaction are ultimately perceptual, and as such have their 
main value as ingredients of agreement as already discussed. Efficiency, meanwhile 
must be addressed on two levels. 
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Should potential agreements be prohibitively inefficient, they most likely will 
not be made. Any agreement reached in a voluntary setting, therefore can be argued to 
be of at least minimum acceptable efficiency. Of course, should a grossly inefficient 
agreement be reached, this may impact on the achievements of the settlement at hand, 
thus impacting on its success or failure. An agreement based on a perception of 
efficiency that then proves not to be so in the real world environment would not be a 
surprising candidate for failure. 
However, this assessment should be made on the performance/impact/outcome 
of any agreement, not specifically its degree of efficiency. Likewise, agreements 
should not be judged on the basis of some perceived inefficiency, at least as far as the 
assignation of success or failure is concerned. Such considerations echo the issues 
raised by output evaluation and counterfactual analysis in suggesting an area worthy 
of consideration for assessing mediator performance and/or broader political issues. 
However, they remain peripheral to actual outcome assessment. 
Effectiveness and stability are of more direct importance. This framework is 
based around the assessment of mediation’s impact by way of analysis of agreements 
and their performance. Hence, the effectiveness, or impact, of an agreement is at its 
cornerstone. Mediation episodes that fail to secure an agreement are ineffective, and 
are coded failures, as are agreements that don’t reach certain minimum requirements. 
The very acknowledgement of the ongoing nature of settlement and resolution style 
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agreements also suggests a place for Susskind and Cruikshank’s use of 'stability' in 
the analysis of success. In order to be truly effective, a settlement must remain in 
place long enough to have a recognisable impact. However, for the pu中oseof 
operationalizing the framework, the term‘durability’shall be used instead of stability. 
Nordquist indicates that an agreement’s durability can be measured either in terms of 
the length of time the agreement is sustained, or on the basis of the agreement’s 
ability to withstand abrupt changes that may threaten its continuance. 86 By providing 
guidelines for quantitative and qualitative measures of agreement, Nordquist’s 
approach is therefore of more use in the present discussion than broader talk of 
stability might be. This is not to say that effectiveness (impact) and durability can 
serve as indicators of success on their own. However, it does highlight how they may, 
when granted a context, be utilised as part of a focussed, outcome based analysis of 
mediation success. 
It is the intention (and hope) of this framework to avoid the morass of 
perceptual/interpretative analysis so evident in many of the approaches addressed in 
chapter three. As already discussed, the utilisation of the success arc is intended to 
step away from the utilisation of abstractions in definition of other abstractions. 
Instead, the terms of settlement and resolution, each a specific, explainable state 
rather than a broad concept, provide a simple, clear understanding of the context in 
which success is best considered. As such, the risk of over determining success to the 
extent that its explanation is as misleading as the abstraction it intended to negate, 
should hopefully be avoided. 
86 Nordquist，悶巴1-Ake.Peace After War: On Conditions For Durable 
Int巴r-StateBoundary A紅白m巴nts,Uppsala, Swesd巴n:D巴partmentOf Peace And Conflict Reseacrh, 
1992. p. 34-35. 
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The arc framework is further simplified by virtue of the fact that it does not 
directly address goals. As is the case with issues of satisfaction and fairness, 
achievement of goals by those involved may lead to an agreement resulting in 
settlement or resolution of the conflict, but it is the form and impact of that 
agreement, rather than the attainment of the goals themselves, that defines success. 
The question can of course be raised, what if the situation is so dire as to result in 
goals more modest even than the simplest of settlement? Surely a mediation episode 
should not be coded a failure if the sole goal of bringing its participants together has 
been achieved? However, while this may imply a positive outcome of sorts, it is not 
enough to suggest the success of a mediation episode itself. There are circumstances 
where a mediation may have no hope of a successful outcome as coded in this 
framework. This should not lower the bar, or broaden the transitory zone, however. 
Rather, it should simply serve to highlight that there can be positive aspects to even 
failed mediations, but mediation cannot be a success without a certain degree of 
impact on the conflict it has been undertaken to address. The question therefore 
becomes one of assessing that impact and trying to discern whether it has identifiable 
positive qualities that can be utilised in suggesting its success. These may have to be 
assessed on a case by case basis. The specific means of addressing this will be 
discussed in the operationalization of the framework. 
In avoiding a direct focus on participant goals, the evaluator also avoids the 
problems of perceptual inte中retation.Firstly, divergence of evaluator and participant 
focus are avoided by the utilisation of the agreement-impact approach. Secondly, the 
evaluator is not left the tricky task of attempting to evaluate what goals may have 
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been held by a party, what salience they granted them and how well they feel they 
were achieved. The question is no longer directly relevant. If an agreement is reached, 
and it proves to be of sufficient quality to be coded a success, it is implicit that parties 
must be satisfied enough at some basic level, even if they may not deem the 
agreement ideal. Finally, as already suggested, the evaluator is no longer left with a 
range of divergent, incompatible goals to attempt to measure in something 
approaching a scientific fashion. Instead, he/she is presented with the task of 
evaluating where an outcome fals on a continuum that has its basis in a practical 
assessment of a mediation episode’s impact on a given conflict. 
4.b: OPERATIONALIZING THE FRAMEWORK 
The development of the framework thus far has two m可orthemes. Firstly, it 
is suggested that possible mediation outcomes exist on a continuum that travels from 
total failure through to complete success. Secondly, it is suggested that, in order to 
understand success, it must be identified not simply at its ideal but, more importantly, 
at its minimum, in order to understand the point beyond which success may be 
claimed. While identifying a clear delineation between success and failure, and hence 
a clear origin for success, would ultimately rely on the sort of arbitrary and subjective 
analysis already criticized, it is suggested that a certain transitory zone exists within 
the continuum.立iswithin this zone that marginal failure and modest success lie (see 
diagram 1). Therefore, it is by identifying those determinant factors that influence 
outcome and possibly discern success from failure that one can begin to draw some 
conclusions about the nature of mediatory success. 
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In a practical sense, the continuum has been framed by utilization of the 
settlement and resolution outcomes present in the discussions of existing approaches 
to framing mediation outcomes. Thus, mediations that result in no identifiable 
agreement are deemed failures. 87 This is not intended to deny the beneficial aspects of 
many mediations that do not result in agreements. However, it is intended to suggest 
that while such episodes may have beneficial, cumulative qualities for the ongoing 
conflict management process, they are not themselves success. Nonetheless, the range 
of failure on the continuum leaves room for discerning different degrees of failure. By 
comparison, mediations that result in a comprehensive resolution of the conflict and 
its issues are identified as successes. This leaves the more modest achievement of 
settlement style agreements straddling the transitory zone (see diagram 2). 
Therefore, in order to operationalize the framework and assess its merits, one 
must consider a number of facets of any settlement process that may be seen as 
determinant factors in suggesting a successful settlement. These have been identified 
as: the nature of any agreement; its re-entry into the conflict environment; its impact 
(and it’s causal link to that impact); and its sustainability/durability. The ordering of 
these possible deter羽 inantsis significant. It suggests that conflict management, and 
mediation itself, is an ongoing social process, rather than a distinguishable single 
event. Simply evaluating a mediation outcome in terms of its agreement (essentially 
output analysis) is as Honeywell demonstrates, arguably flawed. Likewise, an 
arbitrarily suggested time frame may not tel us much more. Instead, it is suggested 
that in order to discern the success or failure of an agreement, one must begin one’s 
87 While an agre巴mentn巴ednot hav巴been‘signedof on', or even v巴rbalized,at a m巴diation’s
conclusion, on巴mustbe able to provide evidence of an agreem巴nt,to巴nsur巴acausal link between the 
mediation and any subsequent alterations in the conflict. 
assessment with the nature of any agreement, then trace that agreement’s institution, 
its impact on conflict behavior and its durability as a process. 
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Successful settlements, it shall therefore be contested, are those with 
agreements that clearly suggest means for addressing the behavioral, if not relational 
aspects of the conflict. They are instituted in a relatively ‘intact’form (thus 
eliminating overly-ambitious settlements of the sort that Susskind and Cruikshank 
discuss88) and, once instituted, resist derailment long enough to deliver on their 
promise, and, as such, ultimately have a clear (positive) and demonstrable impact on 
conflict behavior. Each of these criteria deserve some discussion. 
Obviously, the first question is, what is the nature of the agreement? A 
mediation’s agreement is its first practical outcome, and hence is of great significance. 
It may be a non documented agreement sealed with a hand shake, an official 
statement of principles signed抗 am司orceremony, or a complex legal agreement 
drawn up by experts to directly address specific concerns. However, what matters is 
what it suggests in order to address the conflict which prompted it. A press release 
suggesting ‘useful talks' or‘definite progress’does not suffice, and neither do 
settlements that suggest only negligible or peripheral alterations in conflict behavior. 
For a mediation to be deemed successful it must be shown to have a tangible impact 
on the conflict it has been undertaken to address. Those sorts of agreements, often 
secured in order to claim success where there may have been none, are unlikely to 
provide for this. Of course, a comprehensive plan for negating al future conflict αla 
resolution is not required, given the behavioral focus of this framework. However, 
88 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 31-32. 
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whatever degree of agreement is reached, it must address the conflict and prove 
credible. As Walter suggests, lack of credible guarantees for an agreement can often 
undermine it,89 much as overly ambitious agreements can also be more suggestive of 
failure than success. Susskind and Cruikshank echo this in their discussion of 
feasibility.90 This final suggestion serves to highlight the necessity of evaluation 
beyond the point of agreement and also serves to introduce the next possible 
determinant factor, that of re-entry. 
Given the outcome based focus of the framework, it is clear that an agreement 
(essentially an output) alone cannot constitute a success. How that agreement fairs in 
its application must also be considered. The first step of this consideration is the 
assessment of re-entry. For the pu叩osesof this discussion, re四 entryis taken as 
referring to the process by which agreements made are taken from the rarefied 
atmosphere of the mediation episode and instituted in the conflict environment. 
Essentially, it is the process by which outputs begin being translated into outcomes. 
An agreement, regardless of its quality, cannot be deemed a success if it cannot be 
shown that its m司ortenets have actually been applied to the conflict addressed by the 
mediation. To do so requires a case by case, qualitative analysis of conflict issues and 
agreement features in order to determine the key factors that must be instituted in 
order to suggest the possibility of success. 
Of course, it is important not to set the bar too high on this test. In creating a 
na町owerdefinition of re-entry, Burton suggests it to be “the return of the [mediation] 
participants to their home location to communicate to decision makers their 
89 Walt巴r,Barbara.“The Critical Barier To Civil War Setl巴ment"in Int巴rnationalOmanization, 
Vol. 51, Summ巴r1997. p. 335. 
90 Susskind and Cruikshank. p. 31-32. 
agreement."91 This has important implications. In international mediations, where 
participants are representatives rather than sole disputants, no party to an agreement 
can immediately guarantee complete inaction of al its tenets. Whether minor 
diplomat or head of state, democrat or dictator, any agreement taken back to the 
populace will have to be sold, either to the people or fellow leaders. Horse trading 
will ensue, and seldom, particularly with complex settlements, will an agreement be 
fully instituted. The sign of a success, therefore, is an agreement well enough 
informed by the realities of the situation it is addressing to suggest it will be able to 
survive re-entry with its m司ortenets intact. 
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Once an agreement has been applied to the conflict in question, one can then 
begin to asses its impact. As already suggested, mediation is a real world undertaking, 
and this framework is outcome based. Hence, indication of the actual, demonstrable 
impact a mediation episode has on the conflict that precipitated it is vital in 
determining success. Establishing which indicators best suit such a process of 
determination is, of course, dificult. A complete cessation of al conflict behavior, or 
a complete resolution, while certainly indicative of success, are not the only 
possibilities. However, in attempting to discern a more modest cut-off point, one must 
be careful not to utilize the sort of arbitrary or subjective indicators already criticized. 
The variance between conflicts also suggests a plethora of possible indicators of 
impact, depending on the nature of individual conflict’s issues and behavioral aspects. 
However, changes in conflict behavior post-mediation are identifiable and assessing 
those changes, and their linkages to the intent of any agreement, can be seen as 
suggesting success. 
91 Burton, 1987. p. 9. 
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Of course, when assessing the impact of a given event and discussing it in 
relation to a mediated, instituted agreement, one must attempt to ensure a causal link 
between the two. Without such a link, behavioral and relationship changes, while stil 
undeniably positive, cannot be accredited as indicators of successful mediation. In 
order to assess causality, one must carefully consider such changes as result post 
mediation and ensure both that they are developments that could be expected to result 
from such agreement, and that such agreement was in fact the primary cause of said 
behavior. Of course, this is difficult in the observational realm of evaluation being 
undertaken. No behavioral change is going to be solely due to a mediation episode. 
Many factors play a part in such behavioral changes, but it must be shown that the 
contents of the agreement, rather than other external factors, precipitated this change. 
The final determinant factor is that of durability. As already discussed, this 
can be approached either quantitatively, by way of an agreement’s time of 
maintenance, or qualitatively, by way of an assessment of a given agreement’s ability 
to withstand potential threats to its maintenance. Although potentially important, the 
quantitative aspect is problematic. What might be considered an appropriate period of 
time elapsed for an agreement to be considered a success is likely to vary greatly 
depending on the nature of the conflict situation it is addressing and developments in 
light of the agreement. Likewise, it provides a potentially arbitrary delineation. Is an 
agreement that survives two years a durable one worthy of being coded as a success, 
while one that lasts twenty three months should be deemed a failure? Barring some 
incredibly well defined reason why a certain time scale should be used in a specific 
situation, this sort of approach does not provide for particularly insightful 
assessments, illustrating a major problem of broad quantitative analysis. 
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More useful, is a qualitative approach. In assessing the post agreement period, 
one can identify potential sources of threat to an established agreement (be they 
unpredictable events or expected problems that should have been taken into account 
in concluding and instituting the agreement) and clearly illustrate whether a given 
agreement has been able to overcome them intact. An agreement that can do so is not 
only likely to prove durable in a quantitative manner, but it can also be causally linked 
to its ongoing maintenance in that it has overcome difficulties. Meanwhile, an 
agreement which has simply lasted a long time may have only done so because a 
fortunately benign environment meant its durability was never truly tested. This then 
provides a more tangible suggestion of success. 
Therefore, it is suggested that settlements born out of agreements that address 
the key concerns of a given conflict, are instituted with their m吋ortenets regarding 
these concerns stil intact, have a demonstrable (positive) impact, and show resistance 
to possible upheaval are likely to be deemed successes. In effect, the process is one of 
tracing an outcome through its development, assessing how each of these factors 
impacts on the others and on the overall outcome of the agreement. Of course, most 
conflicts will not exhibit such clear indicators. Hence it is important to follow every 
step closely if one is to get a picture of the nature of the conflict clear enough to make 
suggestions about its outcome. It is these suggestions that can then be used to 
illustrate which determinant factors may be seen as indicating success as opposed to 
failure within the transitory zone of the continuum, thus helping to frame success 
itself. 
4.c: SUMMARY 
Of course, this operationalization of the framework does not provide for a 
clear and absolute discernment of success for the pu叩osesof definition. It cannot 
provide any absolutes that clearly suggest success or failure. Nor does it identify a 
single defining factor required for the determination of success in the evaluatory 
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process. It does however suggest a method of evaluation that may serve the pu中ose
of discerning between failed and successful outcomes in the potentially ambiguous 
transitory zone of the continuum, at which success at its most modest can be defined. 
To do so, assessment must necessarily be undertaken in an observational, qualitative 
manner on a case by case basis. As such, while generic quantitative approaches to 
measuring mediation outcomes may be seen as providing cleaner, more elegant results 
and a consistency across a range of assessments, they do not provide the depth of 
qualitative information required to really understand the nature of a specific 
mediatory episode’s outcome. Hence, while no claim is made that this framework, in 
either its theoretical or operationalized aspect, can serve as a tool for authoritatively 
defining success across the board, it is hoped that by adapting a conception of 
mediation as an ongoing social process and success as an element of a continuum with 
its origins in conceptions of outcome based analysis of conflict settlement, some 
insight can be gained into how best to approach success in a broader sense. 
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(5) 
TESTING THE FRAMEWORK: 
Camp David and The Oslo Process 
In order to investigate the postulations housed within the success continuum, it 
is important to consider them by way of case studies of actual mediation episodes. 
Given the weaknesses of empirically measured indicators of success and the 
qualitative nature of analysis suggested by the framework, case studies serve as a 
particularly useful tool for investigating the merits of the theoretical suppositions 
presented thus far. 
By comprehensively investigating two particular cases of international 
mediation, it is hoped that the theories under consideration can be developed and 
discussed in the interests of further developing our understanding of, and questions 
regarding, the nature of success. In doing so, it is hoped that by both introducing a 
real world subject and utilising a theoretical perspective to determine what broad 
lessons may be learned from a given case study, the integrity of the project will be 
reinforced. Case studies chosen must be complex enough to challenge our conceptions 
of success, and ambiguous enough in their app紅entresults to justify the need for their 
investigation. 
Of course, the theories developed in the preceding chapter were born out of a 
consideration of an array of approaches to understanding mediation outcomes and 
success. As such, it is important that those approaches are also considered in the 
assessment of the chosen cases. By applying such a range of approaches to the same 
mediatory episodes it is hoped that the evaluatory impact of such different approaches 
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(often il defined at study outset) on our understanding of mediation outcomes and, 
hence, our conceptions of success or failure, will become evident. In considering the 
merits and/or failings of these approaches, observations regarding the merit of the 
developed framework will also be granted greater context. Thus, before investigating 
the merits of the framework itself, each case will be assessed on the basis of the 
following approaches: the idea of mediation itself as success; the neo-realist, conflict 
resolution and behavioural assessment schools of thought; and the goal assessment 
approach. 
The cases chosen are those of the Camp David mediations between Israel and 
Egypt in 1979 and the Oslo process which involved Israel and the PLO in 1993. 
These cases were chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, although involving different 
parties, the two episodes were both part of the same greater conflict situation, 
providing a certain continuity that, while not essential, may provide for some 
interesting insights. Secondly, while both were high profile cases, and trumpeted as 
notable breakthroughs at their conclusions, there is also much criticism of each 
process, and the merits of the outcomes they secured are open to debate. This 
contention is ideal, p訂ticularlyfor the pu中osesof discussing the continuum 
framework. Mediation agreements too obviously successes or failures would not 
provide a rigorous enough testing ground for the approaches in question. It is 
important to assess mediation outcomes that may be seen as residing in the transitory 
zone of the continuum, if one is to assess success at its origins. Furthermore, despite 
the many similarities between the two processes, there are enough differences in 
issues, participants and timing to ensure simple replication for discussion is avoided. 
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Finally, while both conflicts were clearly ripe for attempting mediation, there is litle 
to suggest that the mediation episodes themselves were redundant. 
5.a: CAMP DAVID 
a.i: Conflict Background92 and Mediation History 
Notwithstanding the Biblical history of the Jews in Egypt, conflict between 
Israel and that nation, as with much of the region’s conflict over the last fifty years, 
has had its origins in the establishment of the Jewish state. In the aftermath of World 
War Two, escalating tensions between Jews and Palestinians in the region, coupled 
with international sympathy for Jews in light of the Holocaust, resulted in United 
Nations plans for a division of Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish and one 
Arab. Arab nations r吋ectedthe suggestion, but Israel unilaterally proclaimed 
statehood on May 14, 1948. 
The result was an invasion of the newly formed nation by surrounding Arab 
forces, including those of Egypt, sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and refusing to 
recognise the Israeli state. The following conflict was an intense, if intermittent one, 
lasting eight months with the initial inroads of the Arab forces stalled and reversed by 
staunch Israeli resistance. At the cessation of hostilities Israel was also able to seize 
control of much of what was then Palestine. This occupation would come to be a core 
issue of many future conflicts. By the time hostilities ended on January 7, 1949, some 
16,000 troops and civilians had been killed and almost 800,000 Palestinian Arabs 
displaced. Although agreements were signed by Israel and its opponents, the 
evolution of the Israeli state is identified as leading to a subsequent nineteen conflicts 
92 Bercovitch, Jacob and Jackson, Richard. International Conflict: A Chronolol!ical Encvclon巴diaOf 
Conflicts And Their Manal!ement 1945-1995, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997. 
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between Israei and Arab states over the next forty five years.93 Along with a number 
of conflicts involving Syria and Jordan this included some bloody, bitter struggles 
with Egypt. 
The Six Day War of June, 1967, was the first and most famous of these. 
Fearing assault from her Arab neighbours as a result of, among other things, direct 
Egyptian threats, Israel launched a devastating pre-emptive strike, quickly seizing the 
West Bank and Gaza, the Golan heights from Syria and the Sinai desert from Egypt. 
These acquisitions, although ensuring Israel’s immediate security, ultimately served 
as points of contention for future conflict. Most notable of these was the Y om Kippur 
War of October, 1973, in which Egyptian and Syrian forces launched offensives to 
regain territory lost in the Six Day War. After withstanding initial advances, Israel 
drove deep into Egyptian and Syrian territories before an eventual cease-fire was 
declared on October 22, although the stand-off continued long after that, with tension 
between Israel and Egypt remaining high. Egyptian grievances regarding the Sinai 
and the state of Palestine had not been addressed and Israel’s long term security 
concerns had certainly not been assuaged. 
Out of this environment of mistrust and contention, however, developed an 
Israeli同 Egyptianpeace process, building on the 197 4 disengagement treaty94 and 
based around the principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (see 
Appendix 1), which called for an Israeli withdrawal and acknowledgements of 
sovereignty along with the necessity for freedom of navigation, a means to address the 
93 Ibid. p. 57 
94 Bercovitch, Jacob.“A Case Study Of Mediation As A Me出odOf Int巴rnationalConflict R巴solution:
Th巴CampDavid Experience”in Revi巴W Oflnternational Studies, Vol. 12, 1986. p. 53. 
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refugee problem and guarantees of territorial inviolability by way of demilitarised 
zones. In 1977, new American President, Jimmy Carter began what would become a 
term long endeavour to secure peace in the Middle East. Concerned with issues of 
“human rights, Israeli security, Soviet influence, Middle East peace [and] oil 
imports，＇’ and the potential threat of the region to U.S. interests,95 Carter undertook 
extensive research on the conflict, eventually coming to the conclusion that any just 
settlement would have to involve Israeli withdrawal back to its 1967 borders, the 
establishment of a Palestinian territory in the West Bank and Gaza and the 
establishment of normal relations between the Arab states and Israel. Carter was 
intent, in other words, on a comprehensive solution rather than simple interim 
agreements.96 It was his initial intention to utilise the already existent Geneva 
framework, which would have involved al interested parties, including the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation and the USSR, meeting in conference. This particular 
approach was ultimately not followed, however. Both Egypt and Israel were wary of 
the Soviets, while Israel refused to deal with the PLO and Egypt was concerned about 
the possibility of multilateral talks hindering them in their most immediate goal of 
regaining the Sinai. Thus more direct talks, sometimes bilateral, sometimes involving 
the US, began in 1977. Despite Israeli offers to return the Sinai, however, these talks 
ultimately made litle progress. 
It was at this point that Carter suggested that himself, President Sadat of Egypt 
and Israeli Prime Minister Begin adjourr 
the presidential retreat of Camp David for direct, intensive talks. It was Carter’s intent 
to play the part of problem solver and facilitator. To this end, a number of specific 
95 ・Carter, Jimmy. Keening Faith: M巴moirsOf A Pr巴sident,New York: Bantam, 1982. p. 279 
96 ・Princen, Thomas. Intermediari巴SIn International Conflict, Prine巴ton,N巴wJ巴rsey:
Princeton University Pres, 1992. p. 70-71 
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points of contention were identified. These included, among other things: the status of 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as well as those in the Sinai; the issue 
of the Palestinian state (feared by Begin, seen as inevitable by Sadat); security 
concerns; interpretations of UNSC Resolution 242; the status of Jerusalem; and the 
issue of what to do with Palestinian refugees.97 This array of disagreements suggested 
Carter had a very difficult task ahead of him. Illustrating this was the early breakdown 
in communication between Begin and Sadat, which saw Carter acting as a go-between 
and Israeli四 Egyptiancontact managed by various officials. The thirteen day process 
was fraught with difficulties borne out of not only the underlying issues, but also the 
divergent approaches to the mediation taken by Carter and the two foreign leaders. 
Eventually, Carter, intentionally or not, came to take on more of a traditional role 
utilising the Presidency in order to push the discourse forward, using the power of his 
position to cajole and threaten the other participants. After heading off any number of 
problems, Carter was finally able to confound expectations by securing two co-signed 
agreements. 
The first of these, known as The FrameY¥ノarkFor Peace In The Middle East 
(see Appendix 2), established the guiding principles for the pursuit of peace in the 
region. As well as affirming Resolutions 242 and 338 (basically a reaffirmation of 
242, in light of the Y om Kippur War, see Appendix 1) as the basis for peaceful 
settlement, the framework also suggested a means for addressing the Palestinian 
problem, a mutual commitment to not resort to this use of force. Beyond the simple 
avoidance of conflict, however, Carter’s comprehensive vision of peace was 
recognised in the suggestion that steps be taken to establish ful recognition, abolish 
97 Carter. p. 354伽 356
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economic boycotts and guarantee fair treatment of foreign nationals. Furthermore, the 
framework was suggested not simply as a document for the two disputants in question 
but also for Israel’s future dealings with al other Arab nations. 
The second document, the Framework for the Conclusion ofαPeace Treaη 
Between Egypt αnd Israel (see Appendix 2), was intended to serve as the guiding 
document for a treaty between the two nations, to be concluded in the following three 
months. It included Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (but maintenance of air bases for 
civilian purposes), freedom of passage for Israeli ships a number of guidelines for 
troop movements and a commitment to normalisation of relations upon signing the 
treaty. After considerable diplomatic manoeuvring, a peace treaty was eventually 
signed on March 26, 1979 (see Appendix 2). 
Symbolically a success, and perhaps Carter’s most recognised achievement in 
his single teロnPresidency, what can Camp David tel us about the means for 
evaluating mediation episodes and discerning their success? 
a.i: Success By Occurrence 
For those who believe mediation’s very occurrence denotes a success, Camp 
David was of course just th瓜 Atfirst glance this may seem trite, but it bears some 
consideration. Prior to Camp David, Israel and Egypt had been in a state of conflict 
verging on, and occasionally leading to, war, for some thirty years. A long enough 
period of time for any party to a conflict, for modern Israel, it was its entire history. A 
whole generation of Israelis had grown into adulthood believing, not incorrectly, that 
the surrounding Arab states were committed to their destruction. Likewise, already 
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sensitive about external involvement in their region, Egypt and the other Arab states 
had long seen the existence of a Jewish state as an affront imposed upon the region. 
These attitudes only hardened as the new state slowly gained control of both 
Palestinian and Egyptian land in ensuing conflicts. Adding to the entrenched views of 
both sides was the conflict’s major religious component, particul町lyas regards the 
significance of many Israeli sites to both the Jewish and the Islamic faiths, which only 
served to further the distance between the two sides, as did the many deaths over the 
years. 
Given this bleak backdrop, the mediation efforts at Camp David were a 
spectacular development. Not only were the leaders of both nations prepared to come 
together in a dialogue aimed at fostering peaceful relations, but a third party with the 
ability to play a major role in promoting such a dialogue was also committed to a 
mediatory process. In and of itself, these developments suggest, regardless of its 
impact, the move to mediation itself was such a major change in the conflict on both a 
behavioural and a relational level. Thus, the claim could perhaps be made that it was a 
success. 
However, while there may be some merit to deeming Camp David a success 
on the basis of its occurrence, it is limited. While acknowledging what had been 
overcome in order to reach Camp David is important, it should be seen as heralding a 
success for the early diplomatic stages of Carter’s peace initiative, not the mediation 
episode itself. Indeed, as to the question of whether the Camp David mediation was a 
success, it provides no real information. Certainly, the obstacles overcome in getting 
to Camp David may indicate there was a strong commitment amongst those involved 
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regards the success of the efforts. The almost unprecedented act of secluding three 
world leaders for such a period of time also suggested the talks were being taken very 
seriously. However, these factors are ultimately only suggestive of the fact that there 
was a chance of successful mediation. They do not tel us anything about the episode 
itself. Even if one were to work under the limitations of output analysis alone, this 
approach would suggest litle of merit. It does suggest that perhaps, due to the 
preparedness and need of the respective hierarchies to address their ongoing conflict, 
the conflict was ripe for such an attempt to be made, but not so much so that one can 
say 'success’was assured. Furthermore, while in this case mediation itself was 
noteworthy as a breakthrough, what value as an indicator of success does it provide in 
situations where mediation is considered a matter of course? In many international 
settings minor issues of conflict between parties with less tenuous relations than Israel 
and Egypt, can routinely be handled with mediation episodes. In these situations, 
should the very act of mediation be heralded as a success? Arguably not. 
Ultimately, therefore, it is clear that while in the case of Camp David, the 
adjournment to mediation was a notable event, and a great stepping stone in the 
relationship between the two parties, the idea of using mediation itself as an indicator 
of success is of limited utility. 
a.ii: Neo田realist,Conflict Resolution and Behavioural Approaches 
Possibly more informative are the Neo-realist, problem solving/resolution and 
behavioural approaches to understanding conflict outcomes. 
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A neo-realist perspective, anchored in concepts of power politics and conflict 
as a natural systemic feature, would probably deem Camp David a success. As 
Princen indicates, Carter attempted to play the role of facilitator and problem solver, 
but was ultimately constrained by the mantle of the Presidency to act in a manner 
consistent with the mantle of the American presidency.98 Hence, Carter utilised his 
position, threatening withdrawal from proceedings, offering aid by the billions and 
manoeuvring the participants towards an agreement. Thus, Camp David was an 
exercise in traditional political direction.99 However, this was a game that Carter 
played well. By avoiding emotive issues (that may admittedly have led to a more 
resolution oriented outcome), utilising America’s position of influence and playing on 
the fact that both sides considered their relations with the super-power to be of key 
concern, he was able to secure both a framework for Middle East peace, dealing with 
the Palestinian situation, and a commitment to enter into bi-lateral treaty negotiations. 
Within the neo-realist rubric, this commitment to a treaty, followed as it was by the 
treaty itself, the return of the Sinai and increasing normalisation of relations between 
Egypt and Israel, could be seen as indicating an achievement worthy of being coined 
successful. Of course, the commitment to the Palestinian issue was deliberately vague, 
and eventually sacrificed in the interests of a bi回 lateraltreaty, removing the 
motivation for wider Arab involvement. However, these concerns would not 
necessarily affect the neo-realist assessment. While resolution for the Palestinian 
situation and the broader Middle East was desirable, a neo-realist view point would 
contend it to be somewhat unrealistic, instead suggesting that in an environment of 
constant competition and jockeying for power, what was achieved was close enough 
to what could be achieved to constitute success. 
98 Prine巴n.p. 70 
99 Ibid. p. 67 
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Of course, for those of the problem solving, conflict resolution school, with its 
understanding of conflict as an addressable product of structural dysfunction, these 
criteria would not be stringent enough. Carter’s move away from problem solving and 
the goal of a broad and comprehensive peace would be seen as indicative of the 
traditional power politic compromise and suggestive of an outcome shy of true 
success. In this school of thought, the potential of the Camp David Accords would 
have been seen as lying not in the (ultimately achieved) promises of a bi-lateral 
ceasefire between Israel and Egypt, but the suggestions it made as a framework for 
future peace, and resolution of Palestine issues which were at the very heart of al 
Israel’s conflict in the region. By this token, it was出cconcepts behind the framework 
that offered the most. However, its ambiguous approach and ultimate avoidance 
indicated a pit;,cemeal process, that, while providing limited peace in one aspect of 
Middle-East relations, did litle else. Israel’s ongoing struggle with Palestinian 
militancy and its various conflicts with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are al 
evidence of this. Furthermore, the more‘resolution suggestive' aspects of the peace 
treaty that were instituted as regards the normalisation of Israeli Egyptian relations 
have arguably been followed to the leter, but not the spirit, causing dissatisfaction 
amongst those, particularly Israelis, with higher expectations.100 This, in conjunction 
with the failure to tie basic bilateral settlement to the broader issues of concern 
suggest an outcome that fel short of real success. 
Thus, we see how a differing set of priorities, and understanding of conflict, 
suggest a considerably different interpretation. In some ways, this reading may seem 
hat叶i.Driven by practical constraints, Begin, Sadat and Carter settled on what they 
100 Lesch, Anne Mosely and T巴sl巴r,Mark Israel‘Egvot. And Th巴Palestinians:
From Camo David To Intifada, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Pres, 1989. p. 7 
believed they could make work. Nonetheless, this undoubtedly fel short of conflict 
resolution in the truest sense. 
96 
An approach focussing simply on measur油 lebehaviour, by comparison, 
might perhaps provide a reading more in line with that of the neo-realist. In focusing 
the assessment on only clearly measurable indicators, success is somewhat easier to 
suggest. Relations between Israel and Egypt certainly improved. In completing Camp 
David, and following through with the March 26, 1979 Peace Treaty, an array of 
behavioural aspects of conflict between the two were dealt with. This could be seen in 
the return of seized territory, the opening of economic relations, high level interaction 
and various other behavioural indicators. Of course, the continuation of much 
conflictual behaviour in the broader context of the Middle East would not be 
dismissed in this approach. However, such behaviour resembles the pre-mediation 
status quo, rather than a backwards step, while the progress evident in the 
development of interaction between Israel and Egypt does suggest sufficient success. 
It seems evident that, while there is a natural tendency for behaviourally 
focussed and neo田 realistapproaches to suggest similar outcomes, approaching Camp 
David from the mindset of the conflict resolution school suggests a markedly different 
assessment. While neither is‘right’per se, it seems evident that the resolution 
focussed approach is considerably more stringent. Thus, by framing success as only 
evident in comprehensive outcomes, its incidence is diminished. It is evident how 
such an approach may alter onピsassessment. In turn, this highlights the importance 
of clarifying one’s approach at the outset of an assessment and the difficulties 
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presented by the possibilities of such divergent approaches in attempting to establish a 
more general understanding of what success entails. 
a.iv: Goals Based Approach 
Utilising a goals based analysis in assessment of Camp David provides a 
different approach. Assessing the success of a mediation episode on the basis of the 
achievement of party goals is an approach of some merit, but one fraught with 
interpretative difficulties, as shall be seen. 
On superficial inspection, one might suggest Carter’s perspective of the 
mediation effort would be failure. Given his focus on an al encompassing, 
comprehensive plan for peace, it seems evident that his goal was not achieved. 
However, Carter was able to secure an agreement, a fact that participants noticed he 
was intensely focused on. Indeed he was able to secure an agreement where none had 
been thought possible and, hence, regardless of the diminished nature of its focus on 
the Palestinian issue and the broader concept of Middle Eastern peace, Carter’s 
participation might most easily be deemed a success. However, in these competing 
conceptions, the difficulties of goal based analysis are exposed. Should one assess 
Carter’s achievements on the basis of his original goals, or on his achievement of the 
more basic, politically driven, desire to obtain an agreement and prop up his 
presidency?101 Are minimum goals more salient than maximum aspirations in 
assessing success? In the case of Carter, one would be inclined to suggest that the 
more modest goals he achieved were significant enough to suggest a qualified 
101 Princen. p. 101 
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success, but the issue raised as regards the difficulties of assessing outcomes on a 
goals focussed basis are salient ones. 
Likewise, analysis of Sadat’s degree of success raise some interesting issues. 
Intent on shoring up an economy that could no longer support conflict on the level it 
was being asked to, and intent on securing the return of the Sinai territory, Sadat had 
at least, two easily measurable goals. Arguably, he achieved both. As a result of the 
treaty stemming from Camp David, Egypt regained possession of the Sinai after 
Israeli withdrawals, and its economy began to show marked improvement as a result 
of the reduced military requirements brought about by the住eaty.102In the illustratable 
achievement of clearly articulated goals, Sadat’s efforts would appear to suggest a 
successful mediatory episode. This is reinforced by the manner in which he was also 
able to secure improved relations with the United States. However, the Sinai was in 
many ways a secondary aspect of the conflict. Its occupation was a by-product of the 
greater Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence, Sadat’s inability to ensure the sort of resolution 
to the Palestinian problem he had desired, despite trying to make normalisation 
103 conditional on such development, suggests he failed in what was arguably his and 
the Arab world’s primary goal. This may be seen as counterbalancing other 
achievements. However, it could be suggested that in signing off on a deliberately 
imprecise framework and then accepting a treaty that did not address the Palestinian 
issue, Sadat had simply made a cost benefit analysis and revised his goals to a more 
realistic level. This would therefore suggest his effort to be a success, and, indeed, 
they were generally perceived as such. However, it again raises the question of how to 
establish the primacy of competing goals in mediation assessment. 
102 Ibid. p. 9 
103 Ibid. p. 5 
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Most difficult to assess, however, is whether Begin’s efforts should be deemed 
a success. The Israeli ability to secure normalised relations with Egypt without having 
to take any substantive action regards the Palestinian issue seems a clear indicator of 
success. Admittedly, the Sinai was traded away, but the security it bought arguably 
nullified that loss. However, the move of the Camp David process away from 
comprehensive peace meant that, although Begin avoided costly trade-offs, any intent 
he may have had for Israel’s security beyond settling its conflict with Egypt were also 
missed. Israel’s ongoing internal strife, coupled with conflicts with other Arab states 
meant that ultimately only one aspect of security directly improved. Coupled with 
suggestions that perhaps the normalisation of relations was only occurring to a more 
limited extent than Israelis had hoped, 104 the idea that Camp David was a success 
from Begin’s perspective is more questionable. The balance of information would 
suggest that although not really a failure, it was not much of a success. Of course, this 
is based on a subjective interpretation of available information,.thus highlighting the 
ultimately inte叩retative,and potentially arbitrary nature of goals based assessment in 
border-line cases. 
In utilising a goals based approach, one is presented with (in this case) three 
possible interpretations of the process under consideration. Thus, while for those 
involved this approach may suffice, for the independent observer it seems 
problematic. How does one incorporate three different perspectives, and a multitude 
of goals, in making an overall conclusion regarding a mediation outcome? Any 
attempt must necessarily involve both subjective and ultimately arbitrary assessments 
104 Ibid. p. 81向 82
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of which goals serve as the best indicators of success. The result being an assessment 
largely defined by evaluator interpretations. 
a. v: Applying The Framework 
How then, would a framework aimed at tracing mediation as an 
evolutionary process and focussing on success as it features within the transitory 
zone, code the Camp David process? As suggested, such an assessment 
involves considering mediation outcomes as developing phenomena, best assessed 
by tracing the nature of that development from agreement through re司 entry,impact 
and durability. Given the nature of the issues and behaviour patterns associated with 
the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, the agreements reached at Camp David imply the origins 
of what might be a successful episode. The framework for the future treaty provides 
commitments to work on a treaty that would return the Sinai to Egypt, ensure safe 
passage through various waterways for Israeli ships, suggest military force 
placements and, upon signing, the normalisation of relations. As a commitment made 
by two disputants, this serves as a more than satisfactory indicator of the potential for 
settlement. Major changes are suggested and, in the case of force positioning, detailed 
guidelines are set up, al of which could be seen as addressing well the conflict 
behaviour between the two. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East serves to 
suggest the possibility of more comprehensive resolution, which would serve to shift 
the agreement at least, further to the right of the continuum. Of course, the ambiguous 
nature of that document serves to undermine this. Nonetheless, it is stil indicative of 
success at a basic settlement level. 
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Of course, as Honeyman suggests, this‘clash of cymbals' should not conclude 
our assessment.105 An agreement’s practical impact is largely dictated by the manner 
in which it is introduced to, and instituted by, those it will effect. This task was to 
prove particularly difficult in the case of Camp David, thus making the issue of re-
en仕yal the more important in attempting to assess its success or failure. 
As Princen indicates，“in many ways, Carter was to discover, the hard part lay 
ahead.”106 As already suggested, one of the prime problems of instituting mediation 
agreements born out of processes involving representative bargainers is that they must 
ultimately be ratified by other parties before institution. This was a particular 
problem as regards Israel. Begin spent much time to同 ingand fro-ing with the Knesset 
in what became a multilateral process of hard bargaining and political manoeuvring. 
Ultimately of course, a peace treaty was signed and instituted. However, it only 
addressed the treaty framework, not the broader issues of Palestine or relations with 
the other Arab states. In this, we see a m司ordegradation, from what was proposed, to 
what was instituted. However, while this qualifies the success of the process, it does 
not deny it. The details contained within the eventual treaty can be seen as necessary 
for suggesting a settlement in the narrow, bilateral aspect of the conflict. Certainly, 
much was lost 'twixt cup and mouth', but it was not entirely unexpected, and it was 
arguably a conscious decision by those involved to focus on the readily possible, 
rather than the (in the eyes of some at least) ideal. 
However, the real test of the process is its eventual impact. While more 
limited than perhaps originally hoped for, by Carter at least, it seems evident that the 
105 Honeyman. p. 8 
106 Princen. o. 83 
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treaty that was instituted was largely successful in its realisation. The Sinai was 
returned, ambassadors were exchanged and relations were normalised. Of course, the 
quality of the normalisation has been called into question, with Israelis feeling they 
weren’t getting what they had hoped for. However, some in Israel down-play this, 
suggesting that if an avoidance of war was the treaty’s only outcome, that is enough to 
suggest success.107 Admittedly, this new found peace has had its causal link to the 
treaty called into question. Isaac108 points out that while it is true that Egypt and Israel 
have not made war since signing the treaty, neither have Israel and Syria. Thus, the 
causal link has been called into question. This seems a litle trite, however. Most 
obviously, Israel, while not entering a war, has had a number of conflicts with Syria 
since the treaty was signed. Also, it is possible that avoidance of actual war between 
those two was influenced by closer Israeli-Egyptian ties. 
Ultimately, the impact of the treaty that stemmed from Camp David is 
consistent with that of successful conflict settlement. Its achievements are not beyond 
question, nor total by any stretch of the imagination, but they are certainly sufficient 
to suggest a modest success. The final test of the process, is that regarding its 
durability. By any quantitative measure, the treaty has lasted well, with peace between 
Israel and Egypt consistently, if at times coldly, maintained. A qualitative 
assessment of its durability vis-a・visits resistance to threat paints a more interesting 
picture, however. Most obvious for consideration is the impact of the 1981 
assassination of Anwar Sadat. Changes of leadership are always a test of any policy, 
and to have change precipitated by such violence only extenuates this. Misgivings 
about whether or not the policies of Sadat could survive him came to the fore, causing 
107 Isac, Raaβl Jean. “The Real Lessons Of Camp David”in Commentaa, D巴ce1由er1993. p 34 
108 Ibid. p. 34 
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considerable anxiety amongst Israel’s hierarchy.109 Combined with Reagan’s 
accession to the Presidency in America, this lead to calls for Israel to re-examine its 
place in the peace process. In turn, this led to an array of upheavals within Israel. 
Begin, however, was committed to the peace process and determined to see Israel 
honour its formal commitments. Thus, despite a m吋orthreat, the peace process 
continued. Meanwhile, Egyptian views on the process were shaken by such Israeli 
actions as the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which caused doubts in the minds of the 
public, and threatened to make the process politically untenable. However, it 
ultimately survived. 
The inability to resolve any of the m吋orissues at the root of the conflict 
means that its outcome, focussed on simple settlement, sits squarely within the 
transitory zone of the success continuum. However, investigation by way of the 
operationalized framework suggests Camp David to be a success. Although not 
presenting an effective means for resolving the greater conflict, the agreements signed 
at its conclusion did provide significant guidelines for settlement of the bi-lateral 
aspects of conflict between Egypt and Israel. Although its re-entry saw further moves 
away from any real effort at resolution, the intent of the more realistic bi-lateral 
aspects was carried over into an operational peace treaty. Not only did this peace 
treaty result in measurable indicators of behavioural changes, but it also exhibited the 
durability required to survive potential upset. 
In utilising the framework under construction, it becomes evident that Camp 
David’s outcome does indeed require re『 evaluationat each stage of the process. Were 
109 Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. Israel And The Peace Process‘1977-1982, 
New York: State Univ巴rsityOf New York Pres, 1994. p. 218 
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one to simply focus on the agreement, for example, one might be left with a rosier 
picture than would ultimately reflect reality. In tracing the process through its phases 
however, one gains a better understanding of the nature/degree of and, qualifications 
on, its success. Thus, while it sits in the transitory zone of settled, but unresolved 
conflicts, it is of sufficient quality to suggest success. 
a.vi: Observations 
In the case of Camp David at least, it seems that both the ‘mediation as 
success’school of thought and goals based approaches to assessment, do not provide 
enough of an insight to the event to clearly, and without subjective evaluator 
interpretation, suggest its success in a satisfactory manner. How then does the 
framework perform? 
Ultimately, it suggests an outcome similar to that reached by the neo-realist 
and behavioural approaches. This is perhaps unsurprising. As the framework focuses 
on modest outcomes (settlements) as the range in which success can be discerned, 
contentious cases are more likely to be deemed a success by one utilising the 
framework, than by a member of the conflict resolution school. This is indicative too 
of the behavioural focus of much of the assessment on identifying determinant factors 
that discern success from failure within the realm of settlement. 
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5.b: THE OSLO ACCORDS 
b.i: Conflict Background110 and Mediation History 
As suggested in the review of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, issues surrounding 
Israel’s displacement of Palestine are at the heart of much of the region’s conflict, and 
arguably al of Israel’s. By the end of Israel’S independence struggle, it controlled al 
of Palestine with the exception of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. As 
Israel’s occupation continued, despite regional and UN criticism, Palestinian 
militancy flourished, resulting in regular street violence and the evolution of modern 
terrorist tactics. As Israel continued to settle occupied territory, the conflict continued 
to escalate, with Israeli forces chasing the Palestine Liberation Organisation into 
exile, invading Lebanon, and suffering through the intifada. Widely supported by 
Arab neighbours and the USSR, the Palestinian opposition appeared as intractable as 
Israel herself. 
By 1991, however, there was a growing sentiment that the time was right to 
resolve the long festering’Arab-Israeli conflict. 11 In part, this was due to the end of 
the cold war rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. The pre-eminence of US-
Soviet differences in the post-war era, and their respective ties to Israel and the 
Islamic states, made genuine conflict management difficult.112 With that phase of their 
relationship being firmly relegated to the past, however, the US and Soviet Union 
encouraged a conference in Madrid that in turn led to bilateral talks in Washington, 
DC, between Israel and an array of entities from the Arab powers. Amongst these 
i10 B巴rcovitchand Jackson. 
1 Pruit, Dean. Bercovitch, Jacob. Zartman, William.“A Brief History Of The Oslo Talks" in 
Intβrnational Ne1:i:otiation, Vol. 7, 1997. p. 17 
112 Bercovitch, Jacob. 
Israeli-Palestinian Peaβ巴making"in International Ne:otiation, Vol. 2, 1997. p. 223 
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groups was a Palestinian delegation of norトPLOmembers (it being against Israeli law 
to consort with members of the perceived terrorist organisation). However, it soon 
became obvious that the Palestinian representatives were powerless to act without the 
PLO' s blessing. In turn, the PLO was unlikely to give any such blessing to a process 
in which it was not recognised as a participant. However, in the aftermath of the Gulf-
War, both Israel and the PLO were increasingly determined to make progress. The 
PLO was crippled as a result of its unpopular support of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, which cost it in financial backing already depleted by the demise 
of Soviet support. Israel, meanwhile, found itself in a position of comparatively good 
standing, having resisted Iraqi attempts to draw it into the Iraq』 KuwaitGulf conflict, 
and was worn down by the intifada, and years of internal conflict. Thus, a second 
channel of talks was surreptitiously set up in Oslo by a Norwegian academic, Te1je 
Larsen. 
Present at these negotiations were several PLO members and two Israeli 
academics appearing on behalf of Israel, but not in a strictly official capacity. Several 
rounds of talks ensued, and plans were drawn up for an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza 
and a deferment of action on the question of Jerusalem. After five rounds, however, 
the Palestinians became disenchanted at not being able to directly deal with Israeli 
authorities. Impressed by the progress being made, Israel responded by sending the 
Director General of the Foreign Ministry, Uri Shavir. The introduction of official 
Israeli representatives legitimised the process in the eyes of the Palestinians and 
enabled its continuation. Many crises were encountered as both sides shifted their 
positions regularly, but skilled mediation by the Norwegian intermediaries (which 
included shuttling discussion between Peres, who was in touch with Rabin by phone, 
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in one room and Arafat on a phone line in the other), saw an agreement signed on 
August 20, 1993. After the Accords' ratification in the Israelis Knesset, it was then 
famously signed by Arafat and Rabin in an unprecedented ceremony on the White 
house lawn on September 13, 1993. Contained within the document was a declaration 
of principles (see Appendix 3), detailing plans for Palestinian self government in the 
West Bank and Gaza and which resulted in an Israeli acknowledgement of the PLO as 
a representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO’s recognition of Israel’s right to 
exist in“peace and security”， the establishment of Palestinian governance in Jericho, 
the Gaza Strip and other parts of the West Bank, and the establishment of a 
Palestinian police force and commitments to eventually address the future of 
Jerusalem. 
How, then, will this more recent attempt to resolve the core Middle-Eastern 
conflict stand up to the varying forms of assessment at hand, and what will it suggest 
about the newly developed framework for understanding success? 
b.i: Success By Occurrence 
As with Camp David, if one believes the very act of mediation denotes 
success, then the Oslo process was a triumph. However, while this suggestion was 
largely discredited with regard to the Israeli Egyptian process, in this case it may have 
立iorement. 
Given the Israeli reluctance to recognise the PLO as an entity, or allow direct 
interaction with its representatives, and the long held Palestinian belief in the 
illegitimacy not only of Israel’s 1967 territory games, but of the state in its entirety, 
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the act of face to face interaction, particularly once Israeli officials became involved, 
was notable. Indeed, the tacit acceptance of each other implied by the 
negotiation/mediation process can be seen as a clear and fundamental shift on a 
behavioural, and a relational level. It signalled an Israeli willingness to address issues 
of Palestinian self determination with one of its most identifiable figures (PLO leader, 
Y asser Arafat) while the very act of bargaining by the PLO suggested a move away 
from any maximalist ideals of a‘complete’Palestine. Thus, in many respects, the 
process itself was as much of a breakthrough as any agreement that could have been 
derived from it. This is particularly evident due to the unique nature in which the 
Israeli recognition of the process and willingness to deal directly with the PLO was 
actually born out of the progress made in the process’earlier rounds. This does not 
validate the idea as a general means of assessment, however. If few conflicts are as 
entrenched as the one between Israel and Egypt, it is arguable none run deeper than 
that between Israel and the Palestinians its statehood and military actions displaced. 
Hence, while it has some merit in this case, the case’s unique nature, both as regards 
the nature of the conflict and the unique development of its mediation process means 
that this should not be seen as suggesting merit in the approach as a whole. Also, the 
idea of suggesting success in a process without careful consideration of the process or 
its outcome stil seems suspect. 
b.ii: Neo・realist,Conflict Resolution and Behavioural Approaches 
Alas, other approaches to assessing the success of the Oslo process are less 
flattering. From a neo-realist perspective, one might detect early signs of success in 
the Oslo process. Those issues deemed manageable by its participants were addressed, 
and practical means for their management were considered. However, while a neo-
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realist approach to conflict and its management may set less demanding targets than a 
conflict resolution approach, there is stil much to suggest that Oslo was ultimately a 
failure. While early indicators were hopeful, suggesting as they did that progress was 
being made, a longer term assessment highlights ongoing security concerns which 
tend to indicate there is litle to suggest success beyond the political achievement of 
the agreement itself. 
For those utilising the requirements of conflict resolution and problem solving 
in their assessment, Oslo must also seem a failure. In approaching the Palestinian 
issue directly, the Oslo Accords had a much greater chance of providing for the 
resolution of the Middle Eastern conflict than did the ultimately bilateral Camp David 
agreements. The Declaration of Principles provided not simply for a transition of 
power, but an array of means for ensuring ongoing peace and development, including 
guidelines for mutually beneficial economic development, and dispute resolution may 
have been suggestive of a desire to go beyond simple settlement and into the realm of 
broader resolution. This was the theory. 
Unfortunately, the reality has proved considerably more bleak. While initial 
withdrawals and the flush of post-Oslo positivity teasingly suggested the best, 
mounting evidence to suggest neither side was living up to the terms of the treaty, 
coupled with ongoing violence, have indicated that al that was ultimately achieved 
was a temporary behavioural shift. The overarching issues at the root of that 
behaviour were ultimately left unchanged, or, if changed, have since undergone a 
reversion. 
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A behaviourally focussed approach meanwhile, could suggest varying results. 
At the highest levels, there was certainly evidence of a positive shift in behaviour, and 
Israeli withdrawals and the institution of Palestinian governance certainly suggest 
success. The deaths of fifteen Israelis in militant attacks during the first six months of 
autonomy however, serve as an indicator that while overarching, high level 
behavioural changes may have been enacted, litle had changed at the grass roots level 
of the conflict. The further forward in time one travels with this analysis, the more 
clear this becomes, with the eventual result seeming to be the complete breakdown of 
relations between Arafat’s PLO and the Israeli government. This is evidenced most 
dramatically, perhaps, by the recent siege on the Chairman’s headquarters by Israeli 
tanks as part of a sweeping Israeli military incursion into Palestinian territory (April 
2002). Thus, it seems that if one is to ignore the symbolic aspects of the Accords, and 
their perceived breakthroughs and simply consider the alterations made to basic 
conflict behaviour, Oslo, especially in the longer term analysis, would have to be 
coded a failure. 
In the case of Oslo, the three approaches provide similar results. However, 
with regard to the neo-realist and behavioural approaches, this negative conception of 
the process is only achieved if one focuses on a long term assessment. Short term 
achievements may otherwise provide misleadingly positive results. This further 
reinforces the supposition that in order to understand success, or define any outcome 
as truly successful, one must undertake to study mediation outcomes as ongoing 
processes, not simply as discrete events. 
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a.iv: Goals Based Approach 
How then would a goals based approach fair? With the Norwegian mediation 
effort providing a less invasive presence, only the disputants shall be considered in 
this case. 
Recent events clearly indicate that the PLO have not gained what it may have 
wished for. The economic lot of the average Palestinian has, if anything, declined, 113 
the violence and Israeli incursions continue and there is certainly no obvious 
likelihood of an independent Palestinian state developing in the near future. However, 
there were gains made that could be seen as implying success. Given the weak 
position of the PLO entering into the Oslo process, the organisation’s very survival 
must have played a part in Arafat and company’s expectations. Out of favour in the 
region and out of fashion among the new generation of Palestinian activists, the Oslo 
process provided a lifeline to the PLO. Upon its conclusion, the PLO were positioned 
as the pre-eminent representative of Palestinian external afairs. Furthermore, they 
had gone some of the way to redeeming themselves in western and Israeli eyes for the 
grievous political error of supporting Saddam Hussein. The tacit acknowledgement of 
legitimacy granted them by Israel by the bargaining process alone, and the explicit 
recognition granted at its conclusion, were also notable successes. Although an 
idealist would suggest that the ultimate failure of the Oslo process in providing an 
independent Palestine would suggest a failure for the PLO, the achievement of these 
more self-serving goals may have been seen as being almost as important. Hence 
establishing how to define the outcome of the Oslo process rests largely on what 
salience should be granted to these two differing goal strands. Should the 
113 Rubner, Michael.“Th巴OsloPeac巴ProcessThrough thre L巴ns巴s"in Middl巴EastPolicv, 
October 1998. p. 192 
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organisational goals of Arafat and the PLO be taking into account in assessing the 
success of a mediation episode ostensibly intended to address the issue of the whole 
nation? Deciding such matters ultimately has as much impact on the definition of 
success in a given case as does its actual outcomes. 
For Israel, the goal was not so much legitimacy as it was security. Rubner 
quotes Makovsky114 in identifying three m吋orgoals in this regard.115 Firstly, Rabin 
hoped that a deal with the PLO would reduce the incidence of terrorism. Secondly, he 
believed that in reaching agreement with Israel, the PLO would be more motivated to 
combat more radical Palestinian organisations, in order to ensure its survival. Finally, 
it was hoped that an agreement would enable advancement of the peace process vis-a-
vis other nations. 
Obviously, Rabin’s goals for Israel’s security were not achieved. According to 
Israeli security services, although the number of suicide bombers declined somewhat 
in the years following Oslo, in total there have been ninety-three such attacks between 
1994 and April 5, 2002, including 64 in the fifteen months beginning at the start of 
2001 as al pretence of forward progress in the peace proc回 sseems to be have been 
abandoned.116 This statistic is, of course, the most dramatic example of the failure of 
Oslo to ensure Israeli security, but it is representative of a general trend. The 
immediate post-Oslo period did see some developments in Israeli relations with its 
neighbours of course, as witnessed by its with Jordan in 1994.日owever,it would 
seem that these achievements must be small boon considering the failure to ensure the 
14 Makovsky, David. Making Peace With The PLO, Oxford：羽Testvi巴WPres, 1996. 
115 Rubner. p. 92 
16 Ripley, Amanda.“Why Suicide Bombing Is Now Al The Rage＇’ in I血豆， April15 2002. p. 28 
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personal security of the Jewish populace on a general basis. Thus, the goal based 
analysis is perhaps a litle more clear cut. While some achievements were made, the 
process itself, particularly in the longer term, must be considered a failure. This 
highlights the fact that a simple goals based analysis can prove useful in some 
circumstances, but it stil seems to be of limited utility. 
In the case of Oslo, the goals based approach suggests a degree of failure from 
the perspective of either party. However, particularly when interpreting Arafat’s 
achievements, one must determine which goals should take priority, those of political 
self interest or those of broader conflict management? While it is easy to suggest the 
later, it is difficult to suggest with certainty what underlying motivations may have 
been factors, thus calling such assessment into question. 
a.v: Applying The Framework 
Agreement 
The Oslo agreement, as it appears in The Declaration Of Principles, is one 
which addresses a number of major issues of contention for the Palestinian people and 
provides details of how they shall be dealt with. Articles referring to the election of a 
representative council, the withdrawal of Israeli troops, relations with Jordan and 
Egypt, economic relations, and the resolution of disputes are al included. In this, we 
see a credible agreement that addresses certain aspects of the conflict well. Indeed, in 
providing self determination and the potential for economic advancement, aspects of 
the Oslo accords plant seeds of resolution, not simply settlement. However, much like 
Camp David avoided the Palestinian question, Oslo avoids the vital issues associated 
with Jerusalem. Thus, while some aspects are well addressed, too much is left undoneヲ
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especially given the fluid nature of relations in the region. This alone does not denote 
a failed agreement, however. There is, as suggested, much to like about the Oslo 
Accords. This positivity must simply be qualified by the acknowledgement that it was 
not an entirely comprehensive plan. 
Re-entry 
It is at the re-en仕yphase that the Oslo process’problems really become 
evident. On the Israeli side, the Accords were, in stark contrast to Camp Davidヲ
swiftly ratified by the Knesset, enabling the September 13 White House ceremony. 
Thus, the Oslo agreement reached the status of a binding document relatively intact. 
On the Palestinian side, however, there were fundamental problems. Although they 
served as the Palestinian presence at Oslo, the PLO were not the sole, nor the official 
representatives of their people in any practical sense. Thus, an agreement had been 
signed on behalf of people who had no desire for the sort of recognition of and 
dealing with Israel that the Accords provided for. The radical militants of groups such 
as Hamas, therefore, did not feel any duty to follow the Accords. 
Much as Camp David’s approach to region-wide peace failed because it was 
ultimately only a bilateral agreement, so too the Oslo accords proved problematic 
because they too were a bilateral agreement between Israel and one Palestinian 
faction. Thus, its re-entry was destined to be unsatisfactory in that regard. 
Furthermore, the fact that much of the conflict extended beyond official interaction 117 
caused problems. Where two leaders can exert control over their armies sufficient to 
avoid armed conflict, in a guerrilla war of. terror, no one body can hope to control al 
117 That is to say, much of the conflict behaviour was undertaken by forces and individuals b巴yond,or 
b巴neath,oficial control. 
factions. Thus, while the fact that much of the spirit of Camp David did not trickle 
down to the average Egyptian was marginalized because much of the conflict was 
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undertaken at an‘official’（military and diplomatic) level, in the case of the 
Palestinian situation, it was vital that any agreement be adopted by the people. Arafat 
was particularly unsuited for ensuring this. Thus, while a relatively pure agreement 
was finalised, it could not be fully disseminated, meaning that, while the major tenets 
of the agreement were in fact instituted, they were not accepted widely enough to 
enable that to translate into a tangible impact. Here we see the vital importance of 
considering not simply the quality of an agreement, but the nature of its 
establishment. 
Impact 
Partially due to the problems of re-entry, the impact of the Oslo Accords has 
been less than ideal. On paper, a number of their m司orgoals have been achieved, as 
regards the withdrawal of Israeli forces and establishment of a Palestinian Authority. 
However, while these aspects were achieved, further progress has stalled, and the 
underlying motivations of peace and security were never achieved. In part, this was 
due to the fact that the Accords' achievements did not trickle down to the ‘man in the 
stret'. For Palestinians in particular, the political and diplomatic advances that came 
courtesy of the process did not translate into tangible economic benefits of the sort 
that had been hoped for.118 Israelis, meanwhile, saw litle evidence of improved 
personal safety. Systematic treaty breaches can also be attributed to each side. The 
Palestinian Authority unilaterally increased its security forces as well as failing to 
effectively address terrorism, while Israel has balked on aspects of its planned 
18 Rubner. p. 193 
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withdrawal and continued contentious settlement polices in contested regions. This al 
served to create an environment ripe for continuation of the conflict, and its 
escalation. 
Durability 
This leads into the issue of durability. The Oslo peace has ultimately not been 
able to survive at le出tin part because it provided no real means for dealing with the 
dissatisfaction of the many Palestinians that had no say in its creation. Ultimately 
therefore, these attacks became unendurable to both the Israelis and the peace process. 
Meanwhile, Oslo, like Camp David, was also thrown into crisis when one of its main 
protagonists, PM Yitzhak Rabin, was assassinated by a disaffected Israeli in 1995. 
However, where Camp David endured, Oslo faltered, with Rabin’s leading to Peres’ 
succession and eventually, the rise to power of Likud, and its leader, Binyarnin 
Netanyahu, a harsh critic of Oslo. These factors al undermined any positive impact 
that Oslo could have had (as well as explaining many negative things from impact). 
Like Camp David, the Oslo process sits in the transitory zone of the success 
continuum. Although not comprehensive enough to suggest resolution, it nonetheless 
provided an agreement sufficient to suggest settlement. However, unlike Camp 
David, the Oslo process did not fare well in its development. While it was ratified by 
the Israeli Knesset, it could not be fully disseminated amongst a Palestinian 
community that did not necessarily identify with its representatives. Hence, while its 
early phases had a significant positive impact, it was not widely enough accepted to 
avoid the continued violence it was intended to address. Its inability to then withstand 
this violence and shifts in the Israeli political situation thus suggest it to be a failure. 
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b.vi: Observations 
Although proving somewhat more relevant in the case of Oslo, the success as 
occurrence approach to mediation is stil questioned in its assessment of the case. 
While it rightly points to many significant achievements in the process itself, it 
ultimately does not reflect the reality of Oslo’s outcome. Likewise, while presenting 
indicators of failure, a goals based approach is vulnerable, as it was regarding Camp 
David, to interpretive subjectivity in making assessment conclusions. The framework 
for success, meanwhile, again draws results co汀espondingto behavioural and neo-
realist interpretations, as well with those of the conflict resolution school, in this case. 
Again it therefore does not provide a radically different final conclusion. However, in 
its assessment of the development of the mediation agreement it does again provide a 
greater insight into the nature of the breakdown. The causes of Oslo’s failure are 
highlighted as regards re-entry and durability and, thus, possible focuses for 
determining success within the transitory zone are suggested. 
5.c: SUM_'1ARY 
Having considered these two cases of Middle-Eastern mediation, some 
preliminary observations can be made regarding the nature of the success continuum 
framework. 
As far as suggesting success or failure, the framework did not ultimately 
provide a particularly unique assessment of either conflict. Suggesting Camp David to 
be a qualified success and Oslo to be an unfortunate failure is hardly revolutionary. 
However, in tracing the development of each settlement outcome, the framework does 
provide the means for understanding which factors determined the success or failure 
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of their respective episodes. Both mediations resulted in agreements that provided 
credible opportunities for settlement while shying away from more contentious issues, 
and hence any chance of comprehensive resolution. However, in the case of Oslo, the 
agreement in question suffered in its re』 entryas a result of divisions amongst the 
various Palestinian organisations. This, coupled with its inability to endure a number 
of environmental challenges meant that its eventual impact, although initially 
pro立lising,was ultimately undermined to the point that any advances now seem 
negligible. 
As such, the determinant factors of Oslo’s failure were its poor re-entry and its 
marginal durability. The implication that can be drawn from this, therefore, is that 
Camp David’s success was determined not only by its agreement, but also by its re-
entry and durability. Hence, the framework, while not perhaps providing a 
breakthrough in illustrating a new approach to establishing 'what success is’， does, in 
its tracing of the phases of an agreement, provide an insight into what defines a 
successful outcome within the transitory zone of conflict settlement. 
In order to investigate the postulations housed within the success continuum, it 
is important to consider them by way of case studies of actual mediation episodes. 
Given the weaknesses of empirically measured indicators of success and the 
qualitative nature of analysis suggested by the framework, case studies serve as a 
particularly useful tool for investigating the merits of the theoretical suppositions 
presented thus far. By comprehensively investigating two particular cases of 
international mediation, it is hoped that the theories under consideration can be 
developed and discussed in the interests of further developing our understanding of, 
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and questions regarding, the nature of success. In doing so, it is hoped that by both 
introducing a real world subject and utilising a theoretical perspective to determine 
what broad lessons may be learned from a given case study, the integrity of the 
project will be reinforced. Case studies chosen must be complex enough to challenge 
our conceptions of success, and ambiguous enough in their app訂entresults to justify 
the need for their investigation. 
Of course, the theories developed in the preceding chapter were born out of a 
consideration of an array of approaches to understanding mediation outcomes and 
success. As such, it is important that those approaches are also considered in the 
assessment of the chosen cases. By applying such a range of approaches to the same 
mediatory episodes it is hoped that the evaluatory impact of such different approaches 
(often il defined at study outset) on our understanding of mediation outcomes and, 
hence, our conceptions of success or failure, will become evident. In considering the 
merits and/or failings of these approaches, observations regarding the merit of the 
developed framework will also be granted greater context. Thus, before investigating 
the merits of the framework itself, each case will be assessed on the basis of the 
following approaches: the idea of mediation itself as success; the neo同 realist,conflict 
resolution and behavioural assessment schools of thought; and the goal assessment 
approach. 
The cases chosen are those of the Camp David mediations between Israel and 
Egypt in 1979 and the Oslo process which involved Israel and the PLO in 1993. 
These cases were chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, although involving different 
parties, the two episodes were both part of the same greater conflict situation, 
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providing a certain continuity that, while not essential, may provide for some 
interesting insights. Secondly, while both were high profile cases, and trumpeted as 
notable breakthroughs at their conclusions, there is also much criticism of each 
process, and the merits of the outcomes they secured are open to debate. This 
contention is ideal, particularly for the purposes of discussing the continuum 
framework. Mediation agreements too obviously successes or failures would not 
provide a rigorous enough testing ground for the approaches in question. It is 
important to assess mediation outcomes that may be seen as residing in the transitory 
zone of the continuum, if one is to assess success at its origins. Furthermore, despite 
the many similarities between the two processes, there are enough differences in 
issues, participants and timing to ensure simple replication for discussion is avoided. 
Finally, while both conflicts were clearly ripe for attempting mediation, there is litle 




This thesis was undertaken with the intent of producing a rudimentary 
framework to assist in developing a better understanding of what success entails in the 
context of mediation. For anyone with an interest in either the field of conflict 
management or the study of ongoing conflicts, it is suggested that such an 
understanding may be vital for the development of quality mediation evaluation and, 
by extension, the improvement of mediation practices themselves. 
Too often, success is not explicitly addressed in the conflict management 
literature, but is instead couched in abstraction, assumption and the arbitrary 
delineations required to enable quantitative empirical analysis. Furthermore, a number 
of approaches to the evaluation of mediation episodes are discussed herein, al of 
which provide some difficulties for the student attempting to more clearly discern the 
nature of success. Some promulgate the utilization of abstraction while others rely on 
interpreting the often clouded goals of participants. Furthermore, some dichotomously 
opposed approaches (such as that suggesting the possibility of interpreting outcomes 
as discrete events or evolutionary processes) are capable of providing very different 
interpretations of a given event. These problems are in part derived from the 
fundamental difficulties associated with evaluating phenomena in the social science. 
Our inability to control and replicate the conditions of the event under evaluation 
means that any evaluation undertaken will be largely observational, and thus, cannot 
hope to be as systematic as might be possible in a more physical (experimental) 
scientific setting. However, this should be seen not as an insurmountable obstacle, or 
an excuse to fal back on inadequate approaches, but rather as a challenge for those 
with an interest in the field. 
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With this in mind, these considerations regarding the difficulties of social 
science evaluation and the problems of approaches to success in the conflict 
management field were taken into account in the creation of a theoretical framework 
intent on providing an alternative approach to addressing the issues associated with 
success. At its heart are two m司orsuppositions. Firstly, it is suggested that success is 
not a singular phenomena or part of a clearly defined dichotomy with failure. 
Secondly, it is further suggested that mediation episodes must not be assessed at the 
point of agreement, or indeed at any pre-ordained point in their development, but 
instead must be evaluated as an ongoing developmental process if one is to perform 
the sort of comprehensive evaluation required to get to the heart of what success may 
entail. 
In developing the first concept, an arcing continuum was created with failure 
at one end and success at the other. In order to acknowledge the fact that success is 
indeed not an absolutely clearly defined phenomena, the center of the arc was 
identified as a transitory zone within which success at its most modest and failure at is 
most marginal reside. By considering the determinant factors that might separate one 
from the other within that zone, it was suggested an understanding of success at its 
most modest (its basic ‘requirements’in other words) could be attained. To provide a 
practical context, failure was identified as the lack of an agreement, success as 
comprehensive resolution and settlement as residing within the transitory zone. This 
provided a practical context within which to frame possible determinant factors. 
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In investigating these factors, the second basic supposition of the thesis came 
into play. By identifying an a打 ayof possible indicators for explaining what may 
separate success from failure, a developmental process of analysis from conflict and 
agreement, through re目 entryand impact and on to durability was developed. This in 
turn suggested that mediation outcomes would indeed be best assessed in keeping 
with their evolutionary nature. Thus, in operationalizing the framework conflict 
agreements were traced along this line of progression, with consideration made of 
what developments at each stage of the process may mean for their success or failure. 
In pursuing this undertaking (in conjunction with several other approaches, intended 
to grant context to results), a number of observations were made and conclusions 
reached regarding the nature of success as part of a continuum and, most notably, 
regarding the idea of mediation outcomes as ongoing, evolutionary processes. 
Although not ultimately providing the clear definition for success, the arc 
framework does provide an understanding of success as part of a continuum of 
possible mediation outcomes. This understanding is given some credence by the case 
studies undertaken. While one was ultimately suggested to be a success, and the other 
a failure, neither Camp David nor Oslo could be suggested to be without mitigating 
factors that moderated their respective outcomes. Few would suggest Camp David 
was a completely ideal outcome, while it would be a harsh critic that suggested the 
Oslo process didn’t have some redeeming features, if only in its early stages. Hence, 
the supposition that such conflict outcomes should be seen as existing on a continuum 
ranging from abject failure to total success seems justified. 
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The application of the indicators of failure to reach an agreement, settlement 
and resolution seems justified also. While both conflicts were shy of what might be 
considered true resolution, both included agreements suggesting them as conflict 
settlements. Thus, the placement of settlement within the transitory zone of the 
continuum was reinforced, given the divergent outcomes of the two cases. 
The concept of the transitory zone itself, however, proves somewhat 
problematic. The initial motivation behind the idea was that while some outcomes 
may be relatively easily identified as success or failure, many inhabit a gray area 
where there may be litle to separate the two. Thus, it was suggested that by 
discerning what separated success from failure within this zone would serve to 
indicate success at its earliest point on the continuum and, thus, what success was. 
However, this proved more difficult than was initially expected. 
In operationalizing the framework to establish the determinant factors in 
separating success from failure it had been hoped that a concise, generic description 
of what success entailed could have been generated. However, this did not eventuate. 
Thus, it is suggested that such a definitive indicator may not be possible to discern for 
mediation outcomes in a general sense, with each conflict’s unique nature likely to 
suggest different possibilities. Notwithstanding this, however, there was much of 
value provided by the operationalization of the framework. 
In developing an array of determinant factors for consideration in case studies, 
it was contested that conflict management outcomes are best assessed as ongoing 
processes, rather than discrete events. This conclusion was born initially out of 
criticism of output analysis and emphasis of the importance of considering the real-
world impact of any mediation episode in such evaluation and took shape when the 
determinant factors under consideration (agreement, re-entry, impact, durability) 
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clearly suggested an ongoing process of assessment. Honeyman’s conceptualization 
of the developmental nature of conflict settlement reinforced this notion. 
For the most part, the approach adopted in this thesis was validated by the 
results of the case studies. While the framework’s assessment took into account the 
possibility of post agreement events impacting on outcomes, behavioral and neo『
realist approaches (which did, admittedly, provide similar readings of each case) do 
not necessarily do so. Although the wise evaluator would arguably wait a period of 
time before making an assessment under either of these rubrics, they do not 
themselves provide for it in the manner the framework does. Certainly, an assessment 
of the Oslo process immediately after Arafat and Rabin’s famous handshake may 
have reached different conclusions about its success or failure than would a similar 
assessment today. The framework is naturally set up to address this, indicating as it 
does that an assessment is not complete until al the determinant factors have been 
assessed. This is particularly important as regards qualitative tests of durability, which 
necessarily require development in the post agreement environment before assessment 
is possible. 
Although the framework did not provide an absolute set of indicators or 
explanatory factors for success, it did enable some tentative conclusions in that 
regard. On one level, one may look at the relationship between Israel and Egypt, and 
the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, and suggest that given the relative 
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improvement of relations with Egypt, Camp David was a success where Oslo was not. 
Certainly, this conclusion would be in line with that reached under the guidance of the 
framework. However, by utilizing the framework, it is more fully explained. Both 
processes resulted in official agreements which, while not providing for complete 
resolution of ~heir 回spective conflicts, did provide detailed, seemingly credible means 
of settlement. However, Camp David, although moderated in re-entry, was eventually 
enacted reasonably and proved durable, withstanding a number of potential upsets. 
Oslo, by comparison, could not be disseminated to the people and arguably did not 
survive the upheavals that threatened it, at least not with functionality attached. 
Hence, Oslo’s impact was made negligible. 
Thus, it can be suggested that agreements which may promise successes are 
not indicators of success on their own. Likewise, impact, while being the 
‘cornerstone’indicator of success, may actually be dictated by re entry and durability 
Hence, it could be suggested that these are the key determinant factors. This is only a 
preliminary conclusion, and as such it requires further investigation of a wider array 
of cases. However, it is believed that, in the cases studied, re-entry and durability 
were in fact the key determinant factors in separating the success of one from the 
failure of the other. 
These tentative conclusions do suggest a number of possibilities for future 
research however, of which an investigation into determining the importance of re-
entry and durability in defining success is only one. As already discussed, the idea of 
mediation outcomes as evolutionary processes should also perhaps be more widely 
applied and/or more clearly articulated. The conclusions reached by this approach 
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arguably justify the use of case by case qualitative analysis over broad quantitative 
investigations, when considering the sorts of issues tied up in evaluation and the 
understanding of success. Obviously, quantitative evaluation and empirical data have 
many valuable uses. However, for the topic at hand, they arguably provide a picture, 
when one should be looking at the brush strokes. Of course, in addressing the 
understanding of such a subjective concept as‘success’there will always be 
difficulties with any qualitative analysis as regards subjectivity and the lack of clear, 
decisive measures. However, this is no worse a problem than the arbitrariness and 
‘manufactured precision’that can be associated with the establishment of measures 
for any attempts at more empirical analysis. Furthermore, with more careful 
consideration of indicators and their definition, these concerns can be mitigated, if 
never completely negated. 
It is important that any work in a field such as that of conflict management 
should try to address any practical implications that may arise from a given study. In 
this case there are several. Firstly, it seems reasonable to suggest that given the results 
of the two case studies, greater, or more specific, emphasis needs to be placed on 
ensuring the re entry and durability of mediation agreements. As suggested, these are 
not necessarily the definitive determinants of a successful outcome, but there is 
enough to suggest they wa町antfurther consideration in any attempt at mediation. 
Likewise, observation would suggest that perhaps those involved in policy making as 
regards mediation might be wise to step away from simplistic conceptions of success 
as a simple either/or phenomena and mediation outcomes as discrete processes. The 
former is too rigid to address the range of outcomes possible in the international 
environment, while if one accepts the value of issues such as re-entry and durability it 
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is evident the latter is no longer applicable. Of course, as Honeyman indicates, this is 
somewhat problematic. Stepping away from clearly decipherable outcomes and quick 
fire assessments is anathema to many in positions of political power.119 However, 
particularly as the efforts of organizations such as the United Nations move away 
from simply brokering ceasefires, to more al encompassing, long term forms of 
conflict management, such approaches will become more and more out of step with 
the realities of international conflict management. 
Another, more speci白cobservation can be made regarding the failure of Oslo. 
In suggesting that much of the problem lay with the inability of Arafat to establish the 
Declaration’s agreements within a population base he did not completely control and 
the associated problems this brought given the high degree of‘ground level' 
involvement in the conflict, much is implied about the importance of re-entry. With 
regard to conflicts in which parties do not have well established leadership structures 
and the population is widely involved (particularly civil wars and other internal 
strife), re-entry will be problematic and much must therefore be done to ensure that 
any agreement reached can be spread across a party’s divergent strands. This suggests 
perhaps, that for successful settlement of such conflicts, conflict management must go 
well beyond the level of the elite, echoing somewhat Lederach’s observations 
regarding the nature of conflict management approaches as they relate to levels of 
hierarchy within a given community.120 This is clearly an aspect of conflict 
management theory that deserves further investigation. It also suggests the possibility 
that certain determinant factors will likely have differing degrees of importance in 

















































Developing a comprehensive understanding of a broad, multi-faceted concept 
such as success, particularly in a field as fraught with evaluatory pitfalls as that of 
mediation, is a difficult task indeed. In fact, it is arguably beyond the scope of a single 
study. However, it is important for the future of mediation research that such an 
understanding is developed if the academic study of the process is to continue to 
prove relevant to its practical application. Furthermore, the conclusions and 
suggestions developed by way of this thesis’framework should be seen as evidence 
that the task of developing a comprehensive understanding of success in mediation, 
while admittedly difficult, should not be considered unapproachable. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1: UNSC RESOLUTIONS 224αnd338 
UNSC Resolution 242, November 27 1967 
The Security Council, 
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, 
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to 
work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the 
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of 
the Charter, 
1. Affirms that the fulfillm巴ntof Charter principl巴srequires the establishm巴ntof a just and 
lasting peace in th巴MiddleEast which should includ巴theapplication of both the following 
principles: 
o Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the r巴centconflict; 
o Termination of al claims or states of bellig巴rencyand resp巴ctfor and 
acknowledgement of the sover巴ignty,teritorial integrity and political ind巴pendence
of every Stat巴inth巴areaand their right to live in peac巴withins巴cureand recognized 
boundari巴sfre巴fromthr巴atsor acts of forc巴；
2. Affirms further the necessity 
o For guaranteeing fre巴domof navigation through int巴rnationalwaterways in the area; 
o For achieving a just settlement of the r巴fug田 problem;
o For guaranteeing the t巴ritorialinviolability and political indep巴ndenc巴ofevery State 
in the area, through measures including th巴巴stablishmentof d巴militarizedzones; 
3. Requests the S巴cretaryGeneral to designate a Sp巴cialRepresentative to proceed to the Middle 
East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concern巴din ord巴rto promote 
agre巴mentand assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accept巴dsettlement in accordance with 
the provisions and principles in this r巴solution;
4. Requ巴ststhe Secretary-G巴neralto report to th巴S巴curityCouncil on the progress of the efforts 
of the Special Representative as soon as possible. 
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1. Calls upon al parti巴sto present fighting to C巴aseal firing and t巴rminateal military activity 
i町田iediately,no lat巴rthan 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the 
positions after the moment of th巴adoptionof this decision, in the positions they now occupy; 
2. Calls upon al parti巴sconc巴rnedto start immediat巴lyafter the c巴ase-firethe implem巴ntationof 
Security Council R巴solution242 (1967) in al of its parts; 
3. Decid巴sthat, imm巴diatelyand concurrently with the c巴ase-fire,n巴gotiationsst出tb巴tweenthe 
parti巴sconc巴rn巴dunder appropriat巴auspic巴saimed at establishing a just and durable p巴acein 
the Middle East 
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APPENDIX 2: THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND 
SUBSEQUENT PEACE TREATY 
The Framework For Peace In The Middle East, September 17, 1978 
Preamble 
The search for p巴ac巴inthe Middle East must be guid巴dby the following: 
• Th巴agreedbasis for a peac巴fulsettlement of the conflict b巴tweenIsra巴land its neighbors is 
United Nations Security Council R巴solution2_生2_,in al its parts. 
• Aft巴rfour wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the 
cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three gr巴atreligions, does not enjoy the blessings of 
peace. The p巴opleof the Middl巴Easty巴arnfor p巴aceso that the vast human and natural 
resourc巴Sof th巴regioncan be turn巴dto th巴pursuitsof peace and so that this area can becom巴
a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations. 
• The historic initiative of Presid巴ntSadat in visiting J巴rusalemand the rec巴ptionaccorded to 
him by th巴parliam巴nt,gov巴rnmentand people of Israel, and th巴reciprocalvisit of Prime 
Minist巴rB巴ginto Ismailia, th巴p巴aceproposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm 
r巴ceptionof thes巴missionsby the peoples of both countri巴s,have created an unprecedented 
opportunity for peac巴whichmust not be lost if this generation and future gen巴rationsare to be 
spared th巴tragedi巴sof war. 
• Th巴provisionsof the Charter of th巴UnitedNations and th巴otheraccepted norms of 
int巴rnationallaw and legitimacy now provide acc巴pt巴dstandards for the conduct of relations 
among al stat巴s.
• To achieve a r巴lationshipof peac巴， inthe spirit of Article 2 of th巴Unit巴dNations Chart巴r,
future negotiations betwe巴nIsrael and any n巴ighborprepared to negotiate p巴ac巴andsecurity 
with it are n巴C巴ssaryfor th巴purposeof carrying out al the provisions and principles of 
Resolutions 242 and 338. 
• p巴acer巴quiresrespect for th巴sovereignty,t巴rritorialint巴grityand political indep巴nd巴nc巴of
ev巴rystat巴inth巴ar巴aand their right to live in peac巴withinsecure and recogniz巴dboundaries 
free from thr巴atsor acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate mov巴menttoward a 
n巴wera of reconciliation in the Middl巴Eastmark＇巴dby coop巴rationin promoting economic 
d巴velopment,in maintaining stability and in assuring s巴curity.
• Security is巴nhanc巴dby a relationship of p巴aceand by coop巴rationbetwe巴nnations which 
enjoy normal r巴lations.In addition, und巴rthe t巴rmsofp巴acetreaties, the parties can, on the 
basis of reciprocity, agr巴巴 tospecial s巴curityarrangem巴ntssuch as demilitarized zones, 
limited armam巴ntsaτ巴as，巴arlywarning stations, th巴pr巴senc巴ofinternational forces, liaison, 
agreed m巴asuresfor monitoring and other arrang巴mentsthat th巴yagree are useful. 
Framework 
Taking thes巴factorsinto account, th巴parti巴sar巴det巴rmin巴dto r巴acha just, compreh巴nsive,and 
durabl巴S巴tl巴mentof th巴Middl巴Eastconflict through th巴conclusionof peac巴tr巴ati巴sbased on 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in al their parts. Th巴irpu叩oseis to achi巴vepeace and good 
n巴ighborlyrelations. Th巴yr巴cognizethat for p巴aceto巴ndure,it must involve al those who have been 
most deeply affect巴dby the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is 
intended by them to constitut巴abasis for peace not only b巴tweenEgypt and Israel, but also b巴tween
Isra巴land each of its other n巴ighborswhich is prepar巴dto n巴gotiatep巴ac巴withIsrael on this basis. 
With that objective in mind, they hav巴agre巴dto proceed as follows: 
A. w巴stBank and Gaza 
1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of th巴Pal巴stinianpeople should 
participat巴innegotiations on th巴resolutionof the Palestinian problem in al its 
asp巴cts.To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza 
should proce巴din thre巴stages:
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a. Egypt and Isra巴lagree that, in order to ensur巴apeaceful and orderly transfer 
of authority, and taking into account the s巴curityconc巴rnsof al th巴parties,
thぽ巴 shouldbe transitional a汀angem巴ntsfor the West Bank and Gaza for a 
period not exceeding five years. In order to provide ful autonomy to the 
inhabitants, und巴rthese arrangements the Isra巴limilitary government and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a S巴lf-gov巴rning
authority has b巴巴nfr巴elyel巴ctedby the inhabitants of thes巴areasto replac巴
th巴巴xistingmilitary gov巴rnm巴nt.To negotiate the details of a transitional 
arrang巴m巴nt,Jordan will b巴invit巴dto join the negotiations on the basis of 
this fram巴work.Th巴S巴newarrangem巴ntsshould give due consideration 
both to the principle of s巴lf-governmentby the inhabitants of these 
territories and to th巴legitimateS巴curityconc巴rnsof the parties involved. 
b. Egypt, Isra巴1,and Jordan will agree on th巴modalitiesfor establishing 
elect巴dself-governing authority in th巴羽TestBank and Gaza. The 
delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from th巴West
Bank and Gaza or oth巴rPalestinians as mutually agr巴巴d.The parties will 
n巴gotiatean agreement which will define th巴pow巴rsand responsibiliti巴sof 
the self-gov巴mingauthority to b巴巴xercisedin the W巴stBank and Gaza. A 
withdrawal of Isra巴Iiarm巴dfore巴swill take plac巴andther巴willb巴a
r巴d巴ploym巴ntof the remaining Isra巴liforc巴sinto specified S巴curity
locations. The agr巴巴mentwill also includ巴aηangem巴ntsfor assuring 
internal and巴xt巴rnalsecurity and public order. A S仕onglocal police forc巴
will be巴stablished,which may include Jordanian citiz巴ns.In addition, 
Isra巴Iiand Jordanian forc巴swill participat巴injoint patrols and in the 
manning of control posts to assure the security of th巴bord巴rs.
c. Wh巴nth巴self旬。gov巴rningauthority (administrativ巴council)in th巴West
Bank and Gaza is establish巴dand inaugurat巴d,th巴transitionalperiod of five 
y巴arswill begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year aft巴r
the b巴ginningof the transitional p巴riod,negotiations will take place to 
det巴rmineth巴finalstatus of the West Bank and Gaza and its r巴lationship
with its n巴ighborsand to conclude a p巴acetreaty betwe巴nIsra巴1and Jordan 
by th巴巴ndof th巴transitionalperiod. Thes巴n巴gotiationswill b巴conducted
among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elect巴drepresentatives of the 
inhabitants of th巴羽TestBank and Gaza. Two separat巴butrelat巴d
committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of r巴pres巴ntatives
of th巴fourparti巴swhich will negotiate and agr巴巴 onth巴finalstatus of the 
羽TestBank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the s巴cond
committee, consisting of representatives of Isra巴iand repres巴ntativesof 
Jordan to b巴joinedby th巴el巴ctedrepres巴ntativesof the inhabitants of the 
West Bank and Gaza, to negotiat巴th巴peac巴treatybetween Israel and 
Jordan, taking into account th巴agre巴mentr巴ach巴din the final status of the 
West Bank and Gaza. Th巴negotiationsshall be based on al the provisions 
and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. Th巴negotiations
will resolv巴， amongoth巴rmatters, the location of the boundaries and the 
nature of the s巴curitya汀angements.Th巴solutionfrom the negotiations must 
also r巴cogniz巴th巴l巴gitimat巴rht of th巴Pal巴stinianp巴opl巴sand their jus t 
requirem巴nts.In this way, th巴Pal巴stinianswill participate in the 
d巴terminationof their own future through: 
i. Then巴gotiationsamong Egypt, Israel, Jordan and th巴
r巴pres巴ntativesof the inhabitants of th巴WestBank and Gaza to 
agr巴巴 onthe final status of th巴羽TestBank and Gaza and oth巴r
outstanding issues by th巴endof th巴transitionalperiod. 
i. Submitting their agreem巴ntsto a vot巴bythe elect巴dr巴presentatives
of the inhabitants of the W巴stBank and Gaza. 
ii. Providing for the elected r巴pr巴sentativesof the inhabitants of the 
W巴stBank and Gaza to decid巴howth巴yshall govern th巴ms巴Ives
consistent with th巴provisionsof th巴iragr田 ment.
iv. Participating as stat巴dabove in the work of the committee 
n巴gotiatingthe peac巴tr巴atybetw巴巴nIsra巴iand Jordan. 
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2. All necessary measures will be tak巴nand provisions mad巴toassure the security of 
Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in 
providing such security, a strong local polic巴forcewill b巴constitutedby th巴self司
governing authority. It will be compos巴dof inhabitants of th巴WestBank and Gaza. 
The police will maintain liaison on internal security matt巴rswith the designat巴d
Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian offic巴rs.
3. During th巴transitionalperiod, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and th巴self-
gov巴rningauthority will constitut巴acontinuing committe巴todecide by agr巴巴ment
on the modalities of admission of p巴rsonsdisplaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 
1967, together with nec巴ssarymeasures to prev巴ntdisruption and disorder. Other 
matt巴rsof common concern may also be dealt with by this committ巴e.
4. Egypt and Israel will work with巴achother and with other interested parti巴Sto 
巴stablishagr巴巴dproc巴duresfor a prompt, just and p巴rman巴ntimplem巴ntationof the 
resolution of the refuge巴probl巴m.
B. Egypt”Israel 
1. Egypt-Israel und巴rtak巴notto resort to the threat or th巴useof force to settle disput巴s.
Any disputes shall b巴setl巴dby p巴ac巴fulm巴ansin accordanc巴withth巴provisionsof 
Article 33 of the U.N. Chart巴r.
2. In order to achieve peac巴betw巴巴nthem, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith 
with a goal of concluding within thre巴monthsfrom th巴signingof the Fram巴worka 
peace tr巴atybetw巴巴nthem while inviting th巴otherparti巴sto the conflict to proce巴d
simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar p巴acetreaties with a view th巴
achi巴vinga comprehensiv巴p巴acein th巴area.The Framework for th巴Conclusionof a 
Peac巴Tr巴atybetw巴巴nEgypt and Isra巴lwill gov巴rnthe p巴acenegotiations b巴tw巴en
th巴m.The parti巴swill agr巴巴 onth巴modalitiesand the tim巴tablefor the 
impl巴mentationof th巴irobligations under th巴tr巴aty.
C. Associat巴dPrinciples 
1. Egypt and Israel state that th巴principlesand provisions describ巴dbelow should apply 
to peac巴treatiesbetw巴巴nIsra巴land巴achof its neighbors四 Egypt,Jordan, Syria and 
L巴banon. 
2. Signatories shall巴stablishamong thems巴lv巴sr巴lationshipsnormal to stat巴sat peace 
with one another. To this end, th巴yshould und巴rtaketo abid巴byal the provisions of 
the U.N. Charter. St巴psto be tak巴nin this resp巳ctinclude: 
a. ful recognition; 
b. abolishing巴conomicboycotts; 
c. guarant巴eingthat under th巴irjurisdiction the citizens of the other parti巴s
shall enjoy th巴prot巴ctionof the du巴proc巴sof law. 
3. Signatories should explore possibiliti巴sfor economic d巴velopmentin the context of 
final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmospher巴ofpeac巴，
cooperation and fri巴ndshipwhich is their common goal. 
4. Claims commissions may be establish巴dfor th巴mutualsettlement of al financial 
claims. 
5. The Unit巴dStat巴sshall be invited to participat巴din the talks on matt巴rsrelated to the 
modalities of th巴implementationof the agr巴巴m巴ntsand working out the tim巴tablefor 
th巴carryingout of the obligations of the parti巴s.
6. Th巴Unit巴dNations Security Council shall b巴requ巴stedto巴ndorsethe peac巴treaties
and巴nsurethat their provisions shall not be violated. The p巴rmanentmembers of the 
Security Council shall b巴r巴qu巴st巴dto underwrit巴th巴p巴acetreaties and ensur巴
r巴spector the provisions. Th巴yshall b巴r巴quest巴dto conform their polici巴san actions 
with th巴undertakingcontained in this Fram巴work.
Forth巴Governmentof the For th巴Gov巴rnm巴nt
Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhamm巴dAnwar al-Sadat 
of Isra巴l:M巴nachemBegin 
Witness巴dby: Jimmy Cart巴r,Presid巴ntof th巴UnitedStat巴sof Am巴rica
Framework For The Conclusion Of A Peace Treaty Between Egypt And Israel, 
September 17, 1978 
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In order to achieve p巴acebetwe巴nthem, Isra巴land Egypt agr巴巴 ton巴gotiat巴ingood faith with a goal of 
concluding within thre巴monthsof th巴signingof this fram巴worka peac巴treatybetw巴巴nth巴m:
It is agreed that: 
• Th巴siteof then巴gotiationswill be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to b巴
mutually agreed. 
• All of th巴principl巴sof U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the disput巴
between Israel and Egypt. 
• Unless oth巴rwis巴mutuallyagr巴巴d,t巴rmsof th巴peac巴tr巴atywill b巴impI巴m巴nt巴db巴twe巴ntwo 
and thr巴巴 yearsaft巴rth巴peac巴tr巴atyis signed. 
• The following matt巴rsare agre巴db巴twe巴nth巴parties:
1. the ful exercise of Egyptian sover巴igntyup to the internationally r巴cognized border ' 
between Egypt and mandat巴dPalestine; 
2. th巴withdrawalof Israeli arm巴dforces from the Sinai; 
3. the us巴ofairfields left by th巴Israelisn巴aral-Arish, Rafah, Ras巴n-Naqb,and Sharm 
巴I-Sh巴ikhfor civilian purpos巴sonly, including possible commercial use only by al 
nat10ns; 
4. the right of fr巴巴 passag巴byships of Israel through th巴Gulfof Su巴zand th巴Suez
Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to al nations; 
the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are int巴rnationalwat巴rwaysto be open to al 
nations for unimped巴dand nonsusp巴ndablefreedom of navigation and overflight; 
5. the construction of a highway betw巴巴nthe Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with 
guarant巴巴dfr巴eand P巴ac巴fulpassage by Egypt and Jordan; and 
6. th巴stationingof military forces list巴dbelow. 
Stationing of Forces 
• No more than on巴division(mechaniz巴dor infantry) of Egyptian armed forc巴swill be 
stationed within an ar巴alying approximately 50 km. (30 miles）聞は ofthe Gulf of Su巴Zand 
the Suez Canal. 
• Only United Nations forc巴sand civil police巴quippedwith light w巴aponsto perform normal 
police functions will b巴stationedwithin an ar巴alying w巴stof th巴internationalbord巴rand the 
Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles). 
• In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of th巴int巴rnationalbord巴rthere will be Israeli limited 
military forc巴snot to exc巴巴dfour infantry battalions and Unit巴dNations observ巴rs.
• Border patrol units not to exc巴巴dth re巴battalionswill supplem巴ntth巴civilpolice in 
maintaining ord巴rin th巴ar巴anot included above. 
• The exact d巴marcationof the above ar巴aswill be as d巴cid巴dduring the peace negotiations. 
・Earlywarning stations may exist to insure complianc巴withth巴termsof the agreement. 
• Unit巴dNations forces will be stationed: 
1. in part of the紅 eain th巴Sinailying within about 20 km. of the M巴dit巴rraneanSea 
and adjac巴ntto th巴int巴rnationalbord巴r,and 
2. in th巴Sharmel-Sheikh area to insure fre巴domof passage through th巴Straitof Tiran; 
and these forc巴swill not be removed unless such removal is approv巴dby the S巴curity
Council of th巴Unit巴dNations with a unanimous vot巴ofthe fiv巴permanent
m巴mbers.
• After a p巴acetreaty is signed, and aft巴rthe interim withdrawal is compl巴te,normal relations 
will be established between Egypt and Israel, including ful recognition, including diplomatic, 
巴conomicand cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the fr閃
movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citiz巴nsby the du巴proc巴soflaw. 
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Interim Withdrawal 
Between three months and nin巴monthsafter the signing of the p巴ac巴treaty,al Israeli forces 
will withdraw east of a lin巴ext巴nding企oma point east ofEl-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the 
exact location of this line to be deterrnin巴dby mutual agreement. 
Forth巴Gov巴rnmentof th巴Forth巴Governm巴nt
Arab Republic of Egypt: Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat 
of Israel: Menachem Begin 
羽Titn巴SS巴dby: Jimmy Cart巴r,President of th巴UnitedStates of America 
Peαce Treaty Between Israel And Egypt, March 26, 1979 
Th巴Governmentof the Arab R巴publicof Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel; 
PREAMBLE 
Con vine巴dof th巴urg巴ntnee巴ssityof the巴stablishmentof a just, compr巴hensiv巴andlasting peac巴in
the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338; 
R巴affirmingtheir adh巴renceto the "Fram巴workfor P巴acein the Middle East Agr巴edat Camp David," 
dat巴dSeptemb巴r17, 1978; 
Noting that the aforem巴ntionedFramework as appropriate is int巴ndedto constitute a basis for p巴acenot 
only betw巴巴nEgypt and Israel but also betw巴巴nIsrael and巴achof its other Arab neighbors which is 
prepar巴dto negotiat巴peacewith it on this basis; 
Desiring to bring to an叩 d出6stat巴ofwar betw巴巴nthem and to巴stablisha peac巴inwhich ev巴rystate 
in the area can live in s巴curity;
Convinced that th巴conclusionof a Treaty of P巴ac巴b巴tweenEgypt and Israel is an important step in the 
search for comprehensiv巴P巴ac巴inthe area and for the attainment of settlem巴ntof th巴Arab-Israeli 
conflict in al its asp巴cts;
Inviting the oth巴rArab parties to this dispute to join th巴p巴ac巴processwith Israel guided by and based 
on the principles of th巴aforementionedFramework; 
Desiring as well to d巴velopfri巴ndlyrelations and cooperation between th巴ms巴lvesin accordance with 
the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international r巴lationsin 
times of peac巴；
Agr巴eto th巴followingprovisions in the fr巴eexercise of their sovぽ巴ignty,in ord巴rto implement the 
"Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Betw巴enEgypt and Isra巴l”；
Article I 
1. Th巴stateof war betw巴巴nth巴Partieswill be t巴rminat巴dand peac巴willbe establish巴dbetween 
th巴mupon the巴xchangeof instrum巴ntsof ratification of this Treaty. 
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2. Israel will withdraw al its arm巴dforces and civilians from th巴Sinaib巴hindthe international 
boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex 
I ), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its ful sovereignty ov巴rthe Sinai. 
3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provid巴dfor in Annex I, the parties will establish 
normal and fri巴ndlyr巴lations,in accordanc巴withArticle II (3). 
Article I 
Th巴perman巴ntboundary b巴tw巴巴nEgypt and Israel in th巴recognizedinternational boundary between 
Egypt and th巴formermandated t巴rritoryof Pal巴stine,as shown on th巴mapatAnn巴XI, without 
prejudice to th巴issu巴ofth巴statusof th巴GazaStrip. The Parties r巴cognizethis boundary as inviolable. 
Each will respect the territorial int巴grityof the other, including their t巴rritorialwaters and airspac巴．
Article III 
1. Th巴Partieswill apply b巴tweenthem th巴 ~rovisions of the Chart巴rof th巴UnitedNations and 
the principles of int巴rnationallaw governing relations among stat巴sin times of p巴ace.In 
particular: 
a. Th巴yr巴cognizeand will respect巴achother’s sovereignty, territorial int巴grityand 
political independenc巴；
b. Th巴yr巴cogniz巴andwill respect巴achother’s right to live in p巴acewithin their s巴cur巴
and recogniz巴dboundari巴s;
c. They will refrain from th巴thr巴ator use of force, direct! y or indirectly, against each 
oth巴rand will set！巴 aldisput巴sb巴tw巴巴nth巴mby p巴acefulm巴ans.
2. Each Party undertakes to ensur巴thatacts or threats of bellig巴r巴ncy,hostility, or viol巴nc巴do
not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forc巴Esubj巴ctto 
its control or by any other forc巴sstation巴don its t巴rritory, against the population, citiz巴nsor 
property of th巴otherParty. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
inciting, assisting or participatmg in acts or thr巴atsof bellig巴rency,hostility, subv巴rsionor 
viol enc巴againstth巴otherParty, anywh巴re,and und巴rtak巴Sto巴nsurethat perp巴仕atorsof such 
acts are brought to justic巴．
3. The Parti巴sagree that the normal relationship established betwe巴nthem will include ful 
recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of巴conomicboycotts 
and discriminatory barriers to the free movem巴ntof p巴opl巴andgoods, and will guarant巴巴 the
mutual enjoyment by citiz巴nsof the du巴processoflaw. Th巴processby which they und巴rtak巴
to achieve such a relationship parallel to the impl巴m巴ntationof oth巴rprovisions of this Treaty 
is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex II). 
Article IV 
1. In order to provid巴maximums巴curityfor both Parti巴son th巴basisof reciprocity, agreed 
security arrangem巴ntswill be巴stablishedincluding limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli 
t巴rritory,and Unit巴dNations forc巴sand observers, d巴scribedin detail as to nature and timing 
in Annex I, and oth巴rs巴curityarrangements the Parties may agr巴巴 upon.
2. The Parties agr田 tothe stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. 
Th巴Parti巴sagr巴巴 notto request withdrawal of th巴UnitedNations personn巴land that these 
personnel will not be remov巴dunl巴ssuch removal is approv巴dby the Security Council of the 
United Nations, with the affirmative vot巴ofthe five P巴rman巴ntMembers, unl巴sthe Parties 
oth巴rwiseagr田．
3. A Joint Commission will b巴巴stablishedto facilitate the implementation of th巴Treaty,as 
provided for in Annex I. 
4. The security arrangem叩 tsprovid巴dfor in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the 
r巴questof巴ith巴rparty b巴r巴viewedand amend巴dby mutual agr巴巴m巴ntof the Parti巴s.
Article V 
1. Ships oflsrael, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy th巴rightof free 
passage through the Su巴ZCanal and its approach巴Sthrough the Gulf of Suez and the 
M巴diterran巴anS巴aon th巴basisof the Constantinopl巴Conv巴ntionof 1888, applying to al 
nations, Israeli nationals, vess巴lsand cargo巴s,as well as p巴rsons,vess巴lsand cargoes destined 
for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in al matt巴rs
connect巴dwith usag巴ofthe canal. 
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2. Th巴Parti巴sconsider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to b巴internationalwaterways 
open to al nations for unimpeded and non-susp巴ndabl巴fr巴edomof navigation and overflight. 
Th巴parti巴swill respect巴achoth巴r’sright to navigation and ov巴rflightfor acc巴sto either 
country through th巴Straitof Tiran and th巴Gulfof Aqaba. 
Article VI 
1. This Treaty do巴snot affect and shall not b巴int巴rpret巴das affecting in any way the rights and 
obligations of the Parti巴sund巴rthe Chart巴rof th巴Unit巴dNations. 
2. The Parties undertake巴tofulfil in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard 
to action or inaction of any other party and indep巴ndentlyof any instrument external to this 
Treaty. 
3. Th巴yfurther undertak巴totake al the nec巴ssarymeasur巴sfor the application in their r巴lations
of the provisions of the multilat巴ralconv巴ntionsto which th巴yar巴parti巴s,including the 
submission of appropriate notification to the S巴cr巴taryGeneral of the United Nations and 
oth巴rdepositari巴sof such conventions. 
4. Th巴Parti巴sundertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty. 
5. Subj巴ctto Article 103 of the United Nations Chart巴rin the ev巴ntof a conflict between the 
obligation of the Parti巴Sunder th巴pr巴sentTreaty and any of th巴irother obligations, the 
obligations und巴rthis Treaty will be binding and implement巴d.
Article VII 
1. Disputes arising out of th巴applicationor interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by 
negotiations. 
2. Any such disput巴swhich cannot b巴s巴tledby n巴gotiationsshall be resolved by conciliation or 
submitted to arbitration. 
Article VIII 
The Parties agree to巴stablisha claims commission for the mutual settlem巴ntof al financial claims. 
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall enter into forc巴uponexchange of instruments of ratification. 
2. This Treaty supersedes the Agr巴ementbetw巴巴nEgypt and Isra巴lof Sept巴mber,1975. 
3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall b巴regardedas an integral part 
h巴reof.
4. Th巴Treatyshall b巴communicat巴dto the Secretary G巴neralof th巴UnitedNations for 
registration in accordanc巴withthe provisions of Article 102 of th巴Charterof the United 
Nations. 
i殺さ綴；；E窓続手総総務滋綴織滋機祭器建設際機織議議緩滋繁華急令官護側守千三脚漆燃手主総：i'.f議ぬ滋鰯綴藤滋綴潔綴綴綴綴綴蕊滋i滋慾瀦綴綴草薮機
Annex I -Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Agreements 
Article I 
Concept of Withdrawal 
1. Israel will complete withdrawal of al its arm巴dfore巴sand civilians from the Sinai not later 
than three y巴arsfrom the dat巴ofexchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty. 
2. To ensure th巴mutuals巴curityof the Parti巴s,the impl巴m巴ntationof phas巴dwithdrawal will be 
accompanied by th巴militarym巴asur巴sand巴stablishmentof zones set out in this Annex and in 
Map 1, h巴reinafterreferred to as”th巴Zones."
3. Th巴withdrawalfrom the Sinai will be accomplish巴din two phas巴s:
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a. Th巴interimwithdrawal b巴hindth巴linefrom east of El-Arish to Ras Mohammed as 
delin巴atedon盟主立2within nine months from the dat巴ofexchange of instruments of 
ratification of this Treaty. 
b. The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international boundary not later than 
three y巴arsfrom th巴dateof exchange of instrum巴ntsof ratification of this Tr巴aty.
4. A Joint Commission will be formed immediately aft巴rth巴巴xchangeof instrum巴ntsof 
ratification of this Treaty in order to sup巴rvis巴andcoordinat巴movementsand sch巴dules
during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and timetables as n巴C巴ssarywithin the limits 
established by paragraph 3, above. D巴tailsrelating to th巴JointCommission are s巴tout in 
Article IV of the attach巴dApp巴ndix.Th巴JointCommission will be dissolved upon 
completion of final Isra巴liwithdrawal from th巴Sinai.
Article II 
Determination of Final Lines and Zones 
1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parti巴saft巴rthe final withdrawal, the lin巴Sand 
the Zones delin巴atedon盟旦iare to b巴巴stablishedand organized as follows: 
a. Zon巴A
i. Zone A is bound巴don the巴astby lin巴A(red line) and on the west by th巴
Suez Canal and the east coast of th巴Gulfof Suez, as shown on Map 1. 
1. An Egyptian armed force of on巴m巴chanizedinfantry division and its 
military installations, and fl巴ldfortifications, will be in this Zone. 
ii. The main elem巴ntsof that Division will consist of: 
b. Zone B 
a. Three mechanized infantry brigades. 
b. On巴armedbrigade. 
c. s巴V巴nfield artil巴rybattalions including up to 126 artil巴rypi巴C巴s.
d. s巴V巴nanti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-
to-air missil巴sand up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and 
abov巴．
巴. Up to 230 tanks. 
f. Up to 480 armored personnel vehicl巴sof al types. 
g. Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel. 
i. Zon巴Bis bounded by line B (gre巴nlin巴） on the巴astand by lin巴A(red lin巴）
on the west, as shown on Map 1. 
i. Egyptian border units of four battalions巴quipp巴dwith light weapons and 
wheel巴dvehicles will provid巴s巴curityand supplem巴ntth巴civilpolice in 
maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements in the four Border 
Battalions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel. 
ii. Land bas巴d,short rang巴， lowpow巴r,coastal warning points of the border 
patrol units may be巴stablishedon the coast of this Zone. 
iv. There will b巴inZon巴Bfield fortifications and military installations for th巴
four border battalions. 
c. Zone C 
1. Zone C is bound巴dby line B (gr巴巴nline) on the west and the International 
Boundary and th巴Gulfof Aqaba on th巴巴ast,as shown on Map 1. 
i. Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil polic巴willbe stationed in 
Zone C. 
111. The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal 
polic巴functionswithin this Zone. 
iv. The United Nations Force will b巴d巴ployedwithin Zone C and p巴rformits 
自mctionsas d巴fin巴din Article VI of this annex. 
v. The United Nations Fore巴willb巴stationedmainly in camps locat巴dwithin 
d. Zon巴D
the following stationing areas shown on Map 1, and will巴stablishits precise 
locations aft巴rconsultations with Egypt: 
a. In that part of the ar巴ain the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of the 
M巴dit巴rraneanS巴aand adjac巴ntto the International Boundary. 
b. In the Sharm el Sheikh area. 
i. Zone D is bounded by line D (blue lin巴） on the巴astand th巴international
boundary on the w巴st,as shown on Map 1. 
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i. In出isZone th巴rewill b巴anIsraeli limited fore巴offour infantry battalions, 
their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations 
observers. 
ii. The Israeli forces in Zon巴Dwill not includ巴tanks,artillery and anti国 aircraft
missil巴S巴xceptindividual surface-to-air missiles. 
iv. The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 
180 armored personnel vehicl巴sof al typ巴sand up to a total of four 
thousand personnel. 
2. Ace巴sacross th巴internationalboundary shall only be p巴rmittedthrough巴ntrycheck points 
d巴signatedby巴achParty and und巴rits control. Such ace巴sshall be in accordanc巴withlaws 
and regulations of each country. 
3. Only those field fortifications, military installations, forces, and weapons specifically 
permitted by this Ann巴Xshall b巴inthe Zon巴s.
Article III 
Aerial Military Regime 
1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissanc巴flightsof Egypt and Israel shall tak巴plac巴only
ov巴rZon巴sAand D, 1・巴spectiv巴ly.
2. Only unarm巴d,non”combataircraft of Egypt and Israel will be station巴dinZon巴sA andD, 
resp巴ctively.
3. Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight such 
aircraft may b巴maintainedin Zone B. The Egyptian bord巴runit.,., may be equipp巴dwith 
unarmed helicopters to perform their functions in Zone B. 
4. The Egyptian civil polic巴maybe equipp巴dwith unarmed polic巴helicoptersto p巴rformnormal 
police functions in Zon巴c.
5. Only civilian airfields maybe built in th巴Zones.
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military aerial activiti出




1. Egypt and Israel may base and op巴rat巴navalV巴SS巴lsalong the coasts of Zones A and D, 
r巴sp巴ctively.
2. Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may b巴station巴dand operate in the territorial 
waters of Zone B to assist the border units in p巴：rformingth巴irfunctions in this Zone. 
3. Egyptian civil police巴quippedwith light boats, lightly arm巴d,shall perform normal police 
functions within th巴territorialwat巴rsofZon巴C.
4. Nothing in this Annex shall be consid巴redas derogating企omthe right of innoc巴ntpassage of 
the naval vess巴lsof either pぽty.
5. Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones. 
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only thos巴navalactivities specifically 
permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in th巴Zon巴Sand in th巴irterritorial waters. 
Article V 
Early Warning Systems 
Egypt and Israel may establish and operate巴ar匂warningsystems only in Zones A and D respectively. 
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Article VI 
United Nations Operations 
1. Th巴Partieswill r巴questthe United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the 
implementation of this Annex and employ their b巴stefforts to prevent any violation of its 
terms. 
2. With respect to th巴seUnited Nations forces and observ巴rs,as appropriate, the Parties agree to 
requ巴stthe following arrangements: 
a. Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and obs巴rvationposts along the 
international boundary and line B, and within Zone C. 
b. Periodic verification of the implem巴ntationof the provisions of this Annex will be 
carried out not less than twice a month unl巴sotherwise agreed by the Parti巴s.
c. Additional v巴rificationswithin 48 hours after th巴receiptof a requ巴stfrom巴ither
Party. 
d. Ensuring the企eedomof navigation through th巴Straitof Tiran in accordance with 
Article V of the Treaty of P巴ace.
3. Th巴arrang巴mentsdescrib巴din this article for巴achzone will b巴implem巴ntedin ones A, B, 
and C by the United Nations Forc巴andinZon巴Dby the United Nations Obs巴rvers.
4. Unit巴dNations verification t巴amsshall b巴accompaniedby liaison officers of the respective 
Party. 
5. Th巴UnitedNations Forc巴andobserv巴rswill report their findings to both Parties. 
6. Th巴Unit巴dNations Force and Obs巴rversoperating in th巴Zoneswill enjoy fre巴domof
movement and other facilities n巴C巴ssaryfor the p巴rformanceof their tasks. 
7. The United Nations Forc巴andObserv巴rsare not巴mpow巴redto authorize th巴crossingof the 
int巴rnationalboundary. 
8. The Parti巴sshall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and Observers 
will b巴drawn.They ”il b巴drawnfrom nations other than thos巴whichare p巴rmanent
memb巴rsof th巴UnitedNations Security Council. 
9. Th巴Parti巴sagr巴巴 thatthe United Nations should make those command arrangem巴ntsthat will 
best assure the effective implementation of its r巴sponsibilities.
Article VII 
Liaison System 
1. Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system betw巴enthe Parties will b巴
establish巴d.This liaison system is intended to provide an effectiv巴methodto assess progress 
in the impl巴mentationof obligations under the present Ann巳Xand to resolve any probl巴mthat 
may arise in the cours巴ofimplementation, and refi巴roth巴runr巴solvedmatt巴rsto the higher 
military authorities of th巴twocountries respectively for consideration. It is also intended to 
pr巴ventsituations resulting 企omerrors or misint巴rpretationon the part of either Party. 
2. An Egyptian liaison office will be establish巴din the city of El-Arish and an Isra巴Iiliaison 
office will be巴stablish巴din the city of B巴巴r”Sh巴ba.Each office will be h巴ad巴dby an offic巴rof 
the resp巴ctivecountry, and assisted by a number of offic巴rs.
3. A direct t巴lephonelink betwe巴nthe two offices will be set up and also direct telephone lines 
with the Unit巴dNations command will b巴maintainedby both offices. 
Article VIII 
Respect for War Memorials 
Each Party und巴rtakesto preserv巴ingood condition the War Memorials er巴ct巴din the memory of 





The withdrawal of Israeli armed fore巴sand civilians behind the int巴rimwithdrawal line, and the 
conduct of the fore巴sof th巴Partiesand th巴UnitedNations prior to th巴finalwithdrawal, will be 
governed by the attached Appendix and Map 2. 
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Appendix to Annex I-Organization of Movements in the Sinai 
Article I 
Principles of Withdrawal 
1. Th巴withdrawalof Israeli arm巴dforces and civilians from the Sinai will be accomplish巴din 
two phas巴sas d巴scribedin Article I of Annex I. The description and timing of the withdrawal 
are includ巴din this Appendix. The Joint Commission will d巴velopand pr巴S巴ntto the Chief 
Coordinator of the Unit巴dNations forc巴sin th巴MiddleEast th巴d巴tailsof these phases not 
later than on巴monthbefore th巴initiationof巴achphase of withdrawal. 
2. Both parties agree on the following principles for the s巴quenc巴sof military mov巴ments. 
Article II 
a. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli 
armed forc巴Scomplete withdrawal from th巴currentJ and M Lines established by th巴
Egyptian-Israeli Agr巴巴m巴ntof Septemb巴I1975, h巴reinaft巴rreferred to as the 1975 
Agr巴巴ment,up to th巴interimwithdrawal line, al military arrangem巴ntsexisting 
under that Agr巴ementwill remain in effect，巴xc巴ptthose military arrangem巴nts
oth巴rwis巴providedfor in this App巴ndix.
b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations fore巴swill immediately enter the 
巴vacuatedareas to establish int巴rimand t巴mporarybuffer zon巴sas shown on Maps 2 
and 3, r巴spectively,for the purpose of maintaining a s巴parationof fore巴s.United 
Nations forces' d巴ploymentwill precede th巴movementof any other personnel into 
these ar巴as.
c. Within a period of seven days after Isra巴liarmed forces have evacuat巴dany area 
located in Zon巴A,units of Egyptian arm巴dforces shall d巴ployin accordance with 
the provisions of Article I of this Appendix. 
d. Within a p巴riodof sev巴ndays after Israeli armed forc巴shave evacuat巴dany area 
located in Zon巴sA or B, Egyptian border units shall d巴ployin accordance with the 
provisions of Article I of this Appendix, and will function in accordanc巴withthe 
provisions of Article I of Ann巴XI. 
巴. Egyptian civil polic巴willent巴r巴vacuatedar巴asimmediately aft巴rthe United Nations 
forc巴Sto perform normal police functions. 
f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Su巴Zin accordance with the 
provisions of Article I of this Appendix. 
g. Exc巴ptthos巴mov巴mentsm巴ntionedabove, deploym巴ntsof Egyptian armed forces 
and the activiti巴sCOY巴r巴dinAnn巴XI will be ofi巴redin the evacuated areas wh巴n
Israeli armed forces have complet巴dtheir withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal 
line. 
Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line 
1. Th巴withdrawalto the interim withdrawal line will b巴accomplish巴din subphases as described 
in this Articl巴andas shown on 
2. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any d巴claτationof national emergency by a party 
und巴rArticle 89 of the Chicago Convention will not b巴appliedto th巴oth巴rparty on a 
discriminatory basis. 
3. Egypt agrees that th巴useof airfi巴Idsleft by Israel n巴arEl-Arish, Rafah, Ras El-Nagb and 
SharmEl白 Sheikhshall b巴forcivilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by al 
nat10ns. 
4. As soon as possibl巴andnot later than six months after the compl巴tionof the interim 
withdrawal, the Parties shall ent巴rinto n巴gotiationsfor the purpos巴ofconcluding a civil 
aviation agreem巴nt.
5. The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways b巴twe巴ntheir countri巴sand will 
consid巴rfurther road and rail links. Th巴Parti巴sfurther agr巴巴 thata highway will b巴
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constructed and maintained .b巴tw巴enEgypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guarant巴edfr巴e
and peaceful passag巴ofp巴rsons,v巴hidesand goods between Egypt and Jordan, without 
prejudice to their sov巴r巴igntyOV巴rthat part of the highway which fals within their respective 
t巴rritory.
6. Upon completion of th巴int巴rimwithdrawal, normal postal, t巴lephon巴， t巴lex,data facsimil巴，
wireless and cable communications and t巴l巴visionrelay servic巴sby cable, radio and satellite 
shall be established betwe巴nth巴twoParties in accordance with al rel巴vantint巴rnational
conventions and regulations. 
7. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal，巴achParty shall grant normal acc巴sto its ports 
for vess巴lsand cargoes of the oth巴r,as well as V巴sselsand cargo巴sd巴stiredfor or coming 
from the other. Such ace巴swill be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to 
vess巴lsand cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of P巴ac巴willbe implemented 
upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of th巴aforem巴ntion巴dtreaty. 
Article 7・Enjoymentof Human Rights 
The Parti巴saffirm their commitment to resp巴ctand obs巴rv巴humanrights and fundamental f記巴doms 
for al, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the Unit巴dNations Chart巴r.
Article 8 -Territorial Seas 
Without pr巴:judiceto the provisions of Article 5 of th巴Treatyof P巴ac巴巴achParty r巴cognizesth巴right
of the vess巴lsof the oth巴rParty to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with th巴
rules of int巴rnationallaw. 
APPENDIX 3: THE OSLO ACCORDS 
Declaration Of Principles On Interim Self-Governemnt Arrangements, 
September 13, 1993 
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Th巴Governmentof the State of Isra巴1and th巴PLOteam (in the Jordanian-Palestinian d巴legationto the 
Middle East P巴aceConference) (the”Palestinian Delegation”）， representing the Palestinian people, 
agree that it is tim巴toput an巴ndto d巳cadesof confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual 
legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peac巴fulcoexist巴nc巴andmutual dignity and security 
and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peac巴S巴ttlementand historic r巴conciliationthrough the 
agr巴巴dpolitical proc巴s.Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles: 
Article I 
AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 
The aim of the IsraelトPalestiniannegotiations within the current Middle East p巴ac巴processis, among 
other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self『Gov巴rnmentAuthority, th巴巴lectedCouncil (the 
"Council”）， for the Palestinian people in th巴WestBank and th巴GazaStrip, for a transitional period not 
exceeding five y巴ars,leading to a p巴rmanents巴ttlementbased on Security Council resolutions 242 
(1967) and 338 (1973). It is und巴rstoodthat the int巴rimarrang巴m巴ntsar巴anint巴gralpart of the whol巴
p巴ac巴proc巴sand that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implem巴ntationof 
Security Council r巴solutions242 (1967) and 338 (1973). 
Article I 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD 
Th巴agreedfram巴workfor the int巴rimp巴riodis set forth in this D巴clarationof Principles. 
Article III 
ELECTIONS 
1. In order that the Palestinian p巴oplein th巴WestBank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves 
according to democratic principl巴s,direct, fr巴巴 andg巴neralpolitical巴lectionswill be held for the 
Council und巴ragreed sup巴rvisionand international observation, while th巴Palestinianpolice will 
ensure public order. 
2. An agre巴mentwill b巴conclud巴don th巴巴xactmode and conditions of th巴electionsin accordance 
with the protocol attached as Annex I, with th巴goalof holding the el巴ctionsnot lat巴rthan nin巴months
after the entry into forc巴ofthis Declaration of Principles. 
3. These el巴ctionswill constitut巴asignificant interim preparatory step toward the r巴alizationof th巴
l巴gitimaterights of the Palestinian p巴opleand their just requirements. 
Article IV 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip t巴町itory,except for issues that will b巴
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view th巴WestBank and th巴GazaStrip 
as a single territorial unit, whose int巴gritywill be pres巴rvedduring the interim pほiod.
Article V 
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS 
1. The five-year transitional p巴riodwill b巴ginupon the withdrawal from th巴GazaStrip and Jericho 
area. 
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2. Permanent status negotiations will commenc巴assoon as possible, but not lat巴rthan the b巴ginningof 
the third y巴arof the int＇巴rimperiod, b巴tweenth巴Governmentof Israel and the Palestinian p巴ople’s 
re pr巴S巴ntatives.
3. It is und巴rstoodthat these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, 
s巴ttlem巴nts,security a訂angements,bord巴rs,relations and coop巴rationwith other n巴ighbours,and other 
issues of common inter巴st.
4. The two parti巴sagree that the outcome of th巴p巴rmanentstatus n巴gotiationsshould not b巴prejudiced
or preempted by agreements reached for the int巴rimperiod. 
Article VI 
PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
1. Upon the巴ntryinto force of this D巴clarationof Principl巴sand th巴withdrawalfrom th巴GazaStrip 
and the I巴richoarea, a transf，巴rof authority from the Israeli military gov巴rnmentand its Civil 
Administration to the authorized Pal巴stiniansfor this task, as d巴tailedherein, will commence. This 
transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until th巴inaugurationof the Council. 
2. Immediat巴lyaft巴rthe entry into forc巴ofthis Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the 
Gaza Str中 andJericho ar巴a,with the view to promoting巴conomicdevelopment in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, authority will b巴transferredto the Pal巴stiniansin the following spheres：巴ducationand 
culture, h巴alth,social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. Th巴Palestiniansid巴willcommenc巴in
building th巴Pal巴stinianpolice force, as agr巴巴dupon.P巴ndingthe inauguration of th巴Council,the two 
parties may negotiat巴thetransf，巴rof additional pow巴rsand r巴sponsibilities,as agr巴edupon. 
Article VII 
INTERIM AGREEMENT 
1. Th巴Israeliand Palestinian d巴legationswill negotiate an agreem巴nton the int巴rimperiod (th巴
”Interim Agr巴ement").
2. The Interim Agre巴mentshall sp巴cify,among other things, th巴structureof the Council, the number of 
its m巴mbers,and th巴transferof pow巴rsand responsibiliti巴sfrom the Israeli military government and 
its Civil Adminis住ationto th巴Council.Th巴Int巴rimAgreem巴ntshall also specify the Council’s 
executiv巴authority,I巴gislativeauthority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent 
Palestinian judicial organs. 
3. The Interim Agr巴巴mentshall includ巴a町angements,to be impl巴mentedupon the inauguration of th巴
Council, for the assumption by th巴Councilof al of the powers and responsibilities transferred 
previously in accordance with Article VI abov巴．
4. In order to enable th巴Councilto promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will 
巴stablish,among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza S巴aPort Authority, a 
Palestinian D巴velopmentBank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental 
Authority, a Pal巴stinianLand Authority and a Pal巴stinian羽TaterAdministration Authority and any 
oth巴rAuthoriti巴sagre巴dupon, in accordance with the Int巴rimAgreem巴nt,that will specify their 
powers and responsibilities. 
5. After the inauguration of th巴Council,th巴CivilAdministration will be dissolved, and the Israeli 
military government will be withdrawn. 
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Article VIII 
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY 
In ord巴rto guarant巴巴 publicord巴rand int巴rnalsecurity for the Palestinians of the羽f巴stBank and the 
Gaza Strip, the Council will巴stablisha strong police fore巴， whileIsrael will continue to carry the 
responsibility for defending against巴xternalthreats, as w巴1as th巴responsibilityfor overall security of 
Isra巴!isfor the purpose of safeguarding th巴irinternal security and public order. 
Article IX 
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS 
1. The Council will b巴巴mpoweredto legislat巴， inaccordance with the Int巴rimAgreement, within al 
authorities transf1巴rredto it. 
2. Both parties will revi巴Wjointly laws and military orders presently in forc巴inr巴mainingsph巴res.
Article X 
JOil可TISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE 
In ord巴rto provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principl巴sand any subsequ巴nt
agre巴ments p巴rtainingto th巴interimp巴riod,upon th巴巴ntryinto force of this Declaration of Principles, 
a Joint Isra巴Ii-PalestinianLiaison Committee will b巴巴stablishedin order to d巴alwith issu巴srequiring 
coordination, other issu回 ofcommon interest and disput巴s.
Article XI 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS 
Recognizing the mutual ben巴fitof cooperation in promoting the dev巴lopmentof th巴WestBank, the 
Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the en仕yinto forc巴ofthis D巴clarationof Principles, an Israeli”Palestinian 
Economic Cooperation Committ巴巴 willb巴巴stablishedin ord巴rto develop and implement in a 
coop巴rativ巴mannerthe programm巴sidentified in th巴protocolsattached as Annex II and Annex IV. 
Article XII 
LIAISON AND COOPERATION羽TITHJORDAN AND EGYPT 
Th巴twoparties will invit巴theGovernments of Jordan and Egypt to participat巴inestablishing further 
liaison and coop巴rationarrang巴mentsbetwe巴nthe Governm巴ntof Israel and the Pal巴stinian
representatives, on the one hand, and the Governm巴ntsof Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to 
promot巴cooperationbetween them. Thes巴arrangem巴ntswill include the constitution of a Continuing 
Committ閃 thatwill d巴cid巴byagr巴巴m巴nton th巴modalitiesof admission of persons displaced from th巴
W巴stBank and Gaza Strip in 1967, tog巴therwith nec巴ssarymeasures to prevent disruption and 
disord巴r.0th巴rmatters of common conc巴rnwill b巴d巴altwith by this Committee. 
Article XIII 
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES 
1. Aft巴rth巴巴n仕yinto force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than th巴巴veof el巴ctionsfor 
the Council, a red巴ploym巴ntofisra巴limilitary forc回 inth巴前TestBank and the Gaza Strip will take 
place, in addition to withdrawal of Isra巴liforc巴Scarried out in accordance with Article XIV. 
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should 
be red巴ploy巴doutsid巴populatedareas. 
3. Furth巴rredeployments to sp巴cifiedlocations will be gradually impl巴ment巴dcommensurate with the 
assumption of responsibility for public ord巴rand int巴rnals巴curityby th巴Palestinianpolic巴force
pursuant to Article VIII above. 
Article XIV 
ISRAELI WITHDRAW AL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA 
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Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in th巴protocolattached as Ann巴X
IL 
Article XV 
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 
1. Disputes arising out of the application or int巴rpretationof this Declaration of Principles, or any 
subs巴qu巴ntagr巴巴mentsp巴rtainingto the int巴rimp巴riod,shall b巴resolvedby negotiations through the 
Joint Liaison Committ田 tob巴巴stablishedpursuant to Article X abov巴．
2. Disput巴swhich cannot be setl巴dby negotiations may be r巴solvedby a m巴chanismof conciliation to 
b巴agreedupon by th巴parti巴s.
3. The parties may agr巴巴 tosubmit to arbitration disputes relating to th巴interimperiod, which cannot 
be settled through conciliation. To this巴nd,uponth巴agre巴mentof both parties, the parties will 
establish an Arbitration Committe巴．
Article XVI 
ISRAELI剛PALESTTI河IANCOOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMMES 
Both parti巴sview the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a 
”Marshall Plan”， the regional programmes and other programmes, including sp巴cialprogramm巴sfor 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attach巴das Annex IV. 
Article XVII 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
1. This Declaration of Principl巴swill ent巴rinto forc巴onemonth aft巴rits signing. 
2. All protocols ann巴X巴dto this D巴clarationof Principles and Agr巴巴dMinutes pertaining th巴r巴toshall 
be regarded as an int巴gralpart hereof. 
DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of Sept巴mber1993. 
For the Government of Israel: For th巴PLO:
(Sign巴d)Shimon PERES (Sign巴d)Mahmud ABBAS 
Witn巴ssedby: 
The United States of America The Russian F巴d巴ration
(Signed) Warren CHRISTOPHER (Sign巴d)Andrei V. KOZYREV 
ANNEX I 
Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections 
1. Palestinians of Jerusal巴mwho live ther巴willhave th巴rightto participat巴inthe el巴ctionproc巴SS,
according to an agr巴巴mentbetw巴巴nthe two sides. 
2. In addition, the巴lectionagr巴巴m巴ntshould cover, among other things, th巴followingissues: 
(a) The syst巴mof el巴ctions;
148 
(b) The mode of th巴agr巴巴dsup巴rvisionand international observation and th巴irp巴rsonalcomposition; 
( c)Rules and regulations regarding el巴ctioncampaigns, including agreed arrangem巴ntsfor th巴
organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and t巴i巴visionstation. 
3. The future status of displac巴dPalestinians who were register巴don 4 Jun巴1967will not be 
prejudic巴dbecause th巴yare unabl巴toparticipat巴inth巴巴lectionproc巴sowing to practical reasons. 
ANNEX II 
Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces 
from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 
1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from th巴dateof巴ntryinto forc巴ofthis 
Declaration of Pr噌inciplesan agr巴em巴nton th巴withdrawalof Isra巴Iimilitary forces f旨omth巴GazaStr‘i 
and Jericho area. This agr巴巴m巴ntwill include comprehensiv巴arrangementsto apply in the Gaza Strip 
and the Jericho area subsequ巴ntto the Israeli withdrawal. 
2. Israel will implement an accel巴ratedand sch巴du！巴dwithdrawal oflsra巴Iimilitary forces from th巴
Gaza Strip and J巴richoar巴a,beginning immediately with the signing of the agreem巴nton the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho ar巴aand to be completed within a p巴riodnot exc巴巴dingfour months aft巴rthe signing 
of this agre巴ment.
3. The abov巴agr巴ementwill include, among other things: 
(a) Arrangements for a smooth and p巴aceful位ansfi巴rof authority from th巴Israelimilitary gov巴rnment
and its Civil Administration to the Pal巴stinianrepresentatives; 
(b) Structure, powers and r巴sponsibilitiesof th巴Palestinianauthority in th巴seareas, exc巴pt:external 
S巴curity,settlements, Isra巴lis,foreign relations and oth巴rmutually agre巴dmatters; 
( c)Arrangements for th巴assumptionof internal security and public ord巴rby the Palestinian polic巴
force consisting of police officers recruited locally and企omabroad (holding Jordanian passports and 
Palestinian documents issu巴dby Egypt). Those who will participat巴inthe Palestinian police forc巴
coming from abroad should be trained as polic巴andpolic巴offic巴rs;
( d)A temporary int巴rnationalor foreign pres巴nce,as agre巴dupon; 
（巴） Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Ism巴IiCoordination and Cooperation Committe巴formutual 
S巴curitypurposes; 
(f) An economic developm巴ntand stabilization programme including the establishm巴ntof an 
Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment and financial and巴conomicsupport. Both sides will 
coordinate and coop巴ratejointly and unilat巴rallywith regional and international parties to support these 
mms; 
(g) Arrangements for a safe passag巴forp巴rsonsand transportation betw巴巴nthe Gaza Strip and Jericho 
area. 




(b) Jericho -Jordan. 
5. The offic巴sr巴sponsiblefor carrying out th巴powersand responsibiliti巴sof the Palestinian authority 
und巴rthis Annex I and Article VI of th巳Declarationof Principles will b巴locat巴din the Gaza Strip and 
in th巴J巴richoar巴apending th巴inaugurationof th巴Council.
6. Other than these agreed arrangem巴nts,the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to 
be an integral part of th巴w巴stBank and Gaza Strip, and will not be chang巴din the int巴rimperiod. 
ANNEX III 
Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation 
in Economic and Development Programmes 
Th巴twosid巴sagree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committ巴巴 forEconomic 
Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following: 
1. Coop巴rationin the field of water, including a Water Development Programme prepared by experts 
from both sides, which will also sp巴cifyth巴modeof cooperation in th巴managem巴ntof wat巴rresources 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will includ巴proposalsfor studi巴sand plans on water rights of 
each party, as w巴1as on the equitable utilization of joint water resourc巴sfor implem巴ntationin and 
beyond the interim period. 
2. Cooperation in the field of巴lectricity,including an El巴ctricityD巴velopmentProgramme, which will 
also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maint巴nance,purchase and sale of el巴ctricity
r巴sources.
3. Cooperation in the field of en巴rgy,including an Energy Developm巴ntProgramme, which will 
provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in 
th巴Negev,and will encourag巴furth巴rjoint exploitation of oth巴r巴n巴rgyr巴sourc巴s.This Programme 
may also provid巴forth巴constructionof a p巴trochemicalindustrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the 
construction of oil and gas pipelin巴s.
4. Coop巴rationin the field of finance, including a Financial D巴V巴lopmentand Action Programme for 
the巴ncouragementof international investm巴ntin th巴w巴stBank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as 
w巴1as the establishment of a Palestinian Developm巴ntBank. 
5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Programme, which will define 
guidelin巴sfor the establishm巴ntof a Gaza S巴aPort Area, and will provid巴forthe establishing of 
transport and communications lin巴Sto and from the W巴stBank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and tooth巴r
countri巴s.In addition, this Programm巴willprovid巴forcarrying out the nec巴ssaryconstruction of 
roads, railways, communications lines，巴tc.
6. Cooperation in th巴fieldof trad巴， includingstudi巴s,and Trade Promotion Programmes, which will 
encourage local, regional and int巴rregionaltrade, as W巴1as a feasibility study of cr巴atingfree trade 
zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to th巴sezones and coop巴rationin other ar巴as
1・巴latedto trade and commerce. 
7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programmes, which will 
provide for the establishm巴ntof joint Israeli-Pal回 tinianIndustrial R巴searchand Dev巴lopmentCentr巴s,
will promot巴Palestinian-Isra巴Iijoint V巴ntures,and provid巴guidelin巴sfor cooperation in th巴t巴xtile,
food, pharmac巴utical,electronics, diamonds, computer and scienc巴司bas巴dindustries. 
8. A Programme for cooperation in, and regulation of, labour relations and coop巴rationin social 
welfare issu巴s.
9. A Human Resource Development and Coop巴rationPlan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian 
workshops and s巴minars,and for the establishment of joint vocational training centres, research 
institutes and data banks. 
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10. An Environmental Prot巴ctionPlan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere. 
11. A Pro gramme for d巴velopingcoordination and coop巴rationin th巴fieldof communications and 
media. 
12. Any oth巴rprogramm巴Sof mutual inおおst.
ANNEX IV 
Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation 
concerning Regional Development Programmes 
1. The two sid巴swill cooperate in th巴cont巴xtof th巴multilat巴ralpeace efforts in promoting a 
D巴velopm巴ntProgramm巴forthe r巴gion,including the羽「巴stBank and th巴GazaStrip, to be initiated by 
the Group of Seven. The parties will requ巴stth巴Groupof S巴vento seek the participation in this 
Programme of other int巴rest巴dStat巴s,such as memb巴rsof th巴Organisationfor Economic Cooperation 
and D巴V巴lopment,regional Arab States and institutions, as well as members of th巴privatesector. 
2. The D巴V巴lopm巴ntProgramm巴willconsist of two el巴ments: 
(a) An Economic Development Programm巴forth巴WestBank and the Gaza Strip; 
(b) A Regional Economic Dev巴lopm巴ntProgramme. 
A. Th巴EconomicDevelopm巴ntProgramme for the West Bank and th巴GazaStrip will consist of th巴
following elements: 
(1) A Social Rehabilitation Programme, including a Housing and Construction Programme; 
(2) A Small and Medium Business Dev巴lopm巴ntPlan; 
(3) An Infrastructure Development Programm巴（water,el巴ctricity,transportation and communications, 
巴tc.);
(4) A Human Resourc巴sPlan; 
(5) Other programmes. 
B. The Regional Economic Dev巴lopmentProgramm巴mayconsist of the following el巴ments:
(1) The巴stablishmentof a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East 
Dev巴lopm巴ntBank, as a second step; 
(2) Th巴d巴V巴lopm巴ntof a joint Israeli”Pal巴stinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the 
Dead Sea area; 
(3) Th巴M巴diterraneanSea (Gaza) -D巴adSea Canal; 
(4) Regional desalinization and other water development projects; 
(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinat巴dregional effort for the 
prevention of desertification; 
(6) Interconn巴ctionof electricity grids; 
(7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial巴xploitationof gas, oil and other 
energy r巴sourc巴s;
(8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan; 
(9) Regional cooperation in other sph紅白．
3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups and will coorせinatetowards th巴ir
success. Th巴twoparties will encourage int巴r-s巴ssionalactivities, as well as pre-feasibility and 
feasibility studies, within th巴variousmultilat巴ralworking groups. 
Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS 
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Any pow巴rsand responsibiliti回 transferredto the Palestinians pursuant to the D巴clarationof Principles 
prior to th巴inaugurationof the Council will b巴subj巴ctto the sam巴principlesp巴rtainingto Article IV, 
as s巴tout in thes巴AgreedMinut巴sb巴low.
B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS 
Article IV 
It is understood that: 
1. I urisdiction of the Council will cover W巴stBank and Gaza Strip t巴rritory,except for issu巴sthat will 
b巴n巴gotiatedin th巴perman巴ntstatus negotiations: Jerusal巴m,settlem巴nts,military locations and 
Isra巴!is.
2. The Council’s jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agre巴dpowers, responsibiliti巴s,spheres and 
authorities transf1巴rredto it. 
Article VI (2) 
It is agreed that th巴transf，巴rof authority will b巴asfollows: 
1. The Palestinian sid巴willinform the Isra巴Iiside of th巴namesof th巴authorizedPalestinians who will 
assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities白atwill be transfi巴:redto the Palestinians according 
to th巴D巴clarationof Principl回 inthe following fields: education and cultur巴， h巴alth,social welfare, 
dir巴cttaxation, tourism and any other authoriti巴sagreed upon. 
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offic巴swill not b巴affect巴d.
3. Each of the sph巴resd巴scrib巴dabove will continu巴toenjoy巴xistingbudgetary allocations in 
accordance with arrangements to b巴mutuallyagreed upon. Th巴searrangem巴ntsalso will provide for 
the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the dir巴ct
taxation office. 
4. Upon the ex巴cuti on of the D巴clarationof Principles, th巴Israeliand Palestinian del巴gationswill 
imm巴diatelycommence negotiations on a detail巴dplan for the transfer of authority on the above offic巴S
in accordance with the abov巴und巴rstandings.
Article VII (2) 
The Interim Agr巴ementwill also includ巴arrangementsfor coordination and cooperation. 
Article VII (5) 
The withdrawal of the military governm巴ntwill not prevent Isra巴lfrom ex巴rcisingthe powers and 
responsibilities not transf，巴r巴dto the Council. 
Article VIII 
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It is understood that the Interim Agr切 m巴ntwill includ巴arrangem巴ntsfor cooperation and coordination 
betw巴enthe two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that th巴transf1巴rof powers and responsibilities 
to th巴Palestinianpolice will b巴accomplish巴din a phas巴dmann巴r,as agr巴巴din the Int巴rimAgre巴ment.
ArticleX 
It is agr巴巴dthat, upon th巴巴ntryinto forc巴ofthe D巴clarationof Principles, the Isra巴liand Palestinian 
delegations will exchang巴thenam巴sof the individuals designat巴dby th巴mas m巴mb巴rsof the Joint 
Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committ田.It is further agreed that each side will have an equal numb巴rof 
members in the Joint Committ田.The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agr巴巴ment.The Joint 
Committee may add oth巴rt巴chniciansand巴xperts,as n巴cessary.The Joint Committee will decide on 
the fr巴quencyand place or plac巴sof its me巴tings.
ANNEX II 
It is understood that, subs巴quentto the Isra巴liwithdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for 
ext巴rnalS巴curity,and for internal S巴curityand public order of settlem巴ntsand Isra巴lis.Israeli military 
forc巴sand civilians may continu巴touse roads fre巴lywithin the Gaza Strip and th巴J巴richoarea. 
DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirt巴巴nthday of S巴ptemb巴r1993. 
For the Government of Is阻止
(Signed) Shimon PERES 
The Unit巴dStates of Am巴.rica





(Sign巴d)Andrei V. KOZYREV 
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